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Introduction générale
Cette thèse de doctorat comporte trois chapitres regroupés en deux parties dis-
tinctes. La première partie, composée d’un chapitre, teste les modèles théoriques
de décision en situation de risque sur des données réelles pour identifier la théorie
qui permet la meilleure description des choix des individus. Le seconde partie, com-
posée de deux chapitres, examine deux questions de recherche liées à l’efficacité
économique. Le premier chapitre consiste en une étude rétrospective d’une fusion
ayant eu lieu en France dans le secteur des transports urbains. Elle se concentre
sur l’effet de cette fusion sur les coûts des opérateurs. Le second chapitre examine
l’impact d’une hausse de la discrétion (au sens de pouvoir discrétionnaire du dé-
cideur) dans les procédures de sélection des entreprises dans les appels d’offres sur
la productivité des opérateurs sélectionnés. Toutes les questions abordées dans cette
thèse sont traitées avec une perspective empirique permise par la construction de
bases de données uniques. Dans cette introduction, nous présentons la motivation
du travail effectué et les principales contributions de cette thèse.
Partie 1. Modèles de choix dans l’incertain
Les individus prennent constamment des décisions en situation de risque. Un exem-
ple est le choix entre les options de traitement médical proposées par les médecins.
Est-ce que je préfère choisir l’option 1, qui me permet de guérir complètement mais
qui fonctionne seulement dans la moitié des cas, l’option 2, qui permet une guéri-
son partielle mais fonctionne systématiquement ou l’option 3, qui consiste à ne pas
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faire de traitement et espérer la guérison complète observée dans un cas sur cent
? Chaque option comporte une ou plusieurs conséquences possibles auxquelles sont
associées des probabilités. Les individus choisissent entre les options en fonction de
leurs préférences, notamment leur attitude face au risque. En économie, l’étude des
choix en situation de risque pose deux questions : comment les individus doivent-ils
se comporter face à des choix risqués ? Et comment les individus se comportent-ils
? La première question est normative, la seconde descriptive. Ce travail de doctorat
s’intéresse uniquement à la dimension descriptive des comportements des individus.
Le modèle classique de la décision en situation de risque est le modèle d’espérance
d’utilité de Neumann and Morgenstern [1947]. D’autres modèles théoriques comme
le modèle d’utilité dépendante du rang (Quiggin [1982]) ou la théorie des perspectives
cumulées (Kahneman and Tversky [1979], Tversky and Kahneman [1992]) ont émergé
suite à la constatation que, dans les expériences en laboratoire, les individus font
des choix systématiquement incompatibles avec la théorie de l’utilité espérée (Allais
[1953], Kahneman and Tversky [1979]).
La théorie des perspectives cumulées est actuellement le modèle préféré de la littéra-
ture expérimentale car des preuves que les décideurs pondèrent les probabilités de
façon non linéaire comme dans la théorie des perspectives cumulées ont été fournies
par de nombreuses expériences (voir Camerer and Ho [1994], Tversky and Kahne-
man [1992], Wu and Gonzalez [1996], Gonzalez and Wu [1999] et Abdellaoui [2000]).
La théorie s’est également avérée capable de rationaliser les comportements observés
dans les laboratoires qui ne pouvaient pas être expliqués par l’utilité espérée comme
l’assurance probabiliste (voir Wakker et al. [1997]). Certaines personnes se sont
cependant demandé si les résultats de la littérature expérimentale se généralisaient
aux données du monde réel (voir List [2003], Levitt and List [2008]). Ils pensent
que les biais sont moins probables en présence de grands enjeux, d’expérience et de
concurrence.
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Les études existantes reposant sur des données du monde réel utilisent générale-
ment des données d’assurance, de finance et de paris ou de jeux. Cicchetti and
Dubin [1994] présentent des preuves que la décision de souscrire à une assurance
contre le risque de dysfonctionnement de la ligne téléphonique au domicile est com-
patible avec la théorie de l’utilité espérée. Barseghyan et al. [2013] montrent que la
pondération non linéaire des probabilités joue un rôle central dans le comportement
des ménages dans le choix de l’assurance auto et habitation. Kliger and Levy [2009]
constatent également que la théorie des perspectives cumulées est mieux ajustée à
leurs données que l’utilité espérée et l’utilité dépendante du rang en utilisant des
données sur les options d’achat de l’indice S&P500. À l’aide de données provenant
de jeux télévisés, Post et al. [2008] montrent que les préférences dépendent du point
de référence de sorte qu’elles présentent des caractéristiques du modèle de la théorie
des perspectives cumulées. List [2003] et List [2004] fournissent la preuve que bien
que les consommateurs inexpérimentés se comportent comme dans la théorie des per-
spectives cumulées, l’expérience du marché amène le comportement des traders ex-
périmentés proche des prédictions néoclassiques. Au contraire, Pope and Schweitzer
[2011] montrent que les golfeurs professionnels très expérimentés, confrontés à des
gains élevés et à une concurrence intense, présentent une aversion à la perte, comme
le prédit la théorie des perspectives cumulées.
Contributions du premier chapitre
Notre travail apporte une contribution à cette littérature dont les conclusions restent
ambiguës. L’objectif de ce chapitre est de discriminer entre la théorie standard du
choix individuel en économie (théorie de l’utilité espérée de Neumann and Morgen-
stern [1947]) et les théories comportementales, qui sont plus générales que l’utilité
espérée et sont capables d’expliquer des comportements en ajoutant notamment que
les décideurs transforment les probabilités lors de l’évaluation de la valeur des per-
spectives risquées. Ce travail vise à déterminer si le gain apporté par les modèles
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comportementaux ne se produit pas au prix de trop de complexité.
Les paris sur les courses de chevaux sont un bon candidat pour étudier les décisions
prises en situation de risque dans une situation réelle. En effet, parier sur un cheval
implique de faire un choix entre des alternatives clairement identifiées, chaque al-
ternative étant associée à un résultat monétaire. L’alternative qui se produit est
observée publiquement après une courte période de temps. Les choix sont effectués
de manière répétée par un grand nombre de participants et une information abon-
dante et complète est disponible sur les probabilités associées aux différents résultats
possibles.
Notre analyse s’appuie sur un jeu de données unique sur les paris hippiques de
l’opérateur de paris français de 2013 à 2015. Les principales contributions de l’article
sont les suivantes.
Premièrement, l’une des découvertes les plus solides de la littérature utilisant les
données sur les paris hippiques est que les cotes associées aux chevaux reflètent très
bien leurs valeurs intrinsèques, sauf que les favoris (chevaux ayant de fortes chances
de gagner) ont tendance à être sous-estimés tandis que les outsiders (chevaux ayant
une probabilité de gagner relativement faible) sont surestimés (Sauer [1998]). En
conséquence, les rendements espérés sur les outsiders sont plus faibles que sur les
favoris. J’étudie dans un premier temps l’existence de ce biais, appelé biais favori-
outsider, en France, ce qui n’a pas encore été fait.
Deuxièmement, je teste les résultats de Jullien and Salanié [2000] dans un contexte
et à une période différents. Jullien and Salanié [2000] montrent, en se concentrant
sur les paris simples au Royaume-Uni où le système de bookmakers prédomine,
que la théorie des perspectives cumulées décrit mieux le comportement d’un agent
représentatif que les théories de l’utilité espérée et de l’utilité dépendante du rang.
Contrairement à la fonction de pondération des probabilités habituelle en S inversé,
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ils trouvent peu de preuves de l’existence d’un effet de certitude et d’un changement
de concavité des fonctions de pondération de probabilité qu’ils estiment. Ils étab-
lissent également que l’utilité dépendante du rang n’apporte pas d’amélioration par
rapport à l’utilité espérée.
Troisièmement, je surmonte l’une des limites de l’article de Jullien and Salanié [2000]
liée au fait qu’ils n’ont pas pu mettre en œuvre les tests statistiques appropriés pour
comparer les modèles. Cette nouveauté est une amélioration majeure puisque la
comparaison des modèles est l’objectif principal du chapitre.
Quatrièmement, j’assouplis certaines des hypothèses du modèle de Jullien and Salanié
[2000] car le système français est un système de pari mutuel et non un système re-
posant sur des bookmakers. Enfin, je vérifie également la robustesse des résultats à
certaines des hypothèses du modèle en utilisant les caractéristiques des courses.
Je montre d’abord que le biais favori-outsider est présent en France. Je trouve, en
outre, que les théories comportementales de la décision en situation de risque, c’est-à-
dire la théorie des perspectives cumulées et la théorie de l’utilité dépendante du rang,
sont mieux adaptées pour expliquer le comportement des parieurs observé dans les
données que l’utilité espérée. Ce résultat fournit la preuve que les parieurs pondèrent
les probabilités de façon non linéaire lorsqu’ils font des choix. En utilisant la théorie
des perspectives cumulées, je trouve une pondération significative des probabilités
dans le domaine des pertes et une pondération linéaire des probabilités dans le
domaine des gains, ce qui est cohérent avec le résultat de Jullien and Salanié [2000]
mais contredit les résultats des expériences qui trouvent une pondération similaire
des probabilités dans les domaines des gains et pertes (Tversky and Kahneman
[1992], Abdellaoui [2000]).
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Partie 2. Efficacité économique
La seconde partie de ce travail s’intéresse à deux questions spécifiques liées à l’efficacité
économique. Nous estimons d’abord l’effet d’une concentration entre deux grandes
entreprises du secteur des transports urbains sur leurs coûts. Nous étudions en-
suite l’impact de la discrétion dans les procédures d’appels d’offres sur la sélection
des opérateurs, en particulier leur productivité. Le premier chapitre de cette par-
tie s’inscrit dans la littérature dédiée aux analyses rétrospectives des opérations de
concentration. Le second chapitre de cette partie s’inscrit quant à lui dans la littéra-
ture sur les procédures de sélection des opérateurs dans les appels d’offres et leurs
conséquences.
Analyses rétrospectives des opérations de concentration
Figure 1: Fusions annoncées dans le monde entre 1985 et 2016 (source : Nasdaq.com)
Le graphique 3 montre qu’au cours des trois dernières décennies, le nombre d’opérations
de concentration dans le monde a été multiplié par trois. Dans le même temps, le
contrôle des concentrations par les autorités de concurrence s’est développé. En
France, il a commencé à être mis en place à partir de la fin des années 90, avec
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notamment l’obligation de notifier les opérations de concentration au-dessus d’un
certain chiffre d’affaires en 2002, puis l’adoption de lignes directrices relatives au
contrôle des concentrations en 2005.
Les autorités de concurrence s’intéressent aux opérations de concentration situées
au-dessus d’un certain seuil de chiffre d’affaires. Elles cherchent à déterminer si ces
opérations risquent de porter atteinte au surplus du consommateur. La pratique
des autorités de concurrence consiste généralement à examiner si une opération de
concentration emporte des effets anticoncurrentiels en se concentrant sur une po-
tentielle augmentation des prix (et plus rarement sur une potentielle réduction de
l’innovation ou de la qualité et de la diversité de l’offre). Les autorités de concur-
rence étudient également si les opérations sont justifiées par des gains d’efficacité
compensant les atteintes à la concurrence éventuellement constatées. Elles décident
ensuite de la suite à donner à l’opération en choisissant de l’autoriser, de l’interdire
ou de l’autoriser sous certaines conditions.
Le contrôle des concentrations par les autorités de concurrence s’est accompagnée
de la naissance d’une littérature économique évaluant rétrospectivement les fusions
les plus controversées, c’est-à-dire les fusions qui ont fait l’objet d’analyses appro-
fondies par les autorités de concurrence. Les études ex post sont utiles pour aider
les autorités de concurrence à améliorer leurs futures décisions (voir la discussion de
Duso and Ormosi [2015]). En évaluant si les décisions des autorités de concurrence
(intervention ou absence d’intervention) ont atteint leurs objectifs et en cherchant à
comprendre pourquoi si ce n’est pas le cas, les études ex post contribuent à rendre
le contrôle des concentration plus efficace. Les résultats des études rétrospectives
peuvent par exemple être comparés aux résultats des méthodes quantitatives et des
théories mobilisées par les autorités de concurrence lors des analyses ex ante. Ces
comparaisons ont l’intérêt d’aider les autorités de concurrence à tester la validité et
la précision de leurs méthodes et de vérifier si les instruments utilisés ex ante pour
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prédire les effets potentiels des fusions sont appropriés, précis et efficaces. Elles
peuvent mettre en évidence que certains tests économiques ne sont pas appropriés
pour délimiter le marché dans certains secteurs, que les hypothèses retenues pour
modéliser certains aspects d’un marché n’étaient pas adaptées, ou encore établir
la précision des prédictions des simulations ex ante des concentrations. Les études
rétrospectives contribuent également au débat sur la question de savoir si la poli-
tique de la concurrence est trop indulgente ou trop stricte (Baker and Shapiro [2008]
vs. Crandall and Clifford [2003]). Enfin l’existence d’études rétrospectives pourrait
améliorer la transparence des décisions et la responsabilité des autorités de concur-
rence et permettre aux autorités de communiquer sur le travail qu’elles effectuent
afin notamment de justifier leur action.
Comme les analyses ex ante des autorités de concurrence, les articles de recherche
se concentrent principalement sur l’impact des fusions sur les prix. La méthodologie
empirique la plus utilisée est la méthode des doubles différences, qui consiste à
comparer les évolutions de prix entre un groupe affecté par la concentration et un
groupe non affecté par la concentration, avec l’hypothèse qu’en l’absence de fusion
les prix dans les deux groupes auraient suivis des tendances parallèles. Parmi les
études ex post les plus récentes, on peut citer les études suivantes.
Aguzzoni et al. [2014] estiment l’effet d’une fusion entre deux des plus importantes
chaines de magasins de jeux-vidéo au Royaume-Uni. En utilisant la méthode des
doubles différences, ils comparent l’évolution des prix des parties à la fusion avec
celle des sept plus importants concurrents, en distinguant différents types de jeux.
Ils trouvent que la fusion a conduit à une réduction des prix à la fois des nouveaux et
des anciens jeux et que le déclin est plus marqué pour les parties à la fusion que pour
les concurrents, ce qui suggère l’existence de gains d’efficacité, qui proviennent de la
capacité d’obtenir de meilleures conditions auprès des éditeurs et des fournisseurs.
Aguzzoni et al. [2016] estiment l’effet d’une fusion entre deux des plus importantes
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chaines de magasins de livres au Royaume-Uni en comparant les marchés locaux
de vente de livres. Ils comparent le changement de prix après la fusion entre les
magasins localisés dans les marchés locaux où les deux chaines étaient présentes
avant la fusion et dans les marchés locaux où seulement une chaine était présente
avant la fusion en utilisant la méthode des doubles différences. Ils trouvent que la
fusion n’a pas entrainé de hausse de prix, ni au niveau local ni au niveau national.
Allain et al. [2017] analysent l’impact d’une fusion entre chaines de supermarchés
sur les prix de la nourriture. La méthode utilisée compare les changements de prix
des parties à la fusion et des concurrents sur les marchés affectés, définis comme
les marchés locaux où les deux concurrents sont présents ou alternativement les
marchés locaux avec au moins une des parties, et des marchés de comparaison.
Ils trouvent une hausse de prix significative à la suite de la fusion à la fois pour
les parties et les concurrents. Ashenfelter et al. [2013] estiment les effets sur les
prix d’une fusion entre deux fabricants de produits ménagers aux États-Unis. La
stratégie empirique repose sur la méthode des doubles différences et compare les prix
de plusieurs produits ménagers sur les marchés locaux qui ont connu un changement
de concentration et ceux qui n’ont pas été affectés par la fusion. Ils trouvent des
hausses de prix pour certains produits.
Les travaux antérieurs utilisent une méthodologie similaire. On peut citer Focarelli
and Panetta [2003] and Sapienza [2002] dans la banque de détail, Hastings [2004],
Gilbert and Hastings [2005] et Taylor and Hosken [2007] dans la vente de carbu-
rant, Borenstein [1990], Kim and Singal [1993], Borenstein [1990] dans le marché du
transport aérien ou encore Vita and Sacher [2001] dans les hôpitaux. Un nombre
limité d’articles combinent la simulation ex ante des fusions et l’évaluation ex post
des effets des fusions par la méthode des doubles différences pour étudier la validité
des prédiction des modèles de simulation (voir par exemple Peters [2006], Weinberg
[2011], Weinberg and Hosken [2013], Friberg and Romahn [2015] et Björnerstedt and
Verboven [2016]).
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Peu d’études s’intéressent spécifiquement aux gains d’efficacité. Comme expliqué
par Duso and Ormosi [2015], «[l]’un des éléments les plus spéculatifs du contrôle des
concentrations est constitué par les prétentions de gains d’efficacité des parties à la
fusion. Pourtant, très peu d’études ont été menées pour déterminer si les économies
de coûts escomptées avaient eu lieu après la fusion ». Les gains d’efficacité sont
pourtant un argument central des parties et de leurs conseils devant les autorités
de concurrence. Ils peuvent prendre de nombreuses formes, telles qu’une réduction
des coûts de transport et de distribution, des économies d’échelle et de gamme, une
amélioration de la qualité du management ou de l’utilisation de l’expertise (voir
OECD [2016]).
Dans un des premiers articles qui a cherché à estimer les gains d’efficacité d’une
concentration, Focarelli and Panetta [2003] mettent en évidence indirectement les
gains d’efficacité en comparant les effets de fusions dans les banques sur les prix
à court-terme et à long-terme, avec l’hypothèse que les effets anticoncurrentiels se
manifestent peu de temps après la fusion tandis que les gains d’efficacité prennent
plus longtemps à se matérialiser et à être répercutés sur les prix. Ashenfelter et al.
[2015] estiment les effets d’une fusion entre deux grandes brasseries sur les prix, en
distinguant les effets de la hausse de la concentration et des gains d’efficacité permis
par la réduction des distances entre les brasseries et les magasins et donc des coûts
de distribution. Leur résultat indique que la hausse de prix causée par une plus
grande concentration est compensée presque en intégralité par les gains d’efficacité,
et que les entreprises ont répercuté plus rapidement l’effet du pouvoir de marché que
les gains d’efficacité dans les prix. Dranove and Lindrooth [2003] examinent l’effet
de concentrations dans les hôpitaux sur leurs coûts en effectuant une différence de
différences avec un groupe de contrôle constitué d’hôpitaux sélectionnées à partir de
coefficients de propension. Les gains d’efficacité estimés pour les hôpitaux qui restent
complètement séparés après la fusion sont nuls mais ceux estimés pour les hôpitaux
qui fusionnent notamment leurs rapports financiers et sont régulés comme une seule
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entité, ce qui facilite la réorganisation et la rationalisation des services, génèrent des
économies de coûts significatives deux, trois et quatre ans après la fusion. Kwoka and
Pollitt [2010] analysent les effets d’une vague de fusions dans l’industrie électrique
américaine entre 1994 et 2003 sur les coût d’exploitation et les coûts totaux de la
distribution d’électricité en effectuant une double différences de mesures d’efficacité
calculées avec la méthode non paramétrique d’analyse d’enveloppement des don-
nées (DEA, Data Envelopment Analysis). Ils trouvent que les fusions ne se sont
pas traduites par des baisses de coûts. Brito et al. [2013] effectuent une simula-
tion de fusion dans le secteur de l’assurance pour évaluer l’impact d’une série de
fusions dans l’industrie de l’assurance au Portugal sur les prix, en distinguant la
hausse du pouvoir de marché et les gains d’efficacité. Ils trouvent que la période
post fusion n’est caractérisée ni par une hausse du pouvoir de marché, ni par un
changement d’efficacité des entreprises. Ils concluent leur article sur les dimensions
importantes à prendre en compte lors des simulations ex ante des fusions, notam-
ment effectuer des analyses de sensibilité sur les coûts marginaux estimés et tenir
compte des changements des caractéristiques des produits après les fusions.
Contributions du deuxième chapitre
La revue non exhaustive des études rétrospectives des opérations de concentration
montre un grand intérêt pour ce type d’étude et met en évidence qu’aucune de
ces études ne porte sur le secteur des transports urbains ou sur la fusion spéci-
fiquement examinée dans le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse, à savoir la fusion
entre Veolia Transport et Transdev. Il apparait également que peu d’études portent
spécifiquement sur les gains d’efficacité permis par les concentrations. Ce second
chapitre de cette thèse, co-écrit avec Joanna Piechucka, contribue ainsi à la littéra-
ture économique existante en effectuant une étude rétrospective d’une fusion entre
deux opérateurs majeurs de transport urbain en France et en estimant explicitement
si cette fusion a donné lieu à des gains d’efficacité.
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En 2009, Transdev a choisi de fusionner avec Veolia Transport. Cette fusion a été
approuvée par l’Autorité française de la concurrence en 2010 avec des engagements
et la transaction a été finalisée en 2011. La nouvelle entité, qui faisait face à un
principal concurrent et à trois concurrents plus petits sur le marché, détenait une
part de marché de près de 40 %. Alors que l’Autorité de la concurrence française
a, dans ses analyses ex ante, principalement mis l’accent sur les potentiels effets
anticoncurrentiels de l’opération, la principale préoccupation étant la réduction du
nombre de concurrents dans les appels d’offres, les parties notifiantes ont fait valoir
que l’opération générerait des gains d’efficacité spécifiques. Ceux-ci étaient liées,
d’une part, à la réalisation d’économies de coûts dans l’exploitation des réseaux et,
d’autre part, à la possibilité de fournir une offre de services plus étendue grâce à la
mise en commun des expériences des parties à l’opération.
L’analyse empirique de ce chapitre repose, comme la plupart des études rétrospec-
tives, sur la méthode des doubles différences. Trouver un groupe de contrôle appro-
prié pour estimer les effets des fusions est généralement un exercice difficile (voir par
exemple la discussion de Nevo and Whinston [2010]). L’industrie étudiée dans ce
chapitre est adaptée pour appliquer la méthodologie car nous pouvons exploiter les
variations entre les réseaux locaux. Nous testons plusieurs groupes de contrôle afin
de contrôler la possibilité que les réseaux exploités par les concurrents des parties à
la fusion aient réagi à la fusion. Pour identifier plus précisément l’impact de la fusion
sur les coûts des opérateurs de transport, nous explorons en outre l’hétérogénéité
des effets de coût en exploitant la richesse de nos données.
Dans toutes les spécifications examinées, nos résultats montrent que la fusion n’a pas
entraîné de gains d’efficacité pour les parties à la fusion. L’explication est que le choix
de Veolia a été fait trop rapidement, la fusion a été mal préparée et les différences
de cultures entre les deux groupes ont rendu les clients et les employés réticents à
la fusion. Ces explications sont très spécifiques au cas d’espèce. Nous ne pouvons
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donc pas conclure de nos résultats qu’une modification de la structure du marché
dans le secteur des transports urbains ne peut pas conduire à des gains d’efficacité.
Nous pouvons cependant mettre en évidence que le rôle joué par le contexte (culture
des entreprises, raisons du choix de la cible, perception des clients et des employés,
etc.) dans l’absence de concrétisation des gains d’efficacité pose la question de
savoir si les économistes et les autorités de concurrence devraient accorder plus de
poids au contexte dans les analyses ex ante et les études rétrospectives des effets
des concentrations. En effet ces éléments de contexte n’ont dans le cas présent pas
du tout été considérés par l’Autorité de la concurrence lors de l’analyse des gains
d’efficacité potentiels de la fusion.
La sélection des opérateurs dans les marchés publics
La commande publique correspond aux achats de biens, de services et de travaux
effectués par les administrations et les entreprises publiques. Elle mobilise une part
importante de l’argent public. Elle représente 12 % du PIB et 29 % des dépenses
publiques totales en moyenne dans les pays de l’OCDE et environ 14 % du PIB de
l’Union européenne (voir OECD [2017a]). Comme le montre le graphique 4, la part
des dépenses de la commande publique dans les dépenses totales des pays en 2015
allait de 20 % au Portugal à 45 % aux Pays-Bas. Elle s’élevait à 26 % en France.
Les montants élevés associés à la commande publique ont conduit les institutions in-
ternationales, les gouvernements et les académiques à s’interroger sur l’organisation
de la commande publique qui permet d’utiliser au mieux l’argent public, c’est-à-dire
d’obtenir les biens ou les services achetés au meilleur rapport qualité/prix. Plus
récemment, une autre question liée à l’utilisation de la commande publique comme
moyen pour mettre en œuvre des politiques publiques a été soulevée. Elle a no-
tamment été mise en avant par certains pour promouvoir l’innovation (voir OECD
[2017b]) ou encore des objectifs écologiques ou sociaux.
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Figure 2: Part des dépenses de la commande publique dans les dépenses totales
des gouvernements en 2015 (source : graphique effectué à partir des statistiques de
l’OCDE)
La littérature académique en économie porte essentiellement sur la question de
l’organisation des marchés publics, par exemple le type de contrat à mettre en œuvre
ou les procédures de sélection à utiliser, même si le second point a fait l’objet de
quelques publications (voir par exemple Saussier and Tirole [2015] qui critiquent no-
tamment l’utilisation de la commande publique pour atteindre des objectifs sociaux,
environnementaux ou d’innovation). Elle cherche à contribuer à l’identification des
moyens d’action les plus adaptés pour renforcer l’efficacité de la commande publique.
Une littérature conséquente s’intéresse aux implications des procédures de sélection
des opérateurs dans les appels d’offres publics. Elle s’intègre dans la littérature sur
les asymétries d’information dans les contrats (l’entreprise connait mieux ses coûts et
l’environnement économique que l’acheteur public) et l’incomplétude contractuelle
(il est impossible de prévoir tous les événements pouvant survenir lors de l’exécution
d’un contrat). D’un côté, l’opinion traditionnelle est que les enchères ouvertes,
qui sont un mécanisme rigide qui laisse pas ou peu de discrétion aux acheteurs,
constituent un mécanisme efficace de sélection des entreprises, car elles rendent plus
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probable la sélection du soumissionnaire présentant le coût le plus bas, ce qui réduit
le prix gagnant. En utilisant un modèle d’enchères standard, Bulow and Klemperer
[1996] montrent qu’une simple enchère donne presque toujours un meilleur résultat
qu’une négociation avec moins d’entreprises.
Toutefois, comme l’indique Goldberg [1977], lorsque des transactions complexes sont
susceptibles de faire l’objet d’événements inattendus, l’attribution des contrats par
le biais de négociations peut être plus souhaitable que les enchères. Manelli and
Vincent [1995] illustrent l’avantage de la négociation par rapport aux enchères ou-
vertes dans certaines circonstances, en particulier lorsque les dimensions qualitatives
difficiles à contractualiser du bien acheté sont importantes.
La question examinée par la littérature empirique plus récente est celle du degré de
discrétion qui permet les meilleurs résultats. Cette littérature cherche notamment à
déterminer, à chaque fois dans des contextes institutionnels bien spécifiques, si lors
de hausses du niveau de discrétion des acheteurs publics, se traduisant par une plus
grande liberté de l’acheteur public de s’adapter aux circonstances particulières de
l’appel d’offres, les effets positifs ont dominé les effets négatifs d’une plus grande
discrétion.
Cette littérature souligne le mérite de l’introduction d’une certaine discrétion dans
les procédures de sélection. Cameron [2000] teste l’existence potentielle d’un com-
promis entre le prix et la performance ex post des contrats en utilisant un jeu de
données de contrats à long terme conclus avec des services publics d’électricité aux
États-Unis. Elle constate que le fait de disposer d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire accru
se traduisant par une évaluation plus subjective des offres et la négociation après
soumission des offres (par rapport à des procédures d’appel d’offres rigides) entraîne
une réduction de prix de 18 % mais également une augmentation de plus de 50 %
de la probabilité de rupture du contrat. Coviello et al. [2017] analysent les effets
d’une hausse de la discrétion de l’acheteur public, mesurée par la possibilité pour
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l’acheteur de décider qui inviter à soumissionner ou non, sur les résultats ex ante et
ex post d’appels d’offres dans le secteur de la construction en Italie. En utilisant
un modèle de régression à discontinuité, ils montrent, sur leur échantillon principal,
qu’une discrétion accrue n’a aucun effet sur les résultats des enchères ex ante (nombre
d’enchérisseurs, rabais, taille des gagnants, distance du gagnant à l’acheteur public)
et sur la plupart de leurs mesures de performance ex post (durée des travaux, rené-
gociations monétaires). Sur un échantillon réduit plus près du seuil de discontinuité,
ils concluent que les effets positifs de la hausse de la discrétion l’emportent plutôt
sur les effets négatifs. Un plus haut niveau de discrétion est susceptible de réduire la
durée totale des travaux, de conduire à la sélection de plus grandes entreprises et à
une réduction du nombre d’entreprises présentant des offres, réduisant ainsi les coûts
associés à la sélection des offres. Cependant, un niveau de discrétion plus élevé n’a
pas d’effet significatif sur d’autres résultats tels que la remise gagnante, le dépasse-
ment des coûts et la probabilité que le projet soit attribué à une entreprise locale.
Chever et al. [2017] démontrent que la hausse de la discrétion peut également avoir
des bénéfices lors de l’attribution de contrats de faible valeur (donc plutôt simples).
Ils mettent en évidence que la restriction de la concurrence à un petit nombre de
soumissionnaires lors de l’attribution de contrats de faible valeur vise à répartir les
contrats entre des entreprises de bonne réputation et n’entraîne pas de prix plus
élevés. Dans l’ensemble, leurs résultats suggèrent que les enchères restreintes, tout
en économisant sur les coûts de transaction ex ante, préservent un niveau élevé de
concurrence entre les quelques entreprises sélectionnées pour soumettre des offres.
Les preuves empiriques sont partagées sur le point de savoir si la discrétion fa-
vorise les comportements de corruption au détriment des coûts ou de la qualité.
L’argument est qu’une autorité publique pourrait utiliser de manière préjudicia-
ble son pouvoir discrétionnaire pour favoriser une entreprise donnée et en retirer
des avantages personnels, alors que les enchères ouvertes sont considérées comme
un instrument permettant de responsabiliser les acheteurs grâce à une plus grande
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transparence. Palguta and Pertold [2017] observent qu’en Espagne, lorsque le pou-
voir discrétionnaire de l’acheteur est accru par la possibilité de présélectionner des
soumissionnaires potentiels, les entreprises dont le propriétaire est anonyme sont plus
susceptibles de remporter le contrat. Bandiera et al. [2009] exploitent une expérience
menée dans le système italien de passation des marchés publics et concluent que les
acheteurs publics bénéficiant de pouvoirs discrétionnaires plus importants sont plus
efficaces et ne sont pas plus corrompus que les acheteurs plus réglementés, générant
ainsi moins de gaspillage. Il en ressort que l’inefficacité administrative (manque de
compétences de l’acheteur ou charge réglementaire excessive, par exemple) apparaît
comme une source de gaspillage plus importante que la corruption.
Contributions du troisième chapitre
Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse, co-écrit avec Marion Chabrost, contribue à la
littérature qui s’intéresse à la question de l’intérêt d’une plus grande discrétion dans
les procédures de sélection des entreprises dans les marchés publics. Dans l’ensemble,
cette littérature utilise les résultats des contrats (rabais sur les prix, retards, rené-
gociations, etc.) comme mesure de l’efficacité de différents types de procédures de
sélection impliquant différents niveaux de discrétion. Dans ce troisième chapitre,
notre mesure d’efficacité ne correspond pas à une ou plusieurs dimensions du ré-
sultat du contrat. Nous utilisons la productivité de l’entreprise sélectionnée. Nous
pensons que cet indicateur, qui traduit l’efficacité de l’entreprise, reflète sa capacité
à fournir le bien ou le service acheté au meilleur rapport qualité/prix. La première
contribution de ce chapitre consiste donc à étudier une dimension de l’achat public
qui a été négligée jusqu’à présent, qui est l’effet d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire sur la
capacité à sélectionner un fournisseur efficace. La deuxième contribution provient de
l’implication du résultat en termes de politique publique, à savoir qu’une procédure
de sélection qui augmente le pouvoir discrétionnaire est potentiellement en contradic-
tion avec l’objectif principal des marchés publics, qui est d’obtenir le meilleur résultat
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au meilleur prix, et avec un potentiel objectif plus large, qui serait de promouvoir
la productivité. La troisième contribution du chapitre consiste à identifier le rôle de
certaines caractéristiques observées de l’acheteur, du contrat et de l’environnement
économique dans le choix d’une procédure, dans la lignée des travaux de Bajari et al.
[2009].
L’analyse est effectuée à l’aide d’une base de données unique sur les marchés publics
passés en France entre 2006 et 2015. Elle tire parti du cadre réglementaire français
en matière de passation des marchés publics, qui a permis le recours à des procé-
dures d’appel d’offres plus souples que les enchères ouvertes, ce qui a introduit plus
de discrétion dans les procédures de sélection, à partir de 2004. Dans la plupart
des pays, les règles régissant les marchés publics visent à favoriser la transparence
et l’efficacité. Dans cette perspective, les institutions internationales, telles que la
Banque mondiale et l’OCDE, encouragent le recours à des procédures de passation
des marchés concurrentielles et transparentes et, dans de nombreux pays, les règles
en matière de passation des marchés publics fixent des seuils au-dessus desquels
l’acheteur public doit utiliser des procédures d’enchères ouvertes. En Europe, la
Commission européenne a fixé des seuils au-dessus desquels l’utilisation d’enchères
ouvertes strictement réglementées est obligatoire. En dessous de ces seuils, les lois
nationales s’appliquent. En France, en-deçà des seuils fixés par la Commission eu-
ropéenne, les acheteurs publics sont autorisés à choisir entre une procédure stricte-
ment réglementée consistant en une enchère ouverte ou une procédure plus flexible
ouvrant la porte à plus de discrétion, appelée procédure adaptée. Cette procédure
laisse à l’acheteur une certaine liberté quant à la manière de faire de la publicité,
de concevoir l’appel d’offres et de choisir le gagnant, y compris la possibilité de
négocier.
Notre principal résultat est que la procédure adaptée conduit à une allocation in-
efficace des fonds publics aux entreprises les moins performantes par la sélection
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d’entreprises moins productives. C’est, à notre connaissance, la première fois que
cet effet causal est identifié. Nos résultats sont robustes à plusieurs tests de ro-
bustesse qui sont présentés dans le chapitre.
Le mécanisme par lequel la procédure adaptée pourrait conduire à la sélection
d’entreprises moins performantes est présenté dans la dernière partie du chapitre.
Nous avons identifié trois canaux qui pourraient expliquer notre principal résultat.
Premièrement, il se peut que les entreprises choisissent elles-mêmes certaines procé-
dures (auto-sélection). Deuxièmement, il se peut que les acheteurs n’invitent que cer-
tains types d’entreprises à soumissionner dans les procédures adaptées. Troisième-
ment, il se peut que les bassins de soumissionnaires contiennent les entreprises les
plus productives dans les deux types de procédures, mais que la sélection des en-
treprises aboutisse à des résultats différents. Pour faire la distinction entre ces
canaux, nous aurions idéalement besoin des identités de tous les soumissionnaires
dans les appels d’offres pour comparer les bassins de soumissionnaires dans les deux
procédures. Cependant, cette information n’est pas disponible dans notre base de
données. Nous examinons donc le nombre de soumissionnaires et les caractéris-
tiques des gagnants, qui sont les informations dont nous disposons. Nos analyses
suggèrent que notre résultat s’explique par l’effet de la discrétion dans la sélection
des entreprises, même s’il conviendrait d’approfondir l’analyse en examinant tous
les soumissionnaires pour tirer une conclusion définitive.
Deux raisons pourraient expliquer pourquoi les acheteurs publics sélectionnent des
entreprises moins performantes dans le cadre de procédures adaptées. La première
est que l’acheteur public choisit une procédure avec une discrétion accrue afin de pou-
voir sélectionner une entreprise qu’il souhaite privilégier (par exemple si l’acheteur
public est corrompu), de sorte que l’acheteur public n’essaye même pas de sélection-
ner une entreprise efficace. La deuxième raison découle de la finalité de la procédure
adaptée, qui doit être adaptable aux circonstances de l’achat afin de réduire les coûts
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de transaction ex ante, y compris les coûts de publication ou les coûts de sélection
des opérateurs. Dans ce cas, un acheteur public choisirait une entreprise moins ef-
ficace en utilisant la procédure adaptée car il dépenserait moins dans le processus
de sélection. En d’autres termes, la perte de productivité pourrait être considérée
comme le coût d’une réduction des coûts de transaction ex ante. Si l’acheteur pub-
lic est corrompu ou cherche à favoriser une entreprise donnée, la procédure adaptée
est purement inefficace. Si l’acheteur public utilise une procédure adaptée pour
économiser sur les coûts de transaction ex ante, il faudrait comparer les coûts de
transaction ex ante avec les résultats ex post des procédures pour déterminer si un
pouvoir discrétionnaire accru dans les marchés publics est en moyenne bénéfique.
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General Introduction
This doctoral thesis is composed of three chapters grouped into two distinct parts.
The first part, consisting of a chapter, tests the theoretical models of decision under
risk on real data to identify the theory that allows for the best description of the
choices of individuals. The second part, consisting of two chapters, examines two
research questions related to economic efficiency. The first chapter consists of a
retrospective study of a merger that took place in the urban transport sector in
France. It focuses on the effect of this merger on the operators’ costs. The second
chapter examines the impact of an increase in discretion (in the sense of discretion
of the decision-maker) in selection procedures of firms in public tenders on the
productivity of the selected operators. All the questions addressed in this thesis
are treated with an empirical perspective allowed by the construction of unique
databases. In this introduction, we present the motivation of the work done and the
main contributions of the thesis.
Part 1. Models of choices under risk
Individuals constantly make decisions in situations characterized by risk. An exam-
ple is the choice between medical treatment options offered by doctors. Do I prefer
option 1, which allows me to heal completely but only works in half of cases, option
2, which allows a partial cure but works systematically or option 3, which consists
of not doing any treatment and hope for the complete healing observed in one out of
every hundred cases? Each option has one or more possible consequences associated
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with probabilities. Individuals choose between options based on their preferences,
including their attitude toward risk. In economics, the study of choices in situations
of risk raises two questions: how should individuals behave when faced with risky
choices? And how do people behave? The first question is normative, the second
descriptive. This doctoral work focuses solely on the descriptive dimension of the
behavior of individuals.
The classical model of decision under risk is the expected-utility model of Neumann
and Morgenstern [1947]. Other theoretical models such as the rank-dependent util-
ity model (Quiggin [1982]) or cumulative prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky
[1979], Tversky and Kahneman [1992]) have emerged following the observation that,
in laboratory experiments, people make choices systematically inconsistent with ex-
pected utility theory (Allais [1953], Kahneman and Tversky [1979]).
Cumulative prospect theory is currently the favorite model of the experimental lit-
erature because evidence that decision makers weight probabilities non linearly as in
cumulative prospect theory was provided by many experiments (see Camerer and Ho
[1994], Tversky and Kahneman [1992], Wu and Gonzalez [1996], Gonzalez and Wu
[1999] and Abdellaoui [2000]). The theory was also found to be able to rationalize
behaviors observed in laboratories that could not be explained by expected utility
such as probabilistic insurance (see Wakker et al. [1997]). Some people have ques-
tioned whether the findings of the experimental literature generalize to real-world
data (see List [2003], Levitt and List [2008]). They believe that biases are less likely
in the presence of large stakes, experience and competition.
Existing studies using real-world data typically rely on insurance, finance and bets
or games market data. Cicchetti and Dubin [1994] presents evidence that decisions
to purchase insurance against the risk of landline malfunction are consistent with
expected utility theory. Barseghyan et al. [2013] shows that non linear probability
weighting plays a central role in the behavior of households in the choice of auto and
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home insurance. Kliger and Levy [2009] also finds that cumulative prospect theory
better fits their data than expected utility and rank-dependent utility relying on data
on call options on the S&P500 index. Using data from game shows, Post et al. [2008]
shows that preferences are reference dependent so that they exhibit characteristics
of the cumulative prospect theory model. List [2003] and List [2004] provide evi-
dence that although inexperienced consumers behave as in prospect theory, market
experience brings experienced traders’ behavior close to neoclassical predictions. On
the contrary Pope and Schweitzer [2011] shows that highly experienced professional
golfers who face high stakes payoffs and intense competition exhibit loss aversion as
predicted by prospect theory.
Contributions of the first chapter
Our work contributes to this literature which conclusions remain ambiguous. The
goal of the paper is to discriminate between the standard theory of individual choice
in economics (expected utility theory by Neumann and Morgenstern [1947]) and
behavioral theories, which are more general than expected utility and are able to
explain some behaviors by incorporating in particular the fact that decision makers
transform probabilities when assessing the value of risky prospects. This work aims
at determining whether the gain brought by behavioral models does not occur at
the price of too much complexity.
Horserace betting markets are a good candidate to study decisions taken in situ-
ations of risk using real-life data. Wagering on a horse indeed involves making a
choice between clearly identified alternatives, each alternative being associated with
a monetary outcome. The occurring alternative is observed publicly after a short
period of time. Choices are made repeatedly by a large number of participants and
extensive information is available on probabilities of outcomes.
Our analysis relies on a unique dataset of bets on horseraces of the French betting
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operator from 2013 to 2015. The main contributions of the paper are the following.
First, one of the most robust findings of the literature using horserace data is that
odds associated to horses reflect their intrinsic values very well, with the exception
that favorites (horses with a high chance of winning) tend to be underbet while out-
siders (horses with a relatively small chance of winning) are overbet (Sauer [1998]).
As a result, the expected returns on outsiders are lower than on favorites. I first
study the existence of the favorite-longshot bias in France, which has not been done
before.
Second, I test the results of Jullien and Salanié [2000] in a different context and at
a different time period. Jullien and Salanié [2000] shows, by focusing on win bets
in the UK where the bookmaker system prevails, that cumulative prospect theory
describes the behavior of a representative agent better than expected utility and
rank-dependent utility theories. Contrary to the usual inversed S-shaped probability
weighting function, they find little evidence for the existence of a certainty effect and
of a change in concavity of the probability weighting functions that they estimate.
They also establish that rank-dependent utility does not improve on expected utility.
Third, I overcome one of the limits of the paper of Jullien and Salanié [2000], which
is that they could not implement the appropriate statistical tests to compare the
models. This novelty is a major improvement to the paper of Jullien and Salanié
[2000] since comparing models is the main objective of the paper.
Fourth, I relax some of the assumptions of the model of Jullien and Salanié [2000]
because the French system is a pari-mutuel one and not a bookmaker one. Finally, I
also test the robustness of the results against some of the assumptions of the model
using the characteristics of races.
I first show that the favorite-longshot bias exists in France. I further find that be-
havioral theories of decision under risk, that is both rank-dependent and cumulative
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prospect theories, are better suited to explain the behavior of bettors observed in
the data than expected utility is. This result provides evidence that bettors weight
probabilities non-linearly when making choices. Using cumulative prospect theory, I
find significant weighting of probabilities in the domain of losses and linear weighting
of probabilities in the domain of gains, which is consistent with the result of Jul-
lien and Salanié [2000] but contradicts results from experiments which find similar
weighting of probabilities in the gains and losses domains (Tversky and Kahneman
[1992] and Abdellaoui [2000]).
Part 2. Economic efficiency
The second part of this work focuses on two specific issues related to economic
efficiency. We first estimate the effect of a merger between two large companies in
the urban transport sector on their costs. We then study the impact of discretion
in tendering procedures on the selection of operators, especially their productivity.
The first chapter of this section is part of the literature dedicated to retrospective
analysis of concentration operations. The second chapter of this section fits into the
literature on selection procedures in calls for tenders and their consequences.
Retrospective analysis of mergers
Figure 3 shows that over the last three decades, the number of mergers and acqui-
sitions in the world has tripled. At the same time, merger control by competition
authorities has developed. In France, it began at the end of the 1990s, with in par-
ticular the obligation to notify mergers above a certain turnover in 2002, followed
by the adoption of merger control guidelines in 2005.
Competition authorities study concentrations above a certain threshold of turnover.
They seek to determine whether these transactions are likely to affect the consumer’s
surplus. The practice of competition authorities generally consists in examining
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Figure 3: Mergers announced in the world between 1985 and 2015 (source: Nas-
daq.com)
whether a merger carries anti-competitive effects by focusing on a potential price
increase (and more rarely on a potential reduction in innovation or in quality or
diversity of the products offered). Competition authorities also examine whether
the transactions are justified by efficiency gains which compensate for the potential
damage to competition. They then decide whether to authorize the merger, to
prohibit it or to authorize it under certain conditions.
Merger control by competition authorities was accompanied by the birth of an eco-
nomic literature retrospectively evaluating the most controversial mergers, i.e., the
mergers that have been the subject of in-depth analyzes by competition authorities.
Ex post studies are useful to help competition authorities improve their future de-
cisions (see the discussion of Duso and Ormosi [2015]). They contribute to make
merger control more effective by assessing whether the decisions of the competition
authorities (intervention or lack of intervention) have achieved their objectives and
by trying to understand why if this is not the case. The results of retrospective
studies can for example be compared with the results of the quantitative methods
and theories used by the competition authorities in ex ante analyzes. These com-
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parisons have the advantage of helping competition authorities testing the validity
and accuracy of their methods and verifying whether the instruments used ex ante
to predict the potential effects of mergers are appropriate, accurate and effective.
They can highlight that certain economic tests are not appropriate to delimit the
market in certain sectors, that the assumptions used to model certain aspects of a
market were not adapted, or to establish the accuracy of the predictions of ex ante
simulations. Retrospective studies also contribute to the debate over whether com-
petition policy is too lenient or too strict (Baker and Shapiro [2008] vs. Crandall
and Clifford [2003]). Finally, the existence of retrospective studies could improve the
transparency of the decisions and the accountability of the competition authorities
and allows the authorities to communicate on the work they carry out, in particular
to justify their action.
Like the ex ante analyzes of the competition authorities, the existing research papers
focus mainly on the impact of mergers on prices. The most widely used empirical
methodology is the difference-in-differences method, which consists in comparing
the evolution of prices between a group affected by the merger and a group non
affected by the merger, with the assumption that, in the absence of a merger, prices
in both groups would have followed parallel trends. The most recent ex post studies
include the following studies.
Aguzzoni et al. [2014] estimates the effect of a merger between two of the largest
video game store chains in the UK. Using the difference-in-differences method, it
compares the price evolution of the merging parties with that of the seven largest
competitors, distinguishing different types of games. It finds that the merger has led
to a price reduction for both new and old games and that the decline is greater for
the merging parties than for the competitors, suggesting the existence of efficiencies
which would come from the ability to get better terms from publishers and suppliers.
Aguzzoni et al. [2016] estimates the effect of a merger between two of the largest
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book store chains in the UK by comparing local book sales markets. It compares the
price change after the merger between stores located in local markets where both
chains were present before the merger and in local markets where only one chain was
present before the merger using the difference-in-differences method. It finds that the
merger did not result in price increases, either at the local level or at the national
level. Allain et al. [2017] analyzes the impact of a merger between supermarket
chains on the price of food. The method used compares the price changes of the
merging parties and competitors in the affected markets, defined as local markets
where both competitors are present or alternatively local markets with at least
one of the parties, and comparison markets. It finds a significant price increase as
a result of the merger for both parties and competitors. Ashenfelter et al. [2013]
estimates the price effects of a merger between two household product manufacturers
in the United States. The empirical strategy is based on the difference-in-differences
method and compares the prices of several household products in local markets that
have experienced a shift in concentration and those that have not been affected by
the merger. It finds price increases for some products.
Previous works use a similar methodology. We can quote Focarelli and Panetta
[2003] and Sapienza [2002] in retail banking, Hastings [2004], Gilbert and Hastings
[2005] and Taylor and Hosken [2007] in the sale of fuel, Borenstein [1990], Kim and
Singal [1993], Borenstein [1990] in the air transport market or Vita and Sacher [2001]
in hospitals. A limited number of papers combine the ex ante simulation of mergers
and the ex post evaluation of mergers using difference-in-differences to study the
validity of simulation model predictions (see for example Peters [2006], Weinberg
[2011], Weinberg and Hosken [2013], Friberg and Romahn [2015] and Björnerstedt
and Verboven [2016]).
Few studies focus specifically on efficiency gains. As explained by Duso and Ormosi
[2015], “one of the most speculative elements of merger control is merging parties’
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efficiency claims, yet we have very few studies that examine whether anticipated cost
savings took place post merger”. Efficiency gains are however a central argument of
the parties and their counsels in front of competition authorities. They can take
many forms, such as reducing transport and distribution costs, economies of scale
and scope, improving the quality of management or the use of expertise (see OECD
[2016]).
In one of the first articles that sought to estimate the efficiency gains of a concentra-
tion, Focarelli and Panetta [2003] indirectly highlights efficiency gains by comparing
the effects of mergers in banks on short-term and long-term prices, with the assump-
tion that anti-competitive effects occur shortly after the merger, while efficiencies
take longer to materialize and be passed on to prices. Ashenfelter et al. [2015] esti-
mates the effects of a merger between two major breweries on prices, distinguishing
the effects of increased concentration and of efficiencies originating from reduced
distances between breweries and stores and hence shipping costs. Its results indi-
cate that the price increase caused by greater concentration is offset almost entirely
by efficiency gains, and that firms have passed on the effect of market power more
rapidly than efficiencies into prices. Dranove and Lindrooth [2003] examines the
effect of several mergers between hospitals on their costs by applying a difference-in-
differences methodology with a control group of hospitals selected using propensity
score matching. The estimated efficiency gains for hospitals that remain completely
separated after the merger are nil but those estimated for hospitals that merge their
financial reports and are regulated as a single entity, which facilitates the reorga-
nization and rationalization of services, generate significant cost savings two, three
and four years after the merger. Kwoka and Pollitt [2010] analyzes the effects of
a wave of mergers in the US electricity industry between 1994 and 2003 on the
operating costs and total costs of electricity distribution by performing a difference-
in-differences of efficiency measures computed with the nonparametric method of
Data Envelopment Analysis. It finds that the mergers did not translate into lower
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costs. Brito et al. [2013] conducts a merger simulation in the insurance sector to as-
sess the impact of a series of mergers in the insurance industry in Portugal on prices,
distinguishing the increase in market power and efficiency gains. It finds that the
post merger period is characterized neither by an increase in market power nor by a
change in the efficiency of companies. It concludes on the important dimensions to
consider in ex ante mergers simulations, including conducting sensitivity analyzes on
estimated marginal costs and taking into account changes in product characteristics
after mergers.
Contributions of the second chapter
The non-exhaustive review of retrospective merger studies shows the interest for
this type of study and highlights that none of these studies deals with the urban
transport sector or the merger specifically examined in the second chapter of this
thesis, namely the merger between Veolia Transport and Transdev. It also appears
that few studies specifically address the efficiency gains allowed by mergers. The
second chapter of this thesis, co-written with Joanna Piechucka, thus contributes to
the existing economic literature by carrying out a retrospective study of a merger
between two major urban transport operators in France and by explicitly estimating
whether this merger resulted in efficiency gains.
In 2009, Transdev selected Veolia Transport to merge. This merger was approved by
the French Competition Authority in 2010 with remedies and the deal was closed in
2011. The new entity, which faced one main competitor and three smaller competi-
tors in the market, had a market share of nearly 40%. While the French Competition
Authority mostly focused on potential anticompetitive effects, the main concern be-
ing the reduction in the number of competitors in competitive tenders, the notifying
parties argued that the transaction would generate specific efficiency gains. These
were claimed to be linked, on the one hand, to the achievement of cost savings in the
operation of networks and, on the other hand, the possibility of providing a more
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extensive service offering thanks to the pooling of experience between the parties.
The empirical analysis of this chapter uses, like most retrospective studies, the
difference-in-differences method. Finding an appropriate control group to estimate
the effects of mergers is usually a great challenge (see for example the discussion of
Nevo and Whinston [2010]). The characteristics of our industry suggest a good field
for applying the methodology, as we can easily exploit variations in the conditions
across local networks. We consider several control groups in order to control for the
possibility that the networks operated by the competitors of the merging parties
have reacted to the merger. To identify more precisely the impact of the merger on
the costs of transport operators, we further explore heterogeneity in the cost effects
by exploiting the richness of our data.
In all specifications, our results show that the merger did not lead to efficiency gains
for the merging parties. Our explanation is that the choice of Veolia was made
too hastily, the merger was poorly prepared and the differences in cultures between
the two groups made both clients and employees reluctant to the merger. These
explanations are highly specific to the case at hand. We cannot hence conclude
from our results that a change of market structure in the sector of urban transport
cannot lead to efficiency gains. Additionally, the role played by the context (culture,
choice of the target, perception by clients and employees, operational preparation of
the merger, etc.) in the lack of materialization of efficiency gains questions whether
the context should be given more weight by economists in their models and by
competition authorities in their analysis of potential effects of mergers.
Selection of operators in public procurement
Public procurement is the purchase of goods, services and works by governments and
public enterprises. It mobilizes a large share of public money. It accounts for 12% of
GDP and 29% of total public expenditure on average in OECD countries and about
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14% of GDP in the European Union (see OECD [2017a]). As shown in Figure 4,
the share of public procurement expenditures in total country expenditures in 2015
ranged from 20% in Portugal to 45% in the Netherlands. It amounted to 26% in
France.
Figure 4: Share of public procurement in total government expenditures in 2015
(source: figure made from OECD data)
The high amounts associated with public procurement have led international insti-
tutions, governments and academics to try to determine the organization of public
procurement that makes the best use of public money, that is to say that enables to
obtain the goods or services purchased at the best value for money. More recently,
another issue related to the use of public procurement as a means to implement pub-
lic policies has been raised. It has been put forward by some to promote innovation
(see OECD [2017b]) or ecological or social objectives.
The academic literature in economics focuses on the question of the organization of
public procurement, for example the types of contracts to implement or the selection
procedures to use, even if the second point has been the subject of a small number
of publications (see for example Saussier and Tirole [2015] which criticizes the use
of public procurement to achieve social, environmental or innovation objectives). It
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seeks to contribute to the identification of the most appropriate means of action to
reinforce the effectiveness of public procurement.
A substantial body of literature focuses on the implications of operator selection
procedures in public tenders. It fits into the literature on asymmetries of information
in contracts (the company knows better its costs and the economic environment than
the public buyer) and contractual incompleteness (it is impossible to predict all the
events that can occur when executing a contract). On the one hand, the traditional
view is that open auctions, which are a rigid mechanism that leaves buyers with little
or no discretion, are an effective mechanism for selecting firms because they make
the selection of the lowest cost bidder more likely, thereby reducing the winning
price. Using a standard auction model, Bulow and Klemperer [1996] shows that a
simple auction almost always yields a better outcome than a negotiation with fewer
firms would.
However, as Goldberg [1977] argues, when complex transactions are likely to be
subject to unexpected events, awarding a contract through negotiation may be
more desirable than auctions. Manelli and Vincent [1995] illustrates the benefit
of negotiation over open auctions under certain circumstances, in particular when
non-contractible quality dimensions of the procured good are important.
The question examined by the more recent empirical literature is that of the degree
of discretion that allows the best results. This literature seeks in particular to
determine, each time in very specific institutional contexts, whether the positive
effects have dominated the negative effects of greater discretion when increases in
the level of discretion of public purchasers, resulting in greater freedom for the public
purchaser to adapt to the particular circumstances of the tender, have occurred.
This literature emphasizes the merit of introducing a certain discretion in the selec-
tion procedures. Cameron [2000] tests for the potential existence of a compromise
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between price and ex post performance by using a dataset of long-term power con-
tracts electric utilities have awarded in the United States. It finds that increasing
discretion through allowing a more subjective evaluation of bids as well as post bid
negotiations (compared to rigid competitive bidding procedures) yields a price re-
duction of 18% but also an increase in the probability of contract breach by more
than 50%. Coviello et al. [2017] analyzes the effect of increased discretion - measured
in terms of whether the buyer can decide who to invite to bid or not - over ex ante
and ex post procurement outcomes using a dataset of public tenders in construction
in Italy. Using a regression discontinuity design, it finds, using its main sample, that
increased discretion has no effect on ex ante auction outcomes (number of bidders,
rebates, size of the winners, distance of the winner from the public buyer) and on
most of their ex post performance measures (duration of the works, monetary rene-
gotiations). In a closer neighborhood of the discontinuity threshold, it finds that the
positive effects of discretion may dominate the negative ones. Discretion is likely to
reduce the total duration of works, to lead to the selection of larger firms and to a
reduction in the number of firms submitting bids, thereby saving costs associated to
bid screening. However, a higher level of discretion is found to have no significant
effect over other outcomes such as the winning rebate, cost overrun and the proba-
bility that the project is awarded to a local firm. Chever et al. [2017] shows that the
increase in discretion can also have benefits when tendering low value (hence rather
simple) contracts. It demonstrates that the restriction of competition for small value
contracts aims at sharing out contracts among pre-qualified firms of good repute and
does not result in higher prices. Overall, its results suggest that restricted auctions,
while saving on transaction costs, preserve a high level of competition between the
‘happy few’ firms selected to bid.
Empirical evidence is divided as to whether discretion favors corrupt behavior at
the expense of cost or quality. The argument is that a public authority might preju-
dicially use its discretion to favor a particular business and derive personal benefits
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from it, whereas open auctions are seen as an instrument that favors accountability
of buyers through greater transparency. Palguta and Pertold [2017] observes that,
in Spain, increased discretion through the possibility to preselect potential bidders
makes firms with anonymous untraceable owners more likely to win the contract.
Bandiera et al. [2009] exploits a policy experiment in the Italian public procurement
system and concludes that public buyers endorsed with more discretionary power
are more efficient and are not more corrupt than more regulated ones, thereby gen-
erating less waste overall. It shows that administrative inefficiency (e.g. buyer’s lack
of skills or excessive regulatory burden) appears to be a more important source of
waste than corruption.
Contributions of the third chapter
The third chapter of this dissertation, co-written with Marion Chabrost, contributes
to the literature which is interested in the question of the benefits of a greater discre-
tion in the procedures of selection of the companies in public procurement. Overall,
this literature uses contract outcomes (price discounts, delays, renegotiations, etc.)
as a measure of the effectiveness of different types of selection procedures involving
different levels of discretion. In this third chapter, our measure of effectiveness does
not correspond to one or more dimensions of the result of the contract. We use the
productivity of the selected company. We believe that this indicator, which reflects
the effectiveness of the company, reflects its ability to provide the good or service
purchased at the best value for money. The first contribution of the chapter consists
in studying a dimension of procurement that has been neglected so far, which is
the effect of increasing discretion on the ability to select an efficient supplier. The
second contribution comes from the policy implication of the result, namely that a
selection procedure which increases discretionary power is potentially in contradic-
tion with the main objective of public procurement which is to get the best outcome
at the lowest price, and with one potential broader objective of public procurement,
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which would be to promote productivity. The third contribution of the paper is to
identify the role of some observed characteristics of the buyer, the contract and the
economic environment in selecting a procedure, in line with the work in Bajari et al.
[2009].
The analysis is performed using a unique dataset of public procurement contracts
in France between 2006 and 2015. It takes advantage of the French regulatory
framework for public procurement, which has allowed the use of flexible competitive
bidding procedures and hence opened room for discretionary power in 2004. In most
countries and organizations, the rules on which public procurement lays on aim at
fostering transparency and efficiency. In this perspective, the use of competitive
and transparent award procedures are promoted by international institutions (e.g.
the World Bank, the OECD) and in many countries, public procurement rules set
thresholds for contract value above which the public buyer must use open competi-
tive procedures. In Europe, the European Commission sets thresholds above which
the use of strictly regulated open auctions is mandatory. Below these thresholds, na-
tional laws apply. In France, below the thresholds set by the European Commission,
public buyers are allowed to choose between using a strictly regulated procedure con-
sisting in an open auction, or a more flexible procedure implying more discretionary
power, named the adapted procedure. The latter procedure gives some freedom to
the buyer on how to advertise and design the tender and how to select the winner,
including the possibility of negotiation.
Our main result is that the adapted procedure leads to an inefficient allocation
of public funds towards less efficient firms through the selection of less productive
firms. The magnitude of the effect is large. This is, to our knowledge, the first time
that this causal effect is identified using this identification strategy. Our results are
robust to several robustness checks which are presented in the paper.
The mechanism through which the adapted procedure could lead to the selection of
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less efficient firms are discussed in the last section of the paper. We have identified
three channels which could explain our main result. First, it could be that firms
self-select in some specific procedures. Second, it could be that buyers invite only
some specific types of firms to bid in adapted procedures. Third, it could be that
pools of bidders contain the most productive firms in both types of procedures but
that the screening of firms leads to different outcomes. To discriminate between
these channels, we would ideally need the identities of all the bidders in the tenders
to compare the pool of bidders in the two procedures. However this information
is not available in our dataset. We hence look at the number of bidders and the
characteristics of the winners, which is the information that is available to us. The
analysis suggests that our result is driven by the pure effect of discretion in the
screening of firms, even if one would need to deepen the analysis by looking at all
the bidders to draw a definite conclusion.
Two reasons could explain why public buyers select less efficient firms in adapted
procedures. The first possible reason is that the public buyer chooses a procedure
with increased discretion in order to be able to select a firm that he wishes to favor
(for example if the public buyer is corrupted) so that the public buyer does not
even try to select an efficient firm. The second possible reason comes from the
purpose of the adapted procedure, which is to be adaptable to the circumstances
of the purchase in order to save on ex ante transaction costs, including publication
costs or screening costs. In this case, a public buyer would select a less efficient firm
using the adapted procedure because he would spend less in the selection process.
Put differently, the loss in productivity can be seen as the cost of reduced ex ante
transaction costs. If the public buyer is corrupted or seeks to favor a particular firm,
then the adapted procedure is purely inefficient. If the public buyer uses an adapted
procedure to save on ex ante transaction costs, one would have to balance the ex
ante transaction costs with the ex post outcomes of the procedures to conclude on
whether increasing discretion in public tenders is on average beneficial.
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CHAPTER 1
Testing Models of Decision under Risk: The Case of
Horserace Bettors in France∗
∗This chapter is published in Revue Economique 69(5), September 2018, under the title “Tests
des modèles de décision en situation de risque : Le cas des parieurs hippiques en France”. Thank
you to seminar participants at Paris 1, QED Meeting, AFSE Meeting and JMA Meeting for helpful
comments and discussions. All errors are my own.
Abstract
One of the most robust findings in the literature using data on horseraces bets is
that odds associated to horses reflect their chances of winning very well, with the
exception that favorites are underbet while outsiders are overbet. Expected utility
theory and behavioral theories of decision under risk compete to explain this finding.
This chapter seeks to discriminate between the two classes of models by testing which
is the most suited to explain the behavior of bettors observed in the data. Using
a unique dataset of bets on horseraces in France, I find that behavioral theories of
decision under risk better fit my data than expected utility. This result shows that
behavioral theories provide a better representation of choice behavior than expected
utility.
Key words: Decision-making, Expected Utility, Cumulative Prospect Theory, Rank-
Dependent Utility, Probability Weighting Function, Risk Aversion, Representative
Bettor, Favorite-Longshot Bias.
JEL classification: D81, L83.
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1.1. Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Horserace betting markets provide a real-life laboratory to study decisions taken
in situations of risk. First, wagering on a horse involves making a choice between
clearly identified alternatives, each alternative being associated with a monetary
outcome. Second, the occurring alternative is observed publicly after a short period
of time. Third, choices are made repeatedly by a large number of participants.
Fourth, extensive information is available on probabilities of outcomes. Horserace
betting markets hence offer the opportunity to test the theoretical framework of
decision under risk in a simple, yet real-life situation. In particular, they share
many characteristics with very simple financial markets.
A large number of papers have taken advantage of these characteristics. They
have studied whether prices associated to horses (odds) reflect their intrinsic values
(chances of winning in a given race). One of the most robust findings of the litera-
ture is that odds associated to horses indeed reflect their intrinsic values very well,
with the exception that favorites (horses with a high chance of winning) tend to be
underbet while outsiders (horses with a relatively small chance of winning) are over-
bet (Sauer [1998]). As a result, expected returns on outsiders are lower than those
on favorites. An abundant literature tries to explain the existence of this empirical
regularity, called the favorite-longshot bias (see Ottaviani and Sorensen [2008] for a
review of the main explanations). In particular, two theories of decision under risk
compete to this purpose.
On the one hand, the standard theory of individual choice in economics (expected
utility theory by Neumann and Morgenstern [1947]) can rationalize the bias by
posing that bettors have, at least locally, a convex utility function for monetary
outcomes. On the other hand, behavioral theories, which are more general than
expected utility, are able to explain the bias by incorporating the fact that decision
makers transform probabilities when assessing the value of risky prospects.
The goal of this chapter is to discriminate between these two classes of models.
The question under study seeks to identify which model best explains the favorite-
longshot bias. Rank-dependent utility and cumulative prospect theory are general-
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izations of expected utility, I hence expect these models to explain the data better
than expected utility. This work aims at determining whether the gain brought by
behavioral models does not occur at the price of too much complexity.
The stake of the question is that using a model that would be too restrictive or that
would be wrong might prevent from understanding commonly observed behaviors or
lead to wrong predictions. Behaviors which can only be explained using behavioral
models include, for example, the equity premium puzzle in finance, the choice of
some menus of premium/deductible in insurance or the labor supply of cab drivers
in labor economics.
Our analysis relies on a unique dataset of bets on horseraces of the French betting
operator from 2013 to 2015. The main contributions of the chapter are the following.
First, I study the existence of the favorite-longshot bias in France, which has not
been done before to my knowledge. Second, I test the results of Jullien and Salanié
[2000] in a different context and at a different time period. Third, I overcome one
of the limits of the paper of Jullien and Salanié [2000], which is that they could
not implement the appropriate statistical tests to compare the models. This novelty
is a major improvement to the paper of Jullien and Salanié [2000] since comparing
models is the main objective of the paper. Fourth, I relax some of the assumptions of
the model of Jullien and Salanié [2000] because the French system is a pari-mutuel
one and not a bookmaker one. Finally, I also test the robustness of the results
against some of the assumptions of the model using the characteristics of races.
I first show that the favorite-longshot bias exists in France. I further find that be-
havioral theories of decision under risk, that is both rank-dependent and cumulative
prospect theories are better suited to explain the behavior of bettors observed in
the data than expected utility is. This result provides evidence that bettors weight
probabilities non linearly when making choices. Using cumulative prospect theory, I
find significant weighting of probabilities in the domain of losses and linear weighting
of probabilities in the domain of gains, which is consistent with the result of Jul-
lien and Salanié [2000] but contradicts results from experiments which find similar
weighting of probabilities in both gains and losses domains (Tversky and Kahneman
[1992] and Abdellaoui [2000]).
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1.1. Introduction
This chapter fits into a considerable theoretical and experimental literature moti-
vated by the observation that, in laboratory experiments, people make choices sys-
tematically inconsistent with expected utility theory (Allais [1953], Kahneman and
Tversky [1979]). Cumulative prospect theory has emerged as the favorite model from
the experimental literature. Evidence that decision makers weight probabilities non
linearly as in cumulative prospect theory were provided by many experiments (see
Camerer and Ho [1994], Tversky and Kahneman [1992], Wu and Gonzalez [1996],
Gonzalez and Wu [1999] and Abdellaoui [2000]). The theory was also found to be
able to rationalize behaviors observed in laboratories that could not be explained
by expected utility. One such example is probabilistic insurance (see Wakker et al.
[1997]). This type of insurance policy involves a small probability (say 1 %) that the
consumer will not be reimbursed. According to expected utility theory (regardless
of the concavity of the utility function), people should pay approximately 99% times
as much for probabilistic insurance as they pay for full insurance. But experimen-
tal responses show that people are willing to pay much less to compensate for the
low chance that the claim will not be paid. This behavior cannot be explained by
expected utility but is consistent with the overweighting of small probabilities of
prospect theory.
Some people have questioned whether the findings of the experimental literature
generalize to real-world data (see List [2003], Levitt and List [2008]). They believe
that biases are less likely in the presence of large stakes, experience and competition.
Existing studies using real-world settings typically rely on insurance, finance and
bets or games market data. While Cicchetti and Dubin [1994] presents evidence
that decisions to purchase insurance against the risk of landline malfunction are
consistent with expected utility theory, Barseghyan et al. [2013] shows that non
linear probability weighting plays a role in the behavior of households in the choice
of auto and home insurance. Kliger and Levy [2009] also finds that cumulative
prospect theory better fits their data than expected utility and rank-dependent
utility relying on data on call options on the S&P500 index. Using data from game
shows, Post et al. [2008] shows that preferences are reference dependent so that
they exhibit characteristics of the cumulative prospect theory model. List [2003]
and List [2004] provide evidence that although inexperienced consumers behave as
in prospect theory, market experience brings experienced traders’ behavior close to
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neoclassical predictions. On the contrary Pope and Schweitzer [2011] shows that
highly experienced professional golfers who face high stakes payoffs and intense
competition exhibit loss aversion as predicted by prospect theory.
My chapter is closely related to the literature using horserace data. Jullien and
Salanié [2000] shows, by focusing on win bets in the UK where the bookmaker system
prevails, that cumulative prospect theory describes the behavior of a representative
agent better than expected utility and rank-dependent utility theories. Contrary to
the usual inversed S-shaped probability weighting function, they find little evidence
for the existence of a certainty effect and of a change in concavity of the probability
weighting functions that they estimate. They also establish that rank-dependent
utility does not improve on expected utility.
Snowberg and Wolfers [2010] uses an impressively large dataset of pari-mutuel bets
in the United States to test predictions derived for expected utility and cumulative
prospect theories in the particular case of win bets on complex bets. Its approach is
based on the fact that the two theories yield different implications for the prices of
complex bets so that by comparing predictions with real prices, the best model can
be identified. It finds that the model with non linear probability weighting provides
the best description of the data, which suggests that prospect theory permits a
better description of the data than expected utility.
The present chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how horserace bets
are organized in France. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 introduces the
model and the estimation procedure. Section 5 presents the results. The last section
concludes.
1.2 Horserace betting in France
The betting market on horseraces in France is exclusively a pari-mutuel system1.
The concept of pari-mutuel consists in pooling together all bets corresponding to a
race and a bet type, removing a share to cover the taxes and expenses of the betting
operator and redistributing the remainder among winning bettors in proportion to
1There are no bookmaker in France.
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1.3. Data
their bets. Final payoffs hence depend exclusively on the total pool, the share kept
by the betting operator (the “take”)2 and the stakes attracted by each horse.
The more stakes a horse attracts relative to the total pool, the lower the payoff of a
bet on this horse. Payoffs on horses are called odds. For the simplest type of bets
(which are the focus of the chapter), which consists in finding the winner of a given
race, odds of 1.2 on a given horse and race means that a 1 unit winning bet on that
horse returns the bet (1) plus 1.2. Odds hence correspond to net returns of a unit
bet. A horse cannot have odds inferior to 0.1.
For a race happening on a particular day, the market opens online at about 5 AM
on the day of the race. For a bettor which prefers to go to a specialized store, it
starts on the day of the race at the opening of stores. A bettor at the track can only
bet about thirty minutes before the beginning of the race. The market closes right
before the start of the race. Because of the way odds are computed in the pari-
mutuel system, bettors only have access to temporary odds which are computed
with the current state of bets and are updated about every minute online.
1.3 Data
Data were collected from pmu.fr between April 2013 and May 2015. PMU (Pari-
Mutuel Urbain) is the main operator of bets in France. Online, it gathers 84.8% of
the total pool and, in-store, it is a legal monopoly. The dataset records information
on bets, races, horses and tracks for races which were the subject of bets offered by
the PMU. It contains 33,196 races.
For each race, the dataset encompasses the final payoff of each horse, its rank in
the race and many of its characteristics. In addition to the time of day, date and
track, races are also characterized by their discipline, types and conditions. The
data only contains the payoffs of each horse for winning bets, which are the focus
in this chapter.
Since I am interested in modeling the process of decision-making regarding the choice
2In addition to the “take”, French operators also enjoy “breakage”, which is the gain from
rounding payoffs downwards to the nearest ten cents.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Races per day 32 9.29 13 80 735
Running horses per race 12 3.31 2 24 23,464
Odds 27 31.79 0.1 998 279,792
of a specific horse in a race, I drop the 7,919 races in which two or more horses in
a given race belong to a team, which happens when horses have the same owner or
the same trainer. In these cases, all the horses of the team have the same payoff
and if one of them wins the race, a bet on any of the horses in the team also wins.
Hence the payoff of a horse that is part of a team does not reflect its probability of
winning, but rather the probability that any horse in the team wins.
I also remove races in which several horses arrive in the first position, called dead-
heats, because I model a race in which only one horse wins the race. I drop races for
which payoffs are incomplete or erroneous. It includes races which are not recorded
as being over, in which at least one running horse has a missing payoff and for which
the final payoff of the winning horse does not correspond to the dividend. I am left
with 23,462 races.
As Table 1.1 shows, the average number of races per day amounts to 32. During
some days, 80 races take place, while on other days only 13 do. The average number
of running horses in a given race is 12. The minimum is 2 while the maximum is
24. Half of the races includes between 9 and 14 running horses. The distribution
of odds covers a wide range. The maximum reaches 998 while the minimum is 0.1.
The median amounts to 15.4 and the mean to 27. 90% of odds range between 0.1
and 68.4.
Figure 1.1 shows that the sample contains large favorites, with odds between 0.1
and 0.5 (0.2% of the sample), and very long outsiders with odds above 50 (19% of
the sample).
Using these definitions, 64% of large favorites and 0.6% of very long outsiders won
their race. Alternatively, defining large favorites as horses that attract twice more
bets than the second-most-bet horse in their race, large favorites win 44% of the
time.
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1.4. Model and estimation procedure
Figure 1.1: Distribution of odds (90 % of odds only)
1.4 Model and estimation procedure
1.4.1 The theoretical model
The model describes the decision of a representative bettor who bets a in a given
race and is endowed with an initial wealth M 3. The choice of a particular horse
in the race depends only on its probability of winning and final odds. In a given
race r with N horses, the bettor is hence presented with a menu of probabilities and
odds ((O1, p1), (O2, p2), ...(ON , pN))r, probabilities being non negative and summing
to one.
I assume that the menu is known to the bettor when he makes his choice. In practice,
final odds are not known until the beginning of the race and the bettor does not
have perfect knowledge of probabilities of winning. However, previous studies of
horserace bettors imply that bettors have a good knowledge of chances of winning
of horses4 (see Sauer [1998]).
3The data do not contain information on the amount bet (a) or on the wealth of bettors (M).
4The assumption that bettors know the probabilities of winning of the horses running in the
race was tested by reestimating the model on a dataset limited to races in which horses are aged 4
or more and have previously run. In these races, bettors are likely to have a very good knowledge
of probabilities of winning of horses. Limiting the dataset to this subsample did not modify the
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Writing Hi the action of betting on horse i, the overall value of a bet on horse i,
W (Hi), is a number such that the bettor prefers horse i to horse j or is indifferent
between horses i and j if and only if W (Hi) ≥ W (Hj). The representative bettor is
rational in that he bets on the horse with the highest overall value.
Furthermore, I assume that the race is only won by one horse. In this perspective,
the few races won by several horses were removed from the sample.
Given the stated assumptions, bettors continue to bet in a given race until odds
make them indifferent between betting on any horse in the race and not betting5.
So in equilibrium:
∀i ∈ 1, ..., N, W (Hi) = w, w constant (1.1)
Let a be the amount bet by the representative bettor, M her initial wealth, Oi the
odds associated to horse i and pi the probability of winning of horse i. I also define
u, a continuous and strictly increasing utility function with u(0) = 0 and write ϕ+
the probability weighting function of gains and ϕ− that of losses. Both probability
weighting functions are strictly continuous and increasing from the unit interval into
itself and satisfy ϕ+(0) = ϕ−(0) = 0 and ϕ+(1) = ϕ−(1) = 1. In general terms, the
overall value of a bet on horse i can be written :
W (pi, a, M, Oi) = ϕ+(pi) ∗ u(M + aOi) + ϕ−(1 − pi) ∗ u(M − a) (1.2)
The specific expression of the overall value of a bet on horse i depends on the
model of decision-making studied. In expected utility, ϕ+(pi) = ϕ−(pi) = pi. In
rank-dependent theory, ϕ−(1 − pi) = 1 − ϕ+(pi) and in cumulative prospect theory
M = 0, so that I assume that the reference point is not betting6. More details on
results presented in the chapter.
5The equilibrium assumption is stronger in Jullien and Salanié [2000] because odds are chosen
by bookmakers (bookmaker system), not by the market (pari-mutuel system). Here my assumption
is simply that odds adjust so that bettors are indifferent between all horses at the end of the period.
Jullien and Salanié [2000] has to assume that odds are set by bookmakers such that bettors are
indifferent between all horses because of the additional assumption that all horses in the race are
bet.
6This assumption is in line with the literature which commonly assumes that the reference point
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1.4. Model and estimation procedure
Table 1.2: Probability weighting functions
Name Expression Restrictions on parameters
Power ϕ(p) = pα α > 0
Tversky and Kahneman [1992] ϕ(p) = p
γ
[pγ+(1−p)γ ]1/γ
γ > 0
Cicchetti and Dubin [1994] ϕ(p)
1−ϕ(p)
= ( p
1−p
)a1 ∗ ( p0
1−p0
)1−a1 a1 � 0, p0 ∈ [0, 1]
Prelec [1998] ϕ(p) = e−β(− ln p)
α
0 < α � 1, β > 0
Lattimore et al. [1992] ϕ(p) = δp
γ
δpγ+(1−p)γ
γ > 0, δ > 0
each model are given in Appendix A1.
The model is solved using the procedure of Jullien and Salanié [2000] which consists
in computing w and then the probability of winning of the horse which actually
won the race (p1), which is in turn used to compute the likelihood function. The
procedure used to obtain p1 is explained for each model in Appendix A2.
1.4.2 Functional form of the utility function
Following Jullien and Salanié [2000], I assume that the utility function has the
following CARA form throughout the chapter: u(x, θ) = 1−e
−θx
θ
.
The CARA form allows the estimation of the level of absolute risk aversion θ under
the assumption that it is constant. Bettors are risk-loving if θ < 0 and risk-averse
if θ > 0. This expression of u is convenient since M , which is not observed, cancels
out in the expression of the probability used in the likelihood function.
1.4.3 Functional forms of the probability weighting functions
The common functional forms presented in Table 1.2 are estimated. More informa-
tion on these functions is available in Appendix A3.
Let Ω be the vector of parameters of the probability weighting functions correspond-
is the status quo. For a discussion on how people think about gains and losses, see Köszegi and
Rabin [2006], Köszegi and Rabin [2007] and Köszegi and Rabin [2009].
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Table 1.3: Definition of the vector of parameters Ω
Name Rank-dependent utility Cumulative prospect theory
Power Ω = α Ω = (α, β)
Tversky and Kahneman [1992] Ω = γ Ω = (γ, γ �)
Cicchetti and Dubin [1994] Ω = (a1, p0) Ω = (a1, p0, a�1, p
�
0)
Prelec [1998] Ω = (α, β) Ω = (α, β, α�, β�)
Lattimore et al. [1992] Ω = (δ, γ) Ω = (δ, γ, δ�, γ�)
ing to each model. Ω, which depends on the shape of the probability function to
estimate and on whether the model uses one single probability weighting function
(rank-dependent utility) or two probability weighting functions (one for gains and
one for losses as in cumulative prospect theory), is defined in Table 1.3.
1.4.4 Estimation
Let θ be the parameter of the utility function and Ω the vector of parameters of the
probability weighting functions defined in Table 1.3 for each functional form of the
probability weighting function and each model to estimate.
pr1 is the probability of winning of the horse which actually won race r, with r =
1, ..., J . For each r, the likelihood to observe horse 1 winning the race is l(θ, Ω; Or1) =
p1(Or1; θ, Ω).
Assuming that outcomes of races are independent and that the expressions of p1
derived from the model are correct, the probability of observing the sample under
study is the product of the J individual densities, which corresponds to the following
likelihood function:
J�
r=1
p1(Or1; θ, Ω) = L(θ, Ω|O
r
1)
Hence the log-likelihood function:
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1.5. Results
LL = ln L(θ, Ω|Or1) =
J�
r=1
ln p1(Or1; θ, Ω)
The maximum likelihood estimator has the usual asymptotic properties. It is con-
sistent, asymptotically normal, asymptotically efficient and invariant.
θˆ ∼ N(θ0, [I(θ0)]−1), I(θ0) = −E0(∂2 ln L/∂θ0∂θ�0) = −E0(∂ ln L/∂θ0 ∗ ∂ ln L/∂θ
�
0)
Standard errors are computed using both a bootstrap procedure and the previous
formula.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 The favorite-longshot bias
The favorite-longshot bias is the finding that betting on favorites (horses with small
odds) yields a higher expected return than betting on longshots (horses with rel-
atively high odds). It has been shown in a large number of papers, starting with
Griffith [1949]. It has been observed across various types of races and at different
times in North America (McGlothin [1956], Weitzman [1965], Ali [1977], Snyder
[1978], Asch et al. [1982], Snowberg and Wolfers [2010]) where the pari-mutuel sys-
tem prevails, in the UK in both the pari-mutuel and bookmaker systems (Williams
and Paton [1997], Jullien and Salanié [2000]), in Australia in both the pari-mutuel
(Coleman [2002]) and bookmaker systems (Bird et al. [1987]) and in New Zealand
in the pari-mutuel system (Coleman [2002], Gandar et al. [2001]).
The first result of the chapter is that the favorite-longshot bias also exists in France.
The expected return for a 1-unit bet on horse i is Ri = pii ∗ Oi + (1 − pii) ∗ (−1),
where pii is the probability of winning of horse i and Oi corresponds to its final odds.
The probability of winning of a horse, which is the proportion of times the horse
would win the same race repeated an infinitely large number of times, is unknown so
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Figure 1.2: Expected returns by odds
I compute expected returns using the approach commonly adopted in the literature
(see Coleman [2004]), which consists in grouping all horses of the dataset by either
intervals of odds or favorite order (the favorite is in the first group, the second
favorite in the second group, etc.) and computing the percentage of winners and
the average odds of each group.
Expected returns are graphed in Figure 1.2, horses were grouped by odds percentiles
and data is presented on a log-odds scale.
Figure 1.2 shows that returns are not equalized across betting odds: betting on
favorites yields a higher rate of return than betting on outsiders. The expected
return of betting horses with odds of 127 to 1 is −0.6, whereas it is −0.07 for horses
with odds 1.43. Hence payoffs of favorites are not low enough to compensate for
their high probabilities of winning, or equivalently favorites are underbet compared
to their probabilities of winning. On the contrary, payoffs of outsiders are not high
enough to compensate for their low probabilities of winning, or equivalently, they
are overbet.
Hence, in a simple model with linear utility and probability weighting functions, the
data shows that, in equilibrium, rates of returns are not equalized across horses in a
race. Many suggestions have been made to explain this bias, one of which being that
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1.5. Results
Table 1.4: Expected utility model
EU model
aθ -0.014***
(0.0011)
Max LL -45,977.315
the simple model does not properly account for the tastes and beliefs of bettors.
1.5.2 Tests of models of decision-making under risk
Expected utility model
The results of the parameters obtained in the expected utility framework, as well as
the maximum value of the log-likelihood function are presented in Table 1.4.
aθ is significantly negative and has a small absolute value, meaning that at least
statistically and in the income range in which I test them, bettors exhibit a small
and significant taste for risk. The parameter is smaller to the one obtained by
Jullien and Salanié [2000] (−0.055) but similar to that of Snowberg and Wolfers
[2010] which fits their data with a CARA utility function of parameter −0.017.
A bet of e20 on a horse with odds 10 and probability of winning of 25% is equiv-
alent to the lottery winning e200 with a probability of 25% and loosing 20 with a
probability of 75%. The estimated risk-attitude parameter makes a bettor indiffer-
ent between this lottery and the sure amount of e38. A risk neutral bettor would
be indifferent between the same lottery and the sure amount of e35 so that the
behavior of bettors exhibits some risk-love.
Rank-dependent utility model
The results for all functional forms of the probability weighting functions tested are
presented in Table 1.5 and graphed in Figure 1.3.
The risk-attitude parameter of the utility function is negative, statistically significant
and small in every specification of the rank-dependent utility model.
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Table 1.5: Rank-dependent utility models
Power CD LBW Prelec TK
aθ -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.011***
(0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0018)
α 0.97*** 0.91***
(0.014) (0.045)
a1 0.99***
(0.026)
p0 0.99***
(0.22)
γ 1.05*** 0.98***
(0.035) (0.011)
δ 1.48***
(0.237)
β 1.28***
(0.077)
Max LL -45,975.289 -45,974.628 -45,972.658 -45,972.481 -45,975.363
Figure 1.3: Rank-dependent theory - Estimated probability weighting functions
64
1.5. Results
Table 1.6: Comparisons of rank-dependent utility models and expected-utility: sta-
tistical tests
EU RD Power RD CD RD LBW RD Prelec RD TK
AIC 91 957 91 955 91 955 91 951 91 951 91 955
BIC 91 965 91 971 91 979 91 976 91 975 91 971
Likelihood ratio vs. EU 4.1 5.4 9.3 9.7 3.9
Critical value 3.8 6 6 6 3.8
The statistically significant power coefficient differs from and is slightly inferior to 1
(column 1 of Table 1.5) so that ϕ(p) > p, which reflects optimism. In the Cicchetti
and Dubin function (column 2), a1 is not significantly different from 1 although it
is precisely estimated so that p0 is not identified and we are back to the expected
utility model. In the Lattimore, Baker and Witte function (column 3), γ does not
significantly differ from 1 while δ is large and statistically significantly different from
1 at the 5% level. The function is concave and above the 45 degree line, suggesting
optimism. In the Prelec function (column 4), α is close to but statistically different
from 1, β is large and also statistically different from 1. The function is convex
and below the 45 degree line, showing pessimism. In the Tversky and Kahneman
function (column 5), γ is close to but statistically different from 1.
The expected utility model is nested within all models. Likelihood ratio tests be-
tween the latter and the rank-dependent utility models are presented in Table 1.6.
Likelihood ratio tests show that the rank-dependent utility model statistically sig-
nificantly better fits the data than the expected utility model in four specifications
(power, Lattimore et al., Prelec and Tversky and Kahneman). One can notice that
the likelihood ratios are however very close to the associated critical values for the
power and Tversky and Kahneman functions. The first conclusion of the analysis is
that the rank-dependent utility model better fits the data than the expected utility
model. This conclusion differs from Jullien and Salanié [2008] which concluded that
rank-dependent utility models did not improve the fit compared to the expected
utility model because they found that only the Prelec specification fitted their data
better than expected utility.
The results do not permit to conclude on the overall attitude toward risk of bettors,
which combines both the risk attitude parameter of the utility function and the
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shape of the probability weighting function. As Figure 1.3 suggests, the power and
the Tversky and Kahneman functions are extremely close to the diagonal. Table
1.5 shows that attitude toward risk is similar in the expected utility model and the
rank-dependent models with power and Tversky and Kahneman weighting functions.
The difference between the expected utility model and these models hence does not
change anything in terms of behavior of bettors: bettors exhibit a small taste for risk.
In Lattimore et al., the risk attitude parameter suggests that bettors are risk-lovers,
which is reinforced by the overweighting of probabilities. In the Prelec specification,
the risk attitude parameter suggests risk-love but bettors underweight probabilities
so that in the end their behavior exhibits risk aversion. To illustrate, the estimated
parameters in the Prelec case make a bettor indifferent between the lottery winning
e200 with a probability of 25% and loosing 20 with a probability of 75% and the
sure amount of e22. In the Lattimore et al. specification, it makes the bettor
indifferent between the same lottery and the sure amount of e54. Because risk-
neutrality corresponds to the sure amount of e35, the bettor exhibits risk aversion
in the first case and risk-love in the second. I am not able to discriminate between
the models within the rank-dependent theory as the Akaike information criterion
and the Bayesian information criterion, as well as Vuong tests between models, are
inconclusive7.
Cumulative prospect theory
The results for all functional forms of the probability weighting functions tested are
presented in Table 1.7. Probability weighting functions for gains are graphed in
Figure 1.4 and probability weighting functions for losses in Figure 1.5.
The risk-attitude parameter of the utility function is negative, statistically significant
and small in every specification of the cumulative prospect theory model.
The statistically significant power coefficient differs from and is slightly above 1 in
the power probability weighting function of gains and below 1 in the power proba-
bility weighting function of losses (column 1 of Table 1.7). In the case of gains, it is
very close to the diagonal, showing almost no weighting of probabilities. In the case
7I can only establish, using a likelihood ratio test, that the Prelec model, within which the
power model is nested, performs better than the power function.
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Table 1.7: Cumulative Prospect Theory models
Power CD LBW Prelec TK
aθ -0,017*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.0089** -0.014***
(0.0027) (0.0048) (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0021)
α 1.078*** 0.75***
(0.036) (0.26)
β 0.474*** 1.79
(0.123) (1.35)
α� 0.99
(2.94)
β� 0.084
(0.40)
a1 1.05***
(0.15)
p0 0.99***
(0.25)
a�1 0.74
(0.85)
p�0 0.99***
(0.31)
γ 1.05*** 0.99***
(0.085) (0.012)
δ 0.39
(1.00)
γ� 0.96 0.77***
(2.35) (0.072)
δ� 16.94
(123.00)
Max LL -45,972.178 -45,971.818 45,970.667 -45,970.320 -45,972.613
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Figure 1.4: Cumulative Prospect Theory - Estimated probability weighting functions
for gains
Figure 1.5: Cumulative Prospect Theory - Estimated probability weighting functions
for losses
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of losses, it is well above the 45-degree line, showing clearly that bettors overweight
probabilities of losses, which reflects pessimism.
In the Tversky and Kahneman function (column 5), γ does not differ from 1 in
the probability weighting function of gains but it does regarding the probability
weighting function of losses, with γ � = 0.77. The function slightly overweights small
probabilities and underweights high probabilities, being hence inverse S-shaped. The
curvature of the function is less pronounced than in experimental studies such as
Camerer and Ho [1994] which estimated a probability weighting function of gains
with parameter 0.56, Tversky and Kahneman [1992] which found 0.61 for gains and
0.69 for losses, Gonzalez and Wu [1999] which found 0.71 for gains and Abdellaoui
[2000] which found 0.60 for gains and 0.70 for losses. I hence find more sensitivity
to changes in probabilities far from 0 and 1 than those studies and less pronounced
certainty and possibility effects.
In the Cicchetti and Dubin function (column 2), a1 is not significantly different
from 1 in the case of gains so p0 is not identified and the model is equivalent to
expected utility. The estimated parameters of the Cicchetti and Dubin probability
weighting function of losses have very high standard errors so that I cannot draw any
conclusion from their values. Parameters are also too imprecisely estimated in the
Lattimore, Baker and Witte (column 3) and the Prelec (column 4) specifications to
draw any conclusion. Taking a look at the point estimates, the Prelec and Lattimore,
Baker and Witte probability weighting functions of losses exhibit the same shape
as the power function does and the Cicchetti and Dubin function is close to the
Tversky and Kahneman one. However, the statistical significance of the parameters
does not authorize to reject expected utility even if likelihood ratio tests favor these
specifications over expected utility.
Likelihood ratio tests between the expected utility model and the cumulative prospect
theory models are presented in Table 1.8.
Likelihood ratio tests show that cumulative prospect theory models significantly
better fit the data than expected utility in all specifications so that expected utility
is clearly rejected. This result is consistent with the conclusions of Jullien and
Salanié [2000].
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Table 1.8: Comparisons of cumulative prospect theory models and expected-utility:
statistical tests
EU CPT Power CPT CD CPT LBW CPT Prelec CPT TK
AIC 91 957 91 950 91 954 91 951 91 951 91 951
BIC 91 965 91 975 91 994 91 992 91 991 91 975
Likelihood ratio vs. EU 10 11 13.3 14 9.4
Critical value 6 9.5 9.5 9.5 6
Vuong tests between the cumulative prospect theory models using the power and
Tversky and Kahneman weighting functions and rank-dependent utility models fall
in the inconclusive region except for the rank-dependent utility model with the Prelec
probability weighting function for which I find that cumulative prospect theory
models are closer to the true model. There is hence slight evidence that cumulative
prospect theory performs better than rank-dependent utility theory but I cannot
draw any clear-cut conclusion on that.
Jullien and Salanié [2000] finds that the data does not support changing concavity
in the probability weighting functions and that the probability weighting function
for losses is concave while the weighting function for gains is linear. Camerer [2000]
interprets this result as a new explanation for the favorite-longshot bias: “Bettors
like longshots because they have a convex utility and weight their high chances of
losing and small chances of winning roughly linearly. But they hate favorites because
they like to gamble (u(x) is convex), but are disproportionately afraid of the small
chance of losing when they bet on a heavy favorite”.
I find, like Jullien and Salanié [2000], a clear difference between probability weighting
of gains, which is quasi linear, and probability weighting of losses, which departs
from the 45-degree line.
The power model gives the same result as Jullien and Salanié [2000]: the power
function which weights probabilities associated to the utility of losses is concave and
well above the diagonal. I also estimate the Tversky and Kahneman function, which
was not done by Jullien and Salanié [2000]. It tells a different story since it is inverse
S-shaped and close to the diagonal.
I am not able to discriminate between the two models. AIC and BIC of the power
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and the Tversky and Kahneman models are very close (see Table 1.8). Furthermore,
the Vuong statistic for non nested models falls in the inconclusive region. I hence
cannot conclude on the way bettors weight probabilities. I also cannot conclude on
the risk attitude of bettors since the two models have different implications in terms
of behaviors of bettors. To illustrate, the estimated parameters in the Tversky and
Kahneman model make a bettor indifferent between the lottery winning e200 with
a probability of 25% and loosing 20 with a probability of 75% and the sure amount
of e40. In the power model, it makes the bettor indifferent between the same lottery
and the sure amount of e31. In the first case, the bettor hence exhibits a slightly
risk-loving attitude, while in the second case, he is clearly risk-averse.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter relies on the model of Jullien and Salanié [2000] to compare the fit
of expected utility theory, rank-dependent utility theory and cumulative prospect
theory to French data on horserace bets. It shows that the favorite-longshot bias
exists in France. It additionally establishes that both rank-dependent utility and
cumulative prospect theory are better suited to explain the data than expected
utility is, suggesting that bettors weight probabilities non linearly when making
choices. In rank-dependent utility, my results contradict those of Jullien and Salanié
[2000] which found no improvement in fit with this model. In cumulative prospect
theory, my results confirm those of Jullien and Salanié [2000].
The analysis however suffers from one main limitation. I do not have data on
individual bettors so I have to study the behavior of a representative bettor. This
is potentially problematic since bettors might differ with respect to their attitude
toward risk and their beliefs.
Two interesting research paths could be pursued to complement the study. First,
I do not test several shapes of the utility function but rather focus on the proba-
bility weighting function. Jullien and Salanié [2000] initiated this possible venue of
research by testing a HARA utility function. However because they did not have
data on the wealth of bettors, they could not pursue further and finally chose to use
a CARA utility function. I face the same limitations due to available data. Second,
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my data does not allow to test loss aversion, which is one of the main characteristics
of cumulative prospect theory. Information on the amount bet could allow to follow
this path in future research.
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A1. Overall value of a bet in each model
Appendices
A1 Overall value of a bet in each model
The representative bettor bets a in each race and is endowed with an initial wealth
M . The choice of a particular horse depends only on the probability of winning of
the horse and final odds written (O1, p1), (O2, p2), ...(ON , pN) for the N horses of a
race.
A1.1 Expected utility model
The final state of endowment of a bettor wagering on horse i can either be M − a
if the horse loses the race or M + aOi if the horse finishes first. The former occurs
with a probability of 1 − pi and the latter with a probability of pi. The overall value
of a bet on horse i is hence W (pi, a, M, Oi) = pi ∗ u(M + aOi) + (1 − pi) ∗ u(M − a),
where u is a continuous and strictly increasing utility function such that u(0) = 0.
A1.2 Rank-dependent utility model
In the rank-dependent utility model (Quiggin [1982]), the overall value of a prospect
with two possible outcomes equals the utility derived from the worst outcome, which
the decision maker is sure to get, plus the possible increase in utility from obtain-
ing the best outcome, weighted by the weighted probability of obtaining the best
outcome.
The overall value of a bet on horse i is hence W (pi, a, M, Oi) = ϕ(pi)∗u(M +aOi)+
(1 − ϕ(pi)) ∗ u(M − a), where ϕ is the probability weighting function, continuous
and strictly increasing from [0, 1] to [0, 1] and satisfying ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = 1.
A1.3 Cumulative prospect theory model
The cumulative prospect theory model developed by Tversky and Kahneman [1992]
departs from the rank-dependent utility model in that outcomes are perceived as
73
gains and losses with respect to a reference point. Additionally, the value function
differs for gains and for losses. It is generally concave for gains and convex for losses;
and steeper for losses than for gains to reflect loss aversion.
The probability weighting function overweights small probabilities and underweights
moderate and high probabilities. It is inverse S-shaped, meaning concave then con-
vex. The more curved it is, the more sensitivity to small probability changes near
the extreme of the probability scale. This property is called diminishing sensitivity.
The point where the function intersects the diagonal lies at a probability level of
approximately 1/3.
A winning bettor obtains aOi. This happens with probability pi. Losses amount
to a and occur with probability 1 − pi. The probability weighting function of gains
is written ϕ+ and that of losses ϕ−. Both functions are strictly continuous and
increasing from the unit interval into itself and satisfy ϕ+(0) = ϕ−(0) = 0 and
ϕ+(1) = ϕ−(1) = 1. The overall value of a bet on horse i is W (pi, a, Oi) = ϕ+(pi) ∗
u(aOi) + ϕ−(1 − pi) ∗ u(−a).
Note that utility is the same for gains and losses. The reason is that a is not
observed so I do not have enough data to identify u in the domain of losses. Hence
loss aversion is not modelled here. Note also that the reference point is the status quo
which corresponds to not betting. Two key aspects of cumulative prospect theory
are hence modelled here: reference-dependence and different probability weighting
of gains and losses.
A2 Obtaining p1 to estimate the parameters of the mod-
els
A2.1 Expected utility model
Let a be the amount bet by the representative bettor, M her initial wealth, Oi
the odds associated to horse i, pi the probability of winning of horse i and w a
constant. I also define u, a continuous and strictly increasing utility function such
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that u(0) = 0.
In equilibrium, ∀i ∈ 1, ..., N, pi ∗ u(M + aOi) + (1 − pi) ∗ u(M − a) = w.
So that:
pi=
w − u(M − a)
u(M + aOi) − (M − a)
(3)
Because
N�
i=1
pi = 1,
w = u(M − a) +
1
�N
j=1
1
u(M+aOj)−u(M−a)
(4)
Combining equations 3 and 4 solves the model for pi:
pi =
1
u(M + aOi) − u(M − a)
∗
1
�N
j=1
1
u(M+aOj)−u(M−a)
(5)
Given equation 5 and the shape of u,
pi =
1
eaθ − e−aθOi
∗
1
�N
j=1
1
eaθ−e−aθOj
(6)
Note that a, which is not observed in the data, cannot be disentangled from θ.
A2.2 Rank-dependent utility model
Let a be the amount bet by the representative bettor, M her initial wealth, Oi the
odds associated to horse i, pi the probability of winning of horse i and w a constant. I
also define u, a continuous and strictly increasing utility function such that u(0) = 0
and ϕ a probability weighting function, continuous and strictly increasing from [0, 1]
to [0, 1] and satisfying ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = 1.
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In equilibrium ∀i ∈ 1, ..., N, ϕ(pi) ∗ u(M + aOi) + (1 − ϕ(pi)) ∗ u(M − a) = w.
So that:
ϕ(pi)=
w − u(M − a)
u(M + aOi) − (M − a)
(7)
Writing Ψ the reciprocal function of ϕ (which exists since ϕ is strictly increasing):
pi = Ψ(
w − u(M − a)
u(M + aOi) − u(M − a)
) (8)
Because
N�
i=1
pi = 1:
N�
j=1
Ψ(
w − u(M − a)
u(M + aOj) − u(M − a)
) = 1 (9)
Solving this equation, which cannot be done analytically, gives w. Replacing w in
equation 8 solves the model for pi.
A2.3 Cumulative prospect theory
Let a be the amount bet by the representative bettor, Oi the odds associated to
horse i and pi the probability of winning of horse i. I also define u, a continuous
and strictly increasing utility function such that u(0) = 0 and write ϕ+ the proba-
bility weighting function of gains and ϕ− that of losses. Both probability weighting
functions are strictly continuous and increasing from the unit interval into itself and
satisfy ϕ+(0) = ϕ−(0) = 0 and ϕ+(1) = ϕ−(1) = 1.
In equilibrium,
∀i ∈ 1, ..., N, ϕ+(pi) ∗ u(aOi) + ϕ−(1 − pi)) ∗ u(−a) = w. (10)
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Using the fact that
N�
i=1
pi = 1 and combining it with equation 10 solves the model
for pi. It can not be done in a closed form so that p1 is obtained numerically.
A3 Details on probability weighting functions by model
A3.1 Rank-dependent utility model
Power probability weighting function
The probability weighting function has the shape:
ϕ(p) = pα
where α ≥ 0. If the weighted probability of winning the bet is inferior to the real
probability (α > 1), bettors underestimate the overall value of a bet, they are
pessimistic. The expected utility model is equivalent to this model for α = 1.
Cicchetti and Dubin probability weighting function
The function introduced by Cicchetti and Dubin [1994] is:
ϕ(p)
1 − ϕ(p)
= (
p
1 − p
)a1 ∗ (
p0
1 − p0
)1−a1
ϕ(p) crosses the diagonal in p0. a1 is positive. If a1 < 1, the function is convex, then
concave. Inversely, if a1 > 1, it is first concave, then convex. The closer a1 is to 1,
the closer to the diagonal the function is, which means relatively little sensitivity
to small probabilities changes near the extreme of the probability scale and high
sensitivity far off the extremes of the probability scale. When a1 = 1, we are back
to the expected utility model and p0 is not identified.
This function is strictly increasing, its inverse is :
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Ψ(p) =
( p
(1−p)∗A
)1/a1
1 + ( p
(1−p)∗A
)1/a1
with A = (
p0
(1 − p0)
)1−a1
Lattimore, Baker and Witte probability weighting function
The function proposed by Lattimore et al. [1992] is:
ϕ(p) =
δpγ
δpγ + (1 − p)γ
where δ and γ are strictly positive. δ primarily controls the elevation of the function.
It captures the extent of pessimism or optimism. γ primarily controls curvature (i.e.,
sensitivity to changes in probabilities). When δ = 1 and γ = 1, we are back to the
expected utility model. This function is strictly increasing, its inverse Ψ is:
Ψ(p) =
( p
δ(1−p)
)1/γ
1 + ( p
δ(1−p)
)1/γ
Prelec probability weighting function
The probability weighting function proposed by Prelec [1998] is:
ϕ(p) = e−β(− ln p)
α
where 0 < α � 1 and β > 0. When β = 1 and α = 1, we are back to expected utility.
It is equivalent to the power specification for α = 1. α represents the sensitivity to
probabilities: the smaller it is, the more curved the function. β < 1 shows optimism,
β > 1 pessimism. β hence controls the elevation of the function.
This function is strictly increasing, I write its inverse Ψ.
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Ψ(p) = exp(−(−
ln p
β
)(1/α))
Tversky and Kahneman probability weighting function
The probability weighting function of Tversky and Kahneman [1992] is:
ϕ(p) =
pγ
[pγ + (1 − p)γ]1/γ
When γ = 1, we are back to the expected utility hypothesis.
A3.2 Cumulative prospect theory
Power probability weighting functions
Probability weighting functions have the following shapes:
ϕ+(p) = pα, ϕ−(p) = pβ
When α = 1 and β = 1, we are back to the expected utility hypothesis, except that
utility applies to gains and losses rather than to final wealth. Since M cancels out
in the expected utility model, it is nested within this model.
Cicchetti and Dubin probability weighting functions
Assuming that the probability weighting functions have the following shapes:
ϕ+(p)
1 − ϕ+(p)
= (
p
1 − p
)a1 ∗ (
p0
1 − p0
)1−a1
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ϕ−(p)
1 − ϕ−(p)
= (
p
1 − p
)a
�
1 ∗ (
p�0
1 − p�0
)1−a
�
1
These functions cross the diagonal in p0 and p�0. a1 and a
�
1 are positive. When a1 =
a�1 = 1, we are back to the expected utility hypothesis. a1 = a
�
1 and p0 + p
�
0 = 1
is equivalent to rank-dependent utility with the Cicchetti and Dubin probability
weighting function. The reflection case occurs when a1 = a�1 and p0 = p
�
0.
Lattimore, Baker, Witte probability weighting functions
Assuming that the probability weighting functions have the following shapes:
ϕ+(p) =
δpγ
δpγ + (1 − p)γ
ϕ−(p) =
δ�pγ
�
δ�pγ� + (1 − p)γ�
where δ, γ, δ� and γ� are strictly positive. When δ = γ = δ� = γ� = 1, we are back to
the expected utility hypothesis. The reflection case occurs when δ = δ� and γ = γ�.
Prelec probability weighting functions
Assuming that the probability weighting functions have the following shapes:
ϕ+(p) = e−β(− ln p)
α
ϕ−(p) = e−β
�(− ln p)α
�
where 0 < α � 1, β > 0, 0 < α� � 1 and β� > 0. When β = α = β � = α� = 1, we are
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back to expected utility. It is equivalent to the power specification for α = α� = 1.
The reflection case occurs when α = α� and β = β�.
Tversky and Kahneman probability weighting functions
Assuming that the probability weighting functions have the following shapes:
ϕ+(p) =
pγ
[pγ + (1 − p)γ]1/γ
ϕ−(p) =
pγ�
[pγ� + (1 − p)γ�]1/γ�
γ and γ� are positive. When γ = γ � = 1, we are back to the expected utility
hypothesis. The reflection case occurs when γ = γ �.
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CHAPTER 2
Merger Efficiency Gains: An Assessment of the French
Urban Transport Industry∗
∗This chapter was written with Joanna Piechucka (DIW BERLIN). We are extremely thankful
to CEREMA, GART and UTP for providing the complete database on urban public transport in
France for the purpose of our research. Thank you to seminar participants at CERNA, CREST,
Paris 1, the CRESSE Conference, EARIE Annual Conference, AFSE Meeting and JMA Meeting
for helpful comments and discussions. All errors are our own.
Abstract
This chapter provides an ex post evaluation of the merger that took place between
Veolia Transport and Transdev in the French urban public transport industry in
2011, focusing on the existence and possible extent of efficiency gains, which are
often overlooked in merger evaluation studies. We apply a difference-in-differences
methodology to evaluate the effect of the merger on operating costs of transport
operators. Our results show that the merger did not lead to any decrease in operating
costs for the merging parties. Our study relies on the use of several control groups.
It is robust to a great number of robustness checks as well as to the introduction
of heterogeneous treatment effects, depending on the identity of the merging party,
the contract type in place and the closeness of competition of local operators. A
convincing explanation is that the merger proved to be problematic to implement
because the choice of Veolia Transport was made too hastily, the two companies
had very different cultures, clients and employees were reluctant to the merger and
the merger was not well prepared. While we cannot generalize our results, we
contribute to a growing number of case studies undertaken by economists which can
help determining whether horizontal merger policy is being properly enforced and is
efficient. Our findings also highlight the importance of the context (culture, choice
of the target, perception by clients and employees, operational preparation of the
merger, etc.) on the realization of efficiency gains, a determinant that is not given
much weight in analyses by economists.
Key words: Ex post merger evaluation, Difference-in-differences, Merger cost effi-
ciencies.
JEL classification: C31, L40, L50, L92.
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2.1 Introduction
Huge merger activity observed in the last decades and speculations about the effec-
tiveness of competition enforcement in this regard gave rise to a growing interest in
retrospective analyses of mergers. While there exists a substantial number of studies
estimating the price effects of large and/or controversial mergers, there exists little
evidence on the effects of mergers on cost efficiencies. At the same time, efficiency
gains are often one of the main arguments of merging parties in front of competition
authorities and constitute in theory a central aspect to the economic motivation
behind mergers. They constitute the primary justification as for why mergers of
competitors may benefit consumers. Not surprisingly, one of the “most important
finding” of the report of Ormosi et al. [2015] providing a review of merger decisions
in the European Union is that “[...] there is very little information on how dynamic
factors, such as innovation and efficiencies, developed after a merger”.
The objective of this study is to assess whether a merger between two major trans-
port groups gave rise to efficiency gains. We do this by studying the effects on the
operating costs of local urban public transport operators of a large merger which
took place between two of the three leading urban transport groups in France. In
2009, Transdev selected Veolia Transport to merge. This merger was approved by
the French Competition Authority in 2010 with remedies and the deal was closed in
2011. The new entity, which faced one main competitor and three smaller competi-
tors in the market, had a market share of nearly 40%. While the French Compe-
tition Authority mostly focused on potential anticompetitive effects of the merger,
the main concern being the reduction in the number of competitors in competitive
tenders, the notifying parties argued that the transaction would generate specific
efficiency gains. These were claimed to be linked, on the one hand, to the achieve-
ment of cost savings in the operation of the networks and, on the other hand, to
the possibility of providing a more extensive service offering thanks to the pooling
of experience between the parties.
In France, the urban public transport sector is regulated by local authorities (cities
or groups of cities) which are in charge of its organization at the local level. In the
majority of networks they choose to delegate this task to a private/public-private
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operator. Most operators belong to major transport groups. To select a transport
operator, the local authority is required to launch a competitive tender procedure in
which it specifies the characteristics of the service to be provided (network length,
ticket fares, etc.). One of the main choice criterion in the tenders is the level of
subsidies asked by the operator to operate the service. Efficiency gains can hence
be a powerful means for operators in order to succeed in tenders. At the same time,
efficiency gains, if reflected in lower subsidies paid to transport operators, relax
the burden on taxpayers. This is of interest in a sector which is highly subsidized,
commercial revenues covering only 30% of the cost of operating the service.
We study whether efficiency gains did actually materialize by performing an ex post
evaluation of the merger focusing on its effect on operating costs of local operators
belonging to the merging transport groups. Our analysis of efficiency gains is based
on a unique and detailed database which provides information on the characteris-
tics of urban transport networks, as well as detailed costs and revenues of urban
transport operators in France over the 2006-2014 period, that is before and after the
merger. This data was further complemented by a database of competitive tenders
for the choice of transport operators which took place over the 2004-2014 period.
In particular, it contains the identities of the incumbent operator, of the winner
of the tender as well as of other operators that submitted offers in the competi-
tive procedure. This database enables us to construct various control groups, using
information on the intensity of competition in networks.
We employ a difference-in-differences methodology to study the potential efficiency
gains resulting from the merger by comparing the evolutions of operating costs of
networks operated by the merged companies with those of networks operated by
competing companies. The main analysis presented in the chapter is undertaken
on a balanced panel of transport networks which have not experienced a change
of transport operator over the period of the analysis. The use of this voluntarily
restrictive dataset enables us to have networks that remain either in the control or
the treatment group over the whole period studied and to observe costs for each
year and for each network included in the sample. We then perform a robustness
analysis on an unbalanced sample of networks.
Finding a suitable control group to estimate the causal effects of mergers can be a
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great challenge in many industries (see for instance the discussion made by Nevo and
Whinston [2010]). The characteristics of our industry do seem to suggest a good field
for applying the methodology, as we can easily exploit variations in the conditions
across local networks. We consider several control groups in order to control for
the possibility that the networks operated by competitors of the merging parties
have reacted to the merger. We believe that spill-over effects may be an issue only
if competitors of the merging parties expected the merging party to become more
aggressive in competitive tenders following the realization of merger efficiency gains.
They could have reacted strategically by improving their bids in competitive tenders
and subsequently decreasing operating costs. Hence the reaction of competitors of
the merging parties, if any, is likely to concern contracts signed after the merger.
For this reason, the first control group is composed of all networks managed by the
three main competitors of Veolia Transport and Transdev, namely CarPostal, Keolis
and RATP Développement and the second control group accounts for this possible
strategic reaction of competitors post merger by including only networks for which
the contract for the operation of the urban transport service in a given network was
signed prior to the merger.
To identify more precisely the impact of the merger on the costs of transport oper-
ators, we further explore heterogeneity in the cost effects by exploiting the richness
of our data. Firstly, we examine whether the effect of the merger differs between the
networks operated by the respective merging groups, Veolia Transport and Trans-
dev. Secondly, we explore whether effects on costs differ depending on the type of
regulatory contract type in place (fixed-price or cost-plus). Finally, we also consider
the effects of the merger, depending on whether the merging parties were direct local
competitors prior to the merger, defined as having networks in the same or neigh-
boring counties (French département). We also introduce specifications, in which
we remove the years between the announcement of the merger and the closing of
the deal as this event window may suffer from contamination of the data around the
time of the merger.
In the robustness analysis on the unbalanced panel, we are able to test one more
restrictive control group, which is composed only of networks where there seems
to be no competition from Veolia or Transdev during public tenders. This control
group is composed only of networks in which Veolia Transport and Transdev did
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not submit a bid in tenders for the operation of the transport service throughout
the period of our analysis.
In all specifications, our results show that the merger did not lead to efficiency gains
for the merging parties. Our explanation is that the choice of Veolia was made
too hastily, the merger was poorly prepared and the differences in cultures between
the two groups made both clients and employees reluctant to the merger. These
explanations are highly specific to the case at hand. We cannot hence conclude
from our results that a change of market structure in the sector of urban transport
cannot lead to efficiency gains. Additionally, the role played by the context of the
transaction (culture, choice of the target, perception by clients and employees, op-
erational preparation of the merger, etc.) in the lack of materialization of efficiency
gains questions whether this aspect should be given more weight by economists in
their models and by the Competition Authority in its analysis of potential effects of
mergers.
The ability to generalize our results and comment on the European horizontal merger
policy is clearly limited. However, we contribute to a growing number of case studies
undertaken by economists which can help determining whether horizontal merger
policy is being properly enforced. Most such studies concentrate on impacts of hori-
zontal mergers on prices. A sheer amount of empirical research directly estimates the
effects of large and/or controversial mergers by employing a difference-in-differences
methodology. In particular, many recent studies exploit growing availability of data
and features of the retailing sector to assess large mergers in Europe (e.g. Aguzzoni
et al. [2014]; Aguzzoni et al. [2016]; Allain et al. [2017]) and in the U.S. (e.g. Ashen-
felter and Hosken [2010]; Ashenfelter et al. [2013]; Ashenfelter et al. [2015]). Earlier
work applying a similar methodology focused on mergers in major industries, such
as airline markets (Borenstein [1990]; Kim and Singal [1993]), banking (Focarelli
and Panetta [2003]) and petroleum (Hastings [2004]; Gilbert and Hastings [2005]).
Also, a small recent literature studies the actual effects of mergers with the aim
to assess the validity of predictions of merger simulation models (see for instance
Peters [2006]; Weinberg [2011]; Weinberg and Hosken [2013]; Friberg and Romahn
[2015]; Björnerstedt and Verboven [2016]).
Despite a growing number of studies analyzing the price effect of mergers in a vari-
88
2.1. Introduction
ety of industries, still little work exists on the ex post evaluation of merger-specific
efficiency gains. To our knowledge, few studies covering a limited number of sec-
tors exist that evaluate cost efficiencies from mergers directly. Brito et al. [2013]
evaluates the impact of mergers in non-life insurance markets in Portugal through
their effect on exercising of market power through coordinated effects and firms’
internal efficiency. Its analysis relies on the specification and estimation of a struc-
tural model including preferences, technology and a market equilibrium condition.
It shows that following the mergers, there is no evidence either of an increase in
market power through coordinated behavior or of changes in cost efficiency levels.
Kwoka and Pollitt [2010] studies the impact of the merger wave which took place
in the U.S. electricity industry by analyzing its impact on operating and total costs
in electricity distribution. It employs data envelopment analysis to assess efficiency
effects of mergers and concludes on the basis of its results that electricity mergers
are not consistent with improved cost performance. Dranove and Lindrooth [2003]
examines hospital consolidation in the U.S. by focusing on its effect on hospital
costs. Cost function estimates of hospitals undergoing consolidation are compared
to “pseudo-merger” hospitals chosen based on propensity scores. The empirical
strategy is based on the assessment of whether the cost functions of actual merg-
ers are lower than those of pseudo-mergers. It shows that mergers consisting in
consolidation of financial reporting and licenses generated cost savings in the 2-4
years following the mergers. Clearly, more retrospective studies are needed to help
evaluating the effects of mergers on efficiency gains.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the French urban pub-
lic transport industry. Section 2.3 describes the merger under study. Section 2.4
presents our empirical strategy, main empirical analysis, findings and robustness
checks. Section 3.7 discusses the results and section 3.8 concludes.
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2.2 The French urban public transport industry
2.2.1 Organizational background
The general principles of the organization of urban public transport in France date
back to the Transport Law of 19821. It provides a guideline for the organization of
public passenger transportation in urban transport areas and establishes the concept
of economic and social efficiency by declaring the right to affordable public transport.
The public authority, consisting of cities or group of cities, is responsible for the
organization of urban public transport in that it has to define, finance and organize
it2. There exists no national regulator of the sector and transportation is regulated
by local authorities. The relevant public authority is left with the choice to organize
and provide the service itself or to delegate the relevant responsibilities to a fully
private or public-private operator.
Currently, there are approximately 300 transport networks in France and nearly
90% of them are operated through delegated management (GART [2015]). In dele-
gated management, the local authority chooses an operator to which it entrusts the
operation of the service. The key feature of the French model is that the operation
of the network is attributed to only one operator which carries the responsibility of
providing the relevant service in the whole urban transport area (see Yvrande-Billon
[2006]). The relationship between the operator and the local authority is regulated
through a contract in which the local authority specifies the characteristics of the
service (ticket fares, number of stops, routes, frequency, output, schedule, quality of
service, conditions for subsidizing the service, level of investment, ownership struc-
ture, obligations of operators to passengers, etc.) as well as the reimbursement
scheme. In most networks, investment in the infrastructure remains the respon-
sibility of the organizing authority and the local authority owns the rolling stock
and infrastructure, which are put at the disposal of the operator. To illustrate, in
2013, 78% of the rolling stock belonged to organizing authorities (GART [2015]).
1Loi 82-1153 du 30 décembre 1982 d’orientation des transports intérieurs.
2As opposed to the rest of France, the region of Paris (Ile-de-France) has only one author-
ity responsible for organizing urban public transport. It takes its decisions in consultation with
dedicated transport carriers (RATP, SNCF and OPTILE).
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Operating costs are hence the relevant measure of long-term efficiency in the specific
context of urban transport because operators do not incur capital costs, they only
operate the networks.
Until 1993, the automatic renewal of contracts was a common practice (see Gag-
nepain and Ivaldi [2002]). The Sapin Law3 made competitive bidding compulsory
before awarding a contract for the provision of a public service. The aim of the
law was to prevent collusion and corruption and enhance competition between the
operators in the industry. It did not, however, forbid the use of negotiation in the
procedure. As a result, operators are selected in a two-step procedure, i.e. a pre-
selection step with the use of competitive bidding and a negotiation phase which
allows for subjective selection criteria.
2.2.2 Transport groups and competition in the industry
Before the merger, nearly 70% of the operators were subsidiaries of three major
groups, two of which being private and one semi-public: Keolis, Veolia Transport
and Transdev. In 2009 (prior to the merger), Keolis was owned by the French
National Railway Company SNCF. Veolia Transport was then a subsidiary of the
French group Veolia Environment4 and Transdev was owned in majority (69.6%)
by the French public financial institution Caisse des Dépôt et Consignations (here-
after CDC). In addition, three smaller players were already present in the mar-
ket at that time (RATP Développement, Vectalia France and Carpostal). RATP
Développement (hereafter RATP Dev), owned by RATP5, was created in 2002. Our
interviews with local operators suggest that RATP Dev has recently become an
important player in the industry especially in small and middle-sized networks. In
addition, two foreign groups were present in the market: Vectalia France and Car-
Postal France. Vectalia France is a subsidiary of the Spanish group Subus and is
present in France since 1998. CarPostal France is a subsidiary of the Swiss Group
CarPostal Suisse and it operates in France since 2004. The extent of the presence of
Vectalia and CarPostal in France was mainly limited to transport areas close to the
3Loi 93-122 du 29 janvier 1993 relative à la prévention de la corruption et à la transparence de
la vie économique et des procédures publiques.
4Veolia Environnement is a French group with global activities in water provision, water sani-
tation, waste treatment, cleaning and sanitation services, energy services and transport.
5RATP is the operator of urban transport in Paris. It is a public company.
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relevant borders. The remaining operators were independent or belonged to local
and regional transport groups.
Market shares measured by the number of networks of the respective groups are
presented in figure 2.1. Prior to the merger in 2011, the leading transport group
was Keolis (with a market share of nearly 30%), followed by Veolia Transport (26%)
and Transdev (16%).
Figure 2.1: Market shares (in number of networks)
2.2.3 Financial situation
Urban public transport in France is highly subsidized. Operators face public ser-
vice obligations and are obliged to operate in low-density areas. Low prices are
maintained in order to provide accessible transport to all consumers of urban trans-
portation as well as to attract new consumers. While the industry has seen a sig-
nificant increase in the supply and quality of transport, this is not accompanied by
a sufficiently strong demand for the service or by higher ticket fares. The strong
social objective of the public policy of urban transport translates into pricing choices
that are disconnected not only from total costs, but also from operating costs. As
a result, the industry is currently facing strong financial constraints. The ratio of
commercial receipts to operating costs has been deteriorating over the years. Com-
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mercial receipts currently cover, on average, hardly 30% of operating costs (Cour des
Comptes [2015]). The remaining operating costs are covered by subsidies from the
State, local authorities and a special transport tax paid by local firms6. Potential
merger efficiency gains are of interest in such a highly subsidized industry.
2.3 The merger
2.3.1 The story
In 2002, the majority owner of Transdev (CDC) and RATP concluded a strategic
partnership. RATP became a shareholder of Transdev with approximately 26% of
its shares. However, in 2009, both Transdev and RATP were not satisfied with
this partnership. RATP was interested in either developing its activities in urban
public transport outside of the Paris region through its subsidiary RATP Dev or in
taking control of Transdev. CDC, on the other hand, wanted to remain the main
shareholder of Transdev.
CDC, which is a public financial institution, started looking for a new partner for its
subsidiary Transdev. Its goal, as declared publicly, was to avoid that four powerful
French transport groups compete for contracts outside of France. CDC indeed ex-
pected it to be detrimental to the success of the French transport industry and so it
decided to create one large group which had the potential to win contracts abroad.
The new entity was expected to be one of the biggest transport companies in the
world and to be taken public within two years after the merger. Veolia Transport
and Keolis both expressed their interest in merging with Transdev in the spring of
2009.
Near the end of July 2009, Trandev disclosed its preference for Veolia Transport.
The operation was first notified to the European Commission. On August 12, 2010,
the European Commission referred to the French Competition Authority for an
examination of the French part of the concentration. The merger was authorized
6This transport tax consists of a local contribution of employers that allows to provide additional
funding for urban public transport. It is imposed on employers of both the public and private sector
that employ more than 9 full-time employees within an urban transport area of a population of
more than 10,000. It is collected by each urban transport area.
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with remedies by the French Competition Authority in December 20107 and the
final closing of the operation occurred on March 3, 2011.
As in the case of most mergers, the merger between Veolia Transport and Transdev
is associated with potential anticompetitive and pro competitive effects. On the one
hand, the merger resulted in a decrease in the number of players in the industry
and potentially in the number of bidders in the relevant tenders, which could have
fostered anticompetitive effects. On the other hand, the merger may have resulted
in efficiency gains in the form of a decrease in costs. If these cost efficiencies were
passed on to local authorities in the form of more attractive bids in tenders, the
merger would have possibly benefited consumers.
2.3.2 Competition concerns of the French Competition Authority
As certain competition concerns arose during the analysis of the merger by the
French Competition Authority, it was approved subject to several commitments
taken by the merging parties. In particular, the French Competition Authority con-
sidered that the merger raised competition concerns in the urban transport market
which we analyze.
The Competition Authority was concerned that the decrease in the number of candi-
dates resulting from the merger could increase the prices of bids submitted in tenders
and decrease the quality and diversity of offers. To identify the concerned networks
and assess the intensity of competition, it performed a detailed study of past tenders
and market shares. It argued that potential anticompetitive effects were a relevant
threat for networks in which both groups would submit an offer (20-25% of tenders
in 2009)8. These potential anticompetitive effects were particularly strong in the
South of France in the Provence Alpes Côte d’Azur (hereafter PACA) region, where
the presence of Veolia Transport and Transdev was most pronounced.
In order to address these concerns, the merging parties proposed to finance the cre-
ation of a competition stimulation fund in the amount of e6.54 million. This remedy
7Autorité de la concurrence, Décision 10-DCC-198 du 30 décembre 2010 relative à la création
d’une entreprise commune par Veolia Environnement et la CDC.
8Autorité de la concurrence, Décision 13-DCC-137 du 1er octobre 2013 relative à la prise de
contrôle exclusif de la société Transdev Group (ex-Veolia Transdev) par la Caisse des Dépôts et
Consignations.
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was introduced to compensate the expenses associated to responding to tenders for
small candidates, in the case they were not selected, as well as to help local author-
ities organize the selection process. The purpose of the fund was to encourage small
competitors to take part in tenders. The fund also aimed at helping small organizing
authorities to improve their efficiency in the competitive bidding procedures. This
fund was reserved for transport networks in which Veolia Transport and Transdev
were the outgoing operators and that would be subject to open competition within
five years of the merger realization date (forty-four tenders in total). In addition,
to resolve the problems specific to the PACA region, the parties were obliged to sell
their shares and assets in the operation of four urban transport networks located in
the PACA region.
The relevant organizing authorities refused to authorize the divestiture of the con-
tracts in all four networks concerned by the remedy. Hence, no divestitures occurred.
The new entity was not, however, authorized to compete in the tenders for the re-
newal of these contracts9. To our knowledge, two of them were renewed in October
2013 and the new entity did not make an offer for these tenders. Concerning the
competition stimulation fund, information on its use is not available publicly and
hence we could not shed any light on its use.
Concerning efficiency gains, the Competition Authority explained in the decision
that the merging parties argued that the merger would create substantial efficiency
gains, in particular a reduction in operating costs. The Authority, without perform-
ing a detailed analysis of efficiency gains, considered that the occurrence of such
efficiency gains was not credible enough to counterbalance potential anticompetitive
effects from the merger. The Authority also argued that even if efficiency gains were
to materialize as argued by the parties to the concentration, they would most likely
not be passed on to taxpayers via a decrease in subsidies from local authorities to
transport operators.
9Autorité de la concurrence, Décision 13-DCC-137 du 1er octobre 2013 relative à la prise de
contrôle exclusif de la société Transdev Group (ex-Veolia Transdev) par la Caisse des Dépôts et
Consignations, par.43.
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As could be understood from reading the decision of the Competition Authority,
efficiency gains were the key argument pushed forward by the merging parties to
approve the merger. Indeed, the industry suggests several means by which joining
two groups following a merger may give rise to cost efficiencies.
The characteristics of the industry are such that operators do have incentives to
reduce operating costs. The incentive to reduce costs in this highly subsidized
industry comes on the one hand from the pressure of competitors in competitive
tenders and on the other hand from the type of contracts which are used by local
authorities. The dominant contract types observed in France are fixed-price and
cost-plus contracts. In networks regulated under fixed-price contracts, operators
receive subsidies according to their expected operating deficits. Therefore, profits of
operators suffer from cost overruns and lower-than-expected revenues. In networks
regulated under cost-plus contracts, the organizing authority collects commercial
receipts and fully reimburses the operator’s operating costs, increased by a pre-
defined additional amount which constitutes the margin of the operator. Under this
regulatory scheme, the regulator provides the operator with subsidies to cover its
actual deficits. Cost changes hence do not affect the operator’s profits. In the past
years, the industry has seen a move towards fixed-price contracts which are high-
powered incentive schemes for operators. The proportion of networks that were
regulated under a cost-plus contract has indeed decreased substantially, from 100%
in the 1970s, 60% in the 1980s, 25% in the 1990s (Yvrande-Billon [2006]) to only
7% in 2013 (GART [2015]). Operators hence have incentives to decrease costs in
order to increase their profits and to win contracts. We briefly present hereafter the
potential sources of operating cost efficiencies in the case of the merger we analyze.
Operating costs reductions may come from knowledge sharing between local opera-
tors. Local operators are indeed likely to share knowledge at the group level on how
to efficiently operate a network. Gagnepain and Aguiar [2013] uses an earlier version
of our database (up to 2001) to show that an operator belonging to an industrial
group benefits from the cost reducing activities of the remaining operators of the
group because knowledge generated by a local operator may be processed by the
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headquarters of the group and then transmitted to other networks operated by the
group. They suggest that cost reducing activities may concern for instance R&D
processes, the search for cheaper suppliers, experience in procurement contracts bar-
gaining or methods in monitoring employees. A merger between two groups may
have allowed methods, procedures and general knowledge of operators of one group
to be passed on to operators belonging to the other. As an example, appropriate
staff training may help in reducing delays and/or accidents and help fight against
fraud. Knowledge sharing may also concern means of lowering maintenance costs
by for example finding the right balance between prevention and maintenance.
Further, potential operating costs reductions may come from improved managerial
efficiency. A change in the managerial policies and procedures imposed to local
operators by the new group may have moved networks of the new entity closer to
the best practice of the industry. As an example, better management may help
in increasing staff productivity by reducing the rate of absenteeism. The merger
may have changed the attitude of the management, motivating it and making it
more efficient. Cost efficiencies may have resulted in a more stable management at
the regional and national level. To our knowledge, management was very unstable
in Veolia Transport prior to the merger. Regional and national managers changed
very frequently. Since they are responsible for monitoring operating costs of local
operators, a more stable managing team could help local operators to be more
efficient.
Another source of potential operating costs reduction is a decrease in the costs
of materials purchased for operating the networks such as gasoline or spare parts.
By pooling the purchases of the two groups, the merger may have increased their
bargaining power hence leading to better deals. Along the same line, the merger
may have increased the power of the group in the labor market and hence helped
negotiating lower wages, thereby decreasing wages costs.
Finally, the spread of the specific values and specificities of each group to the other
may have reduced operating costs.
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2.4.1 Empirical strategy
Our goal is to perform an ex post evaluation of the merger that took place between
Veolia Transport and Transdev, by comparing the evolution of the operating costs
of the merging companies before and after the merger to the evolution of a control
group unaffected by the merger. We are interested in studying whether the merger
resulted in cost efficiencies achieved by the new entity.
Ideally, we would like to compare actual post merger market outcomes of networks
affected by the merger with market outcomes in these same networks in a world
where the merger did not take place. This, for obvious reasons, is impossible. The
econometric strategy seeks thus to construct a counterfactual group that reflects as
closely as possible how market outcomes of networks affected by the merger would
have evolved had the merger not occurred. The evolution of market outcomes of
operators belonging to Veolia Transport or Transdev which were affected by the
merger (treatment group) is then compared to the evolution of market outcomes of
networks which were not affected by the merger (control group).
Our empirical investigation starts with a simple before-after estimation of the ef-
fect of the merger on operating costs of networks operated by Veolia Transport and
Transdev. In the before-after estimation, the central assumption is that, conditional
on covariates, operating costs of networks operated by Veolia Transport and Trans-
dev would have remained the same had the merger not occurred. This assumption
is strong, as unobserved factors may have affected the evolution of operating costs.
The following regression is estimated:
ln(Cnt) = α0 + α1Postt +
�
i
γiXint + δn + βtrendt + ent, (2.1)
where Cnt represents operating costs of network n in year t, Postt is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 post merger, Xnt is a vector of factors other than the
merger affecting operating costs, trendt is a yearly time trend, δn is a network
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specific fixed effect and ent is the error term. α0, α1, γi and β are the coefficients
to be estimated. Our focus is put on the sign of α1 which allows us to assess
the existence (and possibly the extent) of efficiency gains coming from the merger.
The regression includes a time trend, as operating costs seem to follow a steady
increase over the years. Regressions both with and without networks fixed effects
are considered.10
Our data then allows us to employ a difference-in-differences (hereafter DiD) ap-
proach to estimate the impact of the merger on operating costs of Veolia Transport
and Transdev. The key assumption behind the use of this method is that outcomes
(operating costs) in the treatment group and control group would have followed,
conditional on covariates, parallel trends over time absent the treatment (merger).
The ideal control group is such that the variable of interest evolves similarly as in
the treatment group with the only difference that it did not experience the treat-
ment. Another key assumption of the method is that the merger is exogenous. This
assumption may be violated if omitted variables affect both the market outcome
studied and the decision to merge. The model may also suffer from reverse causality
between the market outcome and the merger. This is for example the case when an
increase in operating costs triggers a merger in order to create cost savings.
We estimate the following equation:
ln(Cnt) = α0 + α1Postt + α2Postt ∗ Treatn +
�
i
γiXint + δn + ent (2.2)
where Cnt represents the operating costs of network n in year t, Postt is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 post merger, Treatn is a dummy variable taking the
value one for networks belonging to the treatment group, Xnt is a vector of factors
other than the merger affecting operating costs, δn is a network specific fixed effect
and ent is the error term. α2 is the coefficient of interest, it provides a measure of
the effect of the merger on the operating costs of the merged entities.
The vector Xnt includes time-varying variables measured at the network level, which
are likely to be a source of omitted variable bias if they are not controlled for, such
10The use of fixed effects implies that the effect of the merger is solely identified for networks
for which we have data both before and after the merger.
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as the number of seat-kilometers provided by the network. We estimate the effect
of the merger with and without fixed effects11. We also estimate the effect of the
merger using time dummies instead of the variable Postt. In addition, we allow
for heterogeneous merger effects to vary depending on whether the network was
managed by Veolia Transport or Transdev prior to the merger, depending on the
type of regulatory contract implemented (fixed-price or cost-plus) and whether the
merging parties operate in the same geographical area. In all estimations, standard
errors are clustered at the network level to account for serial correlation, as suggested
by Bertrand et al. [2004].
The main analysis presented in the chapter is undertaken on a balanced panel of
transport networks which have not seen a change of transport operator over the
period of the analysis. The use of this voluntarily restrictive dataset enables us to
have networks to remain either in the control or the treatment group over the whole
period studied and to have an observation of costs for each year for each network. We
then use an unbalanced panel in the robustness analysis. The unbalanced panel has
the advantage to contain much more networks, allowing us to construct alternative
control groups.
We define several control groups in order to control for the possibility that the net-
works operated by competitors of the merging parties reacted to the merger. We
expect efficiency gains to mainly come from knowledge sharing between the merg-
ing companies, pooling of purchases of materials, common negotiation of wages or
improved management, which are unlikely to spill-over to competitors. Spill-overs
may, however, arise if competitors of the merging parties expected the latter to be-
come more aggressive in competitive tenders because of the efficiency gains from the
merger. In particular, competitors of Veolia and Transdev may have reacted strate-
gically by improving their bids in competitive tenders and subsequently decreasing
operating costs. Hence the reaction of the competitors of the merging parties is
likely to concern contracts signed after the merger.
We gathered evidence from operators in the industry that CarPostal, Keolis and
RATP Développement are similar with respect to their operating costs and respond
11When equation 2.2 is estimated without network fixed effects, we include a dummy for treat-
ment that equals one for networks operated by Veolia Transport and Transdev and zero for networks
included in the control group.
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to cost shocks in the same way. Hence the first control group (C1) is composed
of all networks managed by the three main competitors of Veolia Transport and
Transdev, namely CarPostal, Keolis and RATP Dev12. The second control group
accounts for the possible strategic reaction of competitors post merger by including
only networks in which the contract for the operation of the urban transport service
in a given network was signed prior to the merger (C2).
In the robustness analysis performed on the unbalanced panel, we are able to test
one more restrictive control group, which is composed only of networks where there
seems to be no competition from Veolia or Transdev during public tenders13. We
believe that the operators of these networks are unlikely to react to the merger since
they are not subject to competition neither from Veolia nor from Transdev. This
control group (C3) is composed only of networks in which Veolia Transport and
Transdev did not submit a bid for tenders for the operation of the transport service
throughout the period of our analysis. The definitions of the treatment and control
groups are summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Definitions of treatment and control groups
Group Definition
Treatment group Networks operated by Veolia Transport or Transdev.
Control group C1 Networks operated by Keolis, RATP Dev or CarPostal.
Control group C2 Networks operated by Keolis, RATP Dev or CarPostal.
Contracts signed before the merger.
Control group C3 Networks operated by Keolis, RATP Dev or CarPostal.
Networks in which Veolia Transport and Transdev did not submit a bid in tenders.
Our analysis covers the period 200614-2014. In addition, we perform estimations
excluding the years 2009 and 2010. This corresponds to the period between the
announcement of Transdev wanting to merge and the merger itself. As this an-
nouncement may have affected the operating costs of Veolia Transport, Transdev or
its rival groups, we perform additional estimations excluding this period.
12We have also considered Keolis separately. This does not change our results. For sake of
clarity, we do not present the results of additional control groups considered.
13We also tested a control group consisting only of networks where competition in tenders seems
to be absent, which is considered to happen in networks that did not see a change in operator
since 2005 and in which only one offer was submitted in tenders which took place since 2004.
The parallel trend assumption was not verified for this group, which was hence excluded from the
analysis.
14We test several alternative time windows, starting at 2007 and 2008. This does not change
our results and conclusions of the analysis remain the same.
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2.4.2 Data and variables
Our study uses a 9-year panel of urban public transport networks in France for the
years 2006-2014. The database has been created from an annual survey conducted
by the Centre d’Études et d’Expertise sur les Risques, l’Environnement, la Mobilité
et l’Aménagement (CEREMA) in collaboration with the Groupement des Autorités
Responsables de Transport (GART) and the Union des Transports Publics et fer-
roviaires (UTP). The database contains details on the actors providing the service,
the regulatory environment as well as costs and revenues of operators. For sake
of homogeneity across observations, only bus networks serving more than 20,000
inhabitants in the territory of France have been selected for the analysis.
Studying the effects of the merger on operating costs requires data on the operating
costs themselves, as well as factors, other than the merger, influencing them. Oper-
ating costs C are defined as the sum of labor costs and material costs. Output Y is
measured by the number of seat-kilometers, i.e. the number of seats available in all
buses multiplied by the number of kilometers traveled on all routes. We thus use a
supply-oriented output variable. Labor price wl is obtained by dividing labor costs
by the annual number of employees employed directly by the operator15. Material
price wm is obtained by dividing material costs by the total number of vehicles op-
erated by the operator (without including subcontracted vehicles). Since the local
authority owns the rolling stock and infrastructure, which are put at the disposal of
the operator, the operator does not incur capital costs.
Descriptive statistics of our database, which covers the period 2006-2014, are pre-
sented in Table 2.2. In the full sample, average operating costs amount to nearly
e7M. The average input prices are approximately e38,000 per employee and e19,000
of materials per car per year. More than 200 million seat-kilometers are supplied
yearly, on average.
We then compare mean values of our variables of interest in the periods prior to and
following the merger in Table 2.3. A rapid look at the data suggests that, on average,
15Labor costs concern employees employed directly by the operator. Consequently, the number
of employees does not include the employees of companies to which the operator outsources some
activities. Employees of subcontracting companies represent between 6% and 9% of the total
number of employees of the operator depending on the year considered.
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Table 2.2: Statistics on the dataset – all observations
Variable Name Mean SD Min Max
Costs (’000 Euros) 6,714.3 6,965.2 873.7 38,435.6
Production (’000 seat–kilometers) 205,904.3 180,678.0 25,583.5 750,272.5
Wages (’000 Euros per employee) 38.2 4.2 26.9 53.0
Price of materials (’000 Euros per bus) 19.3 4.8 6.0 34.2
yearly costs have increased in the period following the merger. This is accompanied,
however, by an increase in output over time, as suggested by the average number
of seat-kilometers. Table 2.3 also suggests that prices of labor and material have
slightly increased between the period before and after the merger.
Table 2.3: Statistics on the dataset – pre and post merger
Variable Name Mean Mean pre–merger Mean post–merger
Costs (’000 Euros) 6,714.3 6,161.9 7,404.9
Production (’000 seat–kilometers) 205,904.3 194,404.6 220,279.0
Wages (’000 Euros per employee) 38.2 37.4 39.2
Price of materials (’000 Euros per bus) 19.3 18.0 20.8
The main analysis presented in the chapter relies on a balanced sample of 45 trans-
port networks that have not seen a change of operator over the years 2006-2014, a
sample of 405 observations. Details on the number of observations in the respec-
tive treatment and control groups are presented in Table 2.4. Figure 2.2 provides
a cartographic representation of the transport networks included in the balanced
sample.
Table 2.4: Number of observations (networks) by group – pre and post merger
(balanced panel)
Group All Pre–merger Post–merger
Treatment group 117 (13) 65 52
Control group C1 171 (19) 95 76
Control group C2 117 (13) 65 52
Table 2.5 compares mean values for the treatment and control groups. We find that
on average, the treatment group contains bigger networks and hence faces higher
operating costs than the control groups. Wages and prices of materials remain
comparable between the treatment and control groups.
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(a) Control group – C1 (b) Control group – C2
Figure 2.2: Map of transport network included in the treatment and respective
control groups – balanced panel
Table 2.5: Statistics on the dataset – treatment and control groups
Variable Name Mean T Mean C1 Mean C2
Costs (’000 Euros) 8,465.0 5,516.5 6,466.5
Production (’000 seat–kilometers) 235,028.7 185,977.1 217,285.5
Wages (’000 Euros per employee) 38.7 37.9 38.6
Price of materials (’000 Euros per bus) 19.6 19.0 19.2
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In the robustness part of the chapter, we extend the analysis by exploiting the full
sample, that includes networks which have witnessed a change of operator during
the period of the analysis and networks with missing values of costs or other relevant
variables included in our specifications. Using this unbalanced panel bears the ad-
vantage of having a sample with many more networks. This allows us to introduce
one additional control group (C3). Note that the construction of this group involves
exploiting the database on tenders16. The frequencies of our treatment and each of
our pre- and post merger control groups are presented in Table 2.6. As shown in
Figure 2.3, our additional analysis relies on a larger number of transport networks,
dispersed geographically across the country.
Table 2.6: Number of observations (networks) by group – pre and post merger
(unbalanced)
Group All Pre–merger Post–merger
Treatment group 467 (67) 276 (64) 191 (54)
Control group C1 473 (69) 252 (59) 221 (60)
Control group C2 393 (60) 246 (58) 147 (48)
Control group C3 140 (17) 84 (17) 56 (15)
2.4.3 Main analysis
Identification
The key identifying assumption of the DiD estimation method is that had the treat-
ment not been implemented, operating costs of the treatment group and control
group would have followed, conditional on the control variables included in the re-
gression, the same evolution. Figure 2.4 represents the evolution of operating costs
of the treatment and control groups over time17. It shows clearly that they follow
parallel trends prior to the merger. We also note that these parallels trend were not
interrupted by the merger.
16We use an original database gathering tenders for the choice of a transport operator which
took place in the years 2004-2013. This information was obtained from press releases, as well as
from representatives of organizing authorities. The dataset includes the identity of the transport
operators that submitted bids in the tender, the identity of the incumbent transport operator, as
well as the identity of the winner of the competitive bidding procedure.
17The difference in levels of costs between the treatment and control groups can be fully explained
by the observable characteristics of the networks that we control for in the regressions, namely the
number of seat-kilometers and input prices.
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(a) Treatment (b) Control group – C1
(c) Control group – C2 (d) Control group – C3
Figure 2.3: Map of transport network included in the treatment and respective
control groups – unbalanced panel
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Figure 2.4: Evolution of costs – treatment and control groups
We further verify the satisfaction of the parallel trends assumption running a placebo
test, as suggested by Autor [2003]. It consists in introducing placebo treatments in
the equation of interest in all years except one. The following equation is estimated:
ln(Cnt) = α0 + ηt +
�
j �=2010
βj(Treatn ∗ I(t = j)) +
�
i
γiXint + δn + ent (2.3)
where Cnt represents operating costs of network n in year t, ηt are time-specific
dummies, Xnt is a vector of factors other than the merger affecting operating costs,
δn is a network specific fixed effect, Treatn is a dummy variable taking the value
1 for networks belonging to the treatment group, I(t = j) are time dummies for
all periods except the period just before the merger and ent is the error term. In
equation 2.3, all coefficients βj with j < 2010 are placebo tests for whether the
treatment had an effect on costs between the two groups prior to the merger. This
should not happen because if the treatment had an effect before it even occurred,
this casts doubt on the parallel trends assumption.
The estimated coefficients βj are plotted in Figures 2.5a to 2.5d. 2.5a and 2.5b
show estimates of equation 2.3 with Xnt including only the output of the network
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(a) Control group – C1 (b) Control group – C2
(c) Control group – C1 (d) Control group – C2
Figure 2.5: Time relative to the merger, where (a) and (b) include output as covari-
ate and (c) and (d) include both output and input prices as covariates
reflected by the number of seat-kilometers supplied. 2.5c and 2.5d show estimates of
equation 2.3 with Xnt including also labor and material prices. On top of verifying
whether there is a difference between the two groups before the merger, which is
reflected by coefficients βj with j < 2010, βj with j > 2010 show how the treatment
effect evolves over time after the merger. We might expect the treatment effect to
grow as time passes by since change can take time to implement after a merger.
These graphs show that none of the coefficients are significant (at a 5% significance
level) in the pretreatment period, confirming the parallel trends assumption. It also
shows that we do not observe any significant effect after the merger either.
The other key assumption in the application of the DiD approach is that the choice
to merge with Veolia Transport is not endogenous. The decision by Transdev to
merge with another company was not linked in any way to operating costs of net-
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works operated in France or factors influencing them. Transdev belongs to a public
financial institution. Its initiative to merge with another French transport company
must be understood within this context and the specific situation at that time.
Transdev and RATP were not satisfied by the partnership they had concluded in
2002, consequently, RATP wanted to divest its 26% share of Transdev and develop
its subsidiary RATP Dev. The owner of Transdev, a public institution, hence started
looking for a new partner, with the idea that competition between four French trans-
port groups for contracts abroad was likely to be detrimental to the success of those
groups and therefore to the French transport industry, and that the creation of a
very large group would help win contracts abroad. The initiative of Transdev was
hence strategic for the development of the French transport industry through the
winning of contracts for the operation of networks abroad.
The specific choice of Veolia Transport is neither endogenous to operating costs
of networks. According to a report about the merger published in 2016 by the
French Court of Audit (Cour des Comptes [2016]), Veolia Transport and Keolis
were both serious candidates and the choice of one of them over the other did not
prevail in theory18. A comparative examination of the two offers was organized by
the owner of Transdev but this comparative examination was made very quickly.
For example the elements of valuation and financial structuring of the transaction
were not taken into account in this comparative analysis. According to this report,
“subjected to pressure by Veolia Environnement through the media, the CDC did
not wish to deepen negotiations [...]. This choice is probably not independent from
the fact that the CDC was also the largest shareholder of Veolia Environnement.
The CEO of CDC was in favor of a merger with Veolia Transport19”. Keolis was
hence excluded from the process and the CDC and Veolia entered into exclusive
negotiations on the merger of their subsidiaries. This analysis of the French Court
of Audit is a soft version of the information that can be found in the press. The daily
information newspaper Le Parisien explained in 2009 that the general secretary of
18Regarding operating costs of networks operated in France, a comparison of means of unit costs
(operating costs per seat-kilometers) of networks confirms that the two candidates were similar.
Average unit operating costs of Keolis amount to e0.032 per seat-kilometer and average unit
operating costs of Veolia amount to e0.035 per seat-kilometer. A t test of the difference in means
of unit costs between the two groups shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
means are equal.
19Cour des Comptes [2016], page 436. Translation from French by the Authors.
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the French president intervened to tip the balance in favor of Veolia, whose CEO at
the time was close to the French president. The left-wing political party PS made
a statement to denounce the conditions under which Veolia had been chosen, which
seemed to be primarily a political decision sponsored by the French president in order
to satisfy the top management of Veolia20. An investigation by the French newspaper
Mediapart published in June 2012 argues that Veolia Transport was chosen by the
CDC because of the private relationship between the ex CEO and non executive
president of Veolia and the CEO of CDC so that the choice of Veolia Transport was
mainly motivated by private interests21. We are thus strongly convinced that the
treatment is not endogenous to operating costs of networks operated in France.
Results
Our preliminary analysis consists in the comparison of costs of the merging compa-
nies before and after the merger at the beginning of 2011. The results of estimating
equation 2.1 are given in Table 2.7. Models (M1) – (M3) are simple ordinary-least
square regressions, whereas models (M4) – (M6) include fixed effects to account
for the time-invariant heterogeneity between networks. Note that the regressions in-
clude a time trend to control for the steady increase in operating costs observed over
time. The before-after estimations suggest that operating costs of Veolia Transport
and Transdev have decreased post merger. However none of the results are signif-
icant. Hence we cannot reject the hypothesis that operating costs of the merging
parties did not change as a result of the merger22. As expected, a positive variation
in output impacts cost positively. Similarly, an increase in labor and material price,
ceteris paribus, increase costs. As explained before, the before-after analysis does
not control for changes in economic factors that may impact operating costs but
are unobservable to the econometrician. In order to account for these factors we
perform a DiD estimation, where the costs of the merging parties are compared to
20The article in the French newspaper Le Parisien is available at:
http://www.leparisien.fr/economie/un-geant-du-transport-naitra-de-la-fusion-veolia-transdev-
23-07-2009-588430.php.
21The French newspaper Mediapart published an investigation on the merger in June 2012. See
the article “Veolia Transdev : the secrets of a financial mega-disaster”, by Laurent Mauduit, June
2012, 28, Mediapart.
22The analysis was also performed using operating costs per seat-kilometers, which correspond
to operating costs per unit of output, as dependent variable. Results are unchanged by this
modification and are available upon request.
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carefully designed control groups.
Table 2.7: Before and After estimation
(M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) (M6)
Post–merger -0.0045 -0.045 -0.060 -0.0045 -0.014 -0.015
[0.036] [0.051] [0.042] [0.036] [0.034] [0.014]
lnY 1.08∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.25∗∗
[0.064] [0.068] [0.11] [0.10]
lnwl 0.49 0.49∗∗∗
[0.43] [0.13]
lnwm 0.25∗ 0.15∗∗∗
[0.13] [0.041]
year 0.039∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.014 0.039∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
[0.0073] [0.010] [0.016] [0.0073] [0.0069] [0.0033]
Constant -70.0∗∗∗ -53.4∗∗ -34.8 -70.0∗∗∗ -66.3∗∗∗ -44.6∗∗∗
[14.7] [20.5] [31.2] [14.7] [13.6] [7.28]
Fixed effects no no no yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117
R2 0.01 0.95 0.95 0.66 0.72 0.83
Clustered (at network level) standard errors in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The results of estimating equation 2.2 are presented in Table 2.8 and Table 2.9
respectively for control groups C1 and C2. As regards our first control group C1
(Table 2.8), the point estimates of the coefficients of interest in the regressions
which do not include fixed effects (models (M1) to (M3)) are low in value (between
1.5% and 3%, depending on the specification) and insignificant. In the regressions
with fixed effects (columns (M4) to (M6)) they are substantially lower but remain
insignificant. The coefficients of interest are similar in value and insignificant for
our second control group C2 (Table 2.9). In all regressions considered, coefficients
on the remaining covariates are of the expected signs and magnitudes.
In order to address serial autocorrelation issues, standard errors are clustered by
network (see Bertrand et al. [2004]) in all regressions. Our estimation samples con-
tain respectively 32 networks or 26 networks when considering either control group
C1 or C2. We are aware that the small number of clusters implied by the num-
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ber of networks can lead to biased standard errors and misleading inference. In our
case, the risk is to underestimate serial correlation between errors and underestimate
standard errors. This potential underestimation of standard errors is however not
likely to impact our conclusions since our coefficients of interest are never significant
at the 10% level anyway. We thus conclude that the merger did not lead to cost
efficiencies23.
Table 2.8: Difference-in-differences – Control group C1
(M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) (M6)
Post–merger × Treatment 0.030 0.015 0.016 0.014 -0.0022 0.00076
[0.049] [0.048] [0.049] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
Post–merger 0.041∗∗ 0.012 0.11∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
[0.018] [0.026] [0.017] [0.021]
Treatment 0.070 0.070 0.070
[0.072] [0.067] [0.068]
lnY 1.01∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
[0.041] [0.043] [0.043] [0.089] [0.089] [0.086]
lnwl 0.47∗ 0.45∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
[0.25] [0.26] [0.12] [0.12]
lnwm 0.12 0.13 0.15∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
[0.086] [0.093] [0.040] [0.043]
Constant -3.66∗∗∗ -5.26∗∗∗ -5.20∗∗∗ 2.87∗∗ 0.69 1.82∗
[0.49] [0.99] [1.01] [1.06] [1.09] [1.01]
Fixed effects no no no yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies no no yes no no yes
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 288
R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.67 0.75 0.80
Clustered (at network level) standard errors in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
2.4.4 Robustness checks – balanced panel
This section presents a series of robustness checks done on the balanced panel. Table
2.10 presents the results excluding the years 2009 and 2010, corresponding to the
period ranging from the announcement of Transdev wanting to merge to the merger
23The analysis was also performed using operating costs per seat-kilometers, which correspond
to operating costs per unit of output, as dependent variable. Results are unchanged by this
modification and are available upon request.
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Table 2.9: Difference-in-differences – Control group C2
(M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) (M6)
Post–merger × Treatment 0.050 0.027 0.027 0.017 -0.00086 0.0010
[0.050] [0.048] [0.049] [0.031] [0.030] [0.031]
Post–merger 0.021 -0.015 0.11∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
[0.019] [0.026] [0.019] [0.018]
Treatment 0.060 0.071 0.071
[0.077] [0.070] [0.071]
lnY 1.02∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
[0.045] [0.045] [0.046] [0.096] [0.094] [0.090]
lnwl 0.67∗∗ 0.66∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
[0.25] [0.26] [0.10] [0.10]
lnwm 0.13 0.14 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
[0.11] [0.12] [0.030] [0.038]
Constant -3.77∗∗∗ -6.08∗∗∗ -6.02∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗ 0.43 1.61
[0.54] [1.08] [1.12] [1.14] [1.12] [1.00]
Fixed effects no no no yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies no no yes no no yes
Observations 234 234 234 234 234 234
R2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.67 0.77 0.82
Clustered (at network level) standard errors in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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itself. The aim of this test is to rule out the possibility of operating costs of Veolia
Transport, Transdev or its rival groups to be affected by the announcement of the
merger. As shown in Table 2.10, our results are not modified by the exclusion of
the years 2009 and 2010.
Table 2.10: Difference-in-differences estimation excluding the years 2009–2010
(M1)–C1 (M2)–C1 (M1)–C2 (M2)–C2
Post–merger × Treatment 0.034 0.017 0.033 0.0081
[0.032] [0.036] [0.036] [0.041]
lnY 0.43∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
[0.088] [0.093] [0.093] [0.099]
lnwl 0.31∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
[0.13] [0.12]
lnwm 0.16∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
[0.059] [0.054]
Constant 3.20∗∗∗ 1.95∗ 3.32∗∗∗ 1.62
[1.03] [1.10] [1.11] [1.11]
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 224 224 182 182
R2 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.83
Clustered (at network level) standard errors in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
The fact that we do not observe any significant average result might suggest that
our framework fails to take into account some important underlying heterogeneity
in the behavior of networks exploited by the two merging parties, Veolia Transport
and Transdev. In particular, the effects of the merger may be different whether
we consider networks of Veolia Transport or Transdev. To address this question,
the term of interest Post is interacted with a dummy variable associated to the
merging transport group that managed the network prior to the merger, that is
V eolia or Transdev. We hence examine whether the effect of the merger differs
between the networks operated by the respective groups, as shown in Table 2.11.
When considering these separate effects, we find that the effect of the merger on
operating costs remains insignificant irrespective of the party of the concentration
considered.
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Table 2.11: Difference-in-differences estimation with interaction of treatment (iden-
tity of merging group)
(M1) – C1 (M2) – C1 (M1) – C2 (M2) – C2
Post merger × Veolia 0.010 -0.0079 0.011 -0.0095
[0.033] [0.034] [0.036] [0.035]
Post merger × Transdev 0.016 0.027 0.017 0.031
[0.043] [0.042] [0.045] [0.046]
lnY 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
[0.089] [0.085] [0.095] [0.088]
lnwl 0.42∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗
[0.13] [0.10]
lnwm 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
[0.044] [0.039]
Constant 3.71∗∗∗ 1.83∗ 3.82∗∗∗ 1.62
[1.04] [1.00] [1.12] [0.98]
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 288 288 234 234
R2 0.75 0.80 0.76 0.82
Clustered (at network level) standard errors in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Another potential source of heterogeneity in the behavior of networks may be the
contract type in place in a network throughout a contractual period. Gagnepain
and Ivaldi [2017] suggests that operating costs may differ depending on the type
of regulatory contract type in place (fixed-price or cost-plus). In particular, fixed-
price contracts generate more incentives for cost reductions than cost-plus contracts.
We hence examine whether the effect of the merger differs between fixed-price and
cost-plus contracts. Table 2.12 reports the estimated coefficients for heterogeneous
treatment effects. The term Post × Treat is interacted with the dummy variable
associated to the choice of contract type, where FP refers to fixed-price contracts
and CP to cost-plus contracts. Given that we include network fixed effects in our
specifications, the coefficients of interest solely rely on two changes of contract type
in our sample, of which one concerns our treatment group so our results have to be
interpreted with caution. Our results suggest that there is no significant difference
in the effect of the merger on networks regulated under cost-plus contracts and
networks regulated under fixed-price contracts. We conclude that the effect of the
merger on the merging groups did not differ significantly depending on the contract
type in place and remains insignificant.
Finally, we also consider the effects of mergers, depending on whether the merging
parties were direct local competitors prior to the merger. We introduce two defini-
tions of such networks. The first consists of networks of one of the merging party
such that another network was operated by the other merging party in the same
county. The second consists of networks of one of the merging party such that an-
other network was operated by the other merging party in the same or neighboring
counties. The results of the respective specifications are presented in Tables 2.13
and 2.14. Accounting for whether the merging parties were direct local competitors
prior to the merger, we find no merger-specific efficiency gains.
2.4.5 Robustness checks – unbalanced panel
An additional robustness check consists in performing the analysis on an unbalanced
panel. We did not use this sample for the main analysis because networks can change
from the control groups to the treatment groups and vice versa, depending on their
operators and the composition of the treatment and control groups change over
116
2.4. Merger evaluation
Table 2.12: Difference-in-differences estimation with interaction of treatment (con-
tract type)
(M1) – C1 (M2) – C1 (M3) – C2 (M4) – C2
Post–merger × Treatment × FP 0.0096 -0.0011 0.011 -0.00079
[0.032] [0.032] [0.035] [0.034]
Post–merger × Treatment × CP 0.053 0.031 0.053 0.033
[0.033] [0.031] [0.034] [0.033]
FP 0.090∗∗ 0.062∗ 0.087∗ 0.060∗
[0.044] [0.031] [0.043] [0.033]
lnY 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
[0.084] [0.084] [0.090] [0.088]
lnwl 0.40∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
[0.13] [0.11]
lnwm 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
[0.044] [0.039]
Constant 3.67∗∗∗ 1.83∗ 3.76∗∗∗ 1.61
[0.99] [0.99] [1.06] [0.97]
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 288 288 234 234
R2 – adjusted 0.74 0.80 0.75 0.81
Standard errors in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.13: Difference-in-differences estimation with interaction of treatment (local
competitors - same county)
(M1) – C1 (M2) – C1 (M3) – C2 (M4) – C2
Post merger × Treatment × direct 0.0034 -0.010 0.0043 -0.0094
[0.018] [0.019] [0.022] [0.021]
Post merger × Treatment × non-direct 0.013 0.0027 0.014 0.0029
[0.032] [0.033] [0.036] [0.035]
lnY 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
[0.088] [0.086] [0.094] [0.090]
lnwl 0.41∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
[0.12] [0.10]
lnwm 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
[0.043] [0.038]
Constant 3.70∗∗∗ 1.82∗ 3.80∗∗∗ 1.61
[1.03] [1.01] [1.11] [1.00]
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 288 288 234 234
R2 – adjusted 0.74 0.79 0.75 0.81
Clustered (at network level) standard errors in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2.14: Difference-in-differences estimation with interaction of treatment (local
competitors - same or neighboring counties)
(M1) – C1 (M2) – C1 (M3) – C2 (M4) – C2
Post merger × Treatment × direct 0.0018 -0.0046 0.0034 -0.0032
[0.032] [0.031] [0.035] [0.033]
Post merger × Treatment × non-direct 0.047 0.021 0.048 0.018
[0.029] [0.043] [0.032] [0.043]
lnY 0.40∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
[0.086] [0.088] [0.092] [0.092]
lnw_l 0.40∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
[0.12] [0.11]
lnw_m 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
[0.042] [0.036]
Constant 3.53∗∗∗ 1.76 3.61∗∗∗ 1.55
[1.01] [1.04] [1.09] [1.03]
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 288 288 234 234
R2 – adjusted 0.74 0.79 0.75 0.81
Standard errors in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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time due to missing values in the dataset. However, the key advantage of this panel
is that we observe many more networks as compared to our balanced panel. As a
result, we are able to perform the analysis on one additional control group, exploiting
information about tenders for the choice of a transport operator. Secondly, it allows
us to address the risk of underestimated standard errors resulting from too few
clusters (networks) being included in our main analysis.
As in the case of our main analysis, we verify our identification strategy by plotting
the conditional distribution of treatment time specific effects. We consider two spec-
ifications: (1) including only output as covariate (see Figure 2.6) and (2) including
both output and input prices as covariates (see Figure 2.7). These figures show that,
when both output and input prices are included, none of the coefficients is significant
at a 5% significance level in the pretreatment period, providing evidence that the
parallel trends assumption holds for the control groups (see Figure 2.7). When only
output is included, the effects which correspond to 2006 and 2007 are significant and
negative for C1 and the effect which corresponds to 2006 is significant and negative
for C2 (see Figure 2.6), hence the parallel trends assumption is less robust for these
control groups when input prices are not included in the analysis.
The results of estimating equation 2.2 on our unbalanced sample are presented in
Table 2.15 for control groups C1, C2 and C3 respectively. As in our main analysis,
we find no merger efficiency gains.
2.5 Discussion
Our results clearly demonstrate that operating costs of networks operated in France
by Veolia Transport and Transdev did not decrease following the merger. Local
operators explain this finding by the fact that margins in the sector are extremely
low and operating costs cannot be further reduced. Can we hence conclude from
this failure to produce efficiency gains that such a change in market structure in the
transport sector cannot be a way to decrease costs?
To understand our results, we turned to the annual report of the French Court
of Audit (Cour des Comptes), published in 2016 (see Cour des Comptes [2016]),
which deeply examines the merger that we study in this chapter. The title of the
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(a) Control group – C1 (b) Control group – C2
(c) Control group – C3
Figure 2.6: Time relative to the merger, including output as covariate
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(a) Control group – C1 (b) Control group – C2
(c) Control group – C3
Figure 2.7: Time relative to the merger, including both output and input prices as
covariates
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Table 2.15: Difference-in-differences estimation (unbalanced panel)
(M1) – C1 (M2) – C1 (M3) – C2 (M4) – C2 (M5) – C3 (M6) – C3
Post–merger × Treatment 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.033 0.024 0.017
[0.024] [0.022] [0.024] [0.022] [0.030] [0.031]
Treatment -0.14∗ -0.0029 -0.21 0.0078 0 0
[0.082] [0.032] [0.13] [0.060] [.] [.]
lnY 0.53∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
[0.10] [0.053] [0.11] [0.054] [0.070] [0.053]
lnwl 0.41∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
[0.071] [0.076] [0.086]
lnwm 0.089∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗ 0.065∗
[0.033] [0.034] [0.037]
Constant 1.92 1.56∗∗ 2.05∗ 1.61∗∗ 5.40∗∗∗ 3.10∗∗∗
[1.17] [0.62] [1.17] [0.64] [0.79] [0.64]
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clustered SE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 783 774 725 716 502 493
R2 – adjusted 0.61 0.74 0.60 0.73 0.48 0.70
Standard errors in brackets.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
report, which is quite compelling, is “A hasty decision, a poorly prepared and poorly
conducted project” [translated by the Authors from French]. It appears in the report
that the owner of Transdev, CDC, heavily underestimated the difficulties and risks
of the operation.
The first salient point is that the choice of Veolia Transport by Transdev was made
extremely quickly and consequently, the project was insufficiently studied and the
business plans presented by both Transdev and Veolia Transport were too optimistic
(in terms of gasoline price, cost efficiency gains and growth of activity in France).
The two candidates, Veolia and Keolis, had received only six days to answer to the
specifications set out by Transdev. Transdev did not wish to deepen the negotia-
tions with the two candidates and rapidly chose Veolia Transport. This choice was
most probably linked to the fact that the owner of Transdev (CDC) was the main
shareholder of Veolia Environnement (the owner of Veolia Transport) and that the
chief Executive officer of CDC was in favor of a merger with Veolia Transport.
The second salient point is that Transdev minimized the difficulties linked to the
compatibility between the models and corporate cultures of the two companies,
which were quite different. The trust of Transdev’s clients was linked to its belonging
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to the CDC, a public financial institution and to proximity management. Concerning
Veolia, the business approach was different and relied on the entire group’s activities.
The ability of the teams to work together was also a key condition for success. Yet
Transdev’s management had indicated in a “contribution to the instruction” dated
June 5, 2009, that it was unfavorable to the draft merger with Veolia Transport.
Clients were very skeptical with the new company and teams were demotivated
from the beginning of the project. This explanation corroborates the management
literature, which stresses that culture conflict is a major source of failures of mergers
(see for instance Steigenberger [2017] or Caiazza and T.Volpe [2015] for a review of
this literature). In one often cited study, culture was found to be responsible for
30% of failed integrations (see Dixon [2005]). Notwithstanding, culture is most of
the time neglected when the benefits of potential mergers are examined. It often
seems to be unimportant compared to efficiency gains from combining resources or
knowledge, although cultural clashes can completely prevent merger efficiency gains
from materializing (see Weber and Camerer [2003]).
The third salient point is that the merger was not well prepared even if it took
the companies twenty-one months to obtain approval of competition authorities.
A change in the rules of the game was decided one month before the closing and
shareholders did not manage to agree in time on the operational side. For example,
the CEO of Transdev was supposed to become the CEO of the merged company but
was discarded in favor of a CEO coming from outside a month before the closing.
The CEO of Veolia Transport, who was to become COO, was also discarded. The
new CEO, which came from CDC, was proposed by Veolia Environnement. He was
recruited with a contract signed with Veolia Environnement. On the operational
side, at the time of the closing of the transaction in March 2011, several operational
questions were still not resolved. The merger was in fact a juxtaposition of two legal
entities and two organizations. For instance, no file on the subject was transmitted
to the representative bodies of the workforce, no decision was made on the new
brand and logo, on the reorganization of the networks in France and abroad or on
the location of the headquarters of the new group.
The report concludes that “The merger of Transdev, a CDC subsidiary, with Veolia
Transport, a subsidiary and division of Veolia Environnement, was decided hastily,
insufficiently studied and conducted in a deficient manner. If corporate mergers are
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complex processes whose results are frequently disappointing, particularly with regard
to valuation and synergies achieved, it is clear that in this case the CDC heavily un-
derestimated the difficulties and risks of the operation. It very quickly favored the
choice of Veolia Transport and accepted the accelerated pace desired by Veolia En-
vironnement. In doing so, it was deprived of the opportunity to further analyze the
relevance and feasibility of the operation, contrary to the recommendations of the
Supervisory Commission and the Minister of the Economy. As a result of this pre-
cipitation, the conditions set out in the initial agreement signed on July 22, 2009,
have all been called into question at a later date. [...] More generally, this trans-
action revealed a significant weakness in the governance of the CDC. It is indeed
essential that investment or disinvestment decisions on major issues cease to rest
solely on the responsibility of the CEO and, as in all entities of this size, effectively
involve at the various stages of the decision and of the negotiation the body in charge
of supervising the institution and the action of the CEO24”.
This analysis of the French Court of Audit provides a convincing explanation of
why merger efficiency gains did not materialize. It shows that this failure is highly
specific to the case at stake and that consequently our result cannot be generalized
to the industry. It also highlights that the specific context in which a merger takes
place (justifications for the merger, differences in culture between the companies,
perception of the merger by clients and employees, preparation of the merger, etc.)
are highly relevant dimensions to take into account when assessing the potential
impacts of a merger.
2.6 Conclusion
The goal of the analysis presented in this chapter was to contribute to the growing
literature that attempts to evaluate antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers, by
studying explicitly merger efficiency gains. We employ a difference-in-differences
methodology to study potential merger efficiency gains from a greatly debated
merger which took place between Veolia Transport and Transdev in the French
urban public transport industry in 2011.
24Cour des Comptes [2016], pages 454 and 455. Translated by the Authors from French.
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There exists little evidence in the literature on whether large horizontal mergers
result in efficiencies. This lack in the literature can be explained by data limitations.
Given the particularity of our industry and available data, we were able to introduce
a direct test for merger-specific efficiencies.
Our results show that the merger did not lead to any decrease in operating costs
for the merging parties. Our study relies on the use of several control groups. It
is robust to a great number of robustness checks as well as to the introduction of
heterogeneous treatment effects, depending on the identity of the merging party, the
contract type in place and the closeness of competition of local operators.
A possible explanation of why the efficiency gains expected by the parties to the
merger did not materialize is that the choice of Veolia was made too hastily, the
merger was poorly prepared and the differences in cultures between the two groups
made both clients and employees reluctant to the merger. These explanations are
highly specific to the case at hand, hence we cannot conclude from our result that a
change in market structure in the sector of urban transport cannot lead to efficiency
gains. The role played by the context (culture, choice of the target, perception by
clients and employees, etc.) in the lack of materialization of efficiency gains calls into
question whether it should be given more weight by economists in their research and
by competition authorities in their ex ante analyses of potential effects of mergers.
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CHAPTER 3
Buyer’s discretionary power and the selection of
efficient firms in public procurement∗
∗This chapter was written with Marion Chabrost (Compass Lexecon). We are extremely thank-
ful to InfoPro for providing the complete database on public tenders in France for the purpose of
our research. We are grateful to Francesco Decarolis, Stéphane Saussier, Giancarlo Spagnolo and
Carine Staropoli for their precious and helpful comments. All errors are our own.
Abstract
In this chapter, we document the causal effect of increasing buyer’s discretion on the
relative efficiency of the selected firm by combining a large database of public tenders in
France with financial information on selected firms. In Europe, tenders above a given
threshold have to be awarded through open auctions. Below this threshold, contracts
can be awarded through open auctions or adapted procedures. The latter introduces
flexibility and increases discretionary power by letting the buyer choose how the tender
is organized and how the winner is selected. Using an instrumental procedure to solve
the potential endogeneity of the choice of the awarding mechanism, we assess whether the
use of an adapted procedure makes the selection of a more productive firm more likely
compared with an open auction. Our main result is that the adapted procedure leads to
the selection of relatively less efficient firms than an open auction, in particular in tenders
related to public works. We extend our analysis to explain the mechanism that underpins
our results. Our results suggest that the selection of less productive firms in adapted
procedure is explained by a misuse of discretionary power when screening bids. If the
selection of more productive firms is more likely to lead to lower costs and/or better quality
outcomes, increasing discretion is potentially in contradiction with the primary objective
of public procurement, which is to get the best outcome at the lowest price. Allowing for
more discretion is also in contradiction with one potential secondary objective of public
procurement, which would be to promote productivity.
Key words: Production functions, Productivity, Public Procurement, Award Procedure,
Instrument Variables Estimation.
JEL classification: D24, H57, C26.
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3.1 Introduction
Public procurement is the process of purchasing goods or services by the public sector.
Alone, it accounts for 12% of GDP and 29% of total government expenditures on average
across OECD countries and approximately 14% of GDP in the European Union (see
OECD [2017b]). Given the sheer amount of money involved, public procurement has the
potential to pursue broad policy objectives. As stated by the OECD, “[G]overnments are
increasingly recognising the immense power of public procurement to solve global societal
challenges, improve productivity and boost innovation, while ensuring value for money”.
Whereas the economic literature has started to assess the capability of public procurement
to solve societal issues and to be a tool for innovation, its relationship with productivity
has been neglected so far.
This chapter compares the productivity of suppliers selected in competitive tenders or-
ganized by public buyers using two different types of award procedures. The first type
is open auction. In this procedure, buyers are highly constrained by strict rules on how
to organize the tender and select a supplier. In particular the supplier has to be selected
without negotiation on precisely defined criteria. The main benefit of this procedure is that
it fosters transparency and competition (Bulow and Klemperer [1996]). The second type
of procedure we focus on is called adapted procedures. In this procedure, public buyers
are endowed with a high degree of discretionary power in many aspects of the award (e.g.
publicity, deadline, negotiations and restriction of competition to some invited bidders).
This procedure is characterized by a lower degree of transparency than open auctions,
but one of its main benefits is its possibility to adapt more easily to the specificities and
circumstances of the procurement and hence to reduce transaction costs. An extensive
literature addresses the question of which degree of discretion in the award mechanism
yields the most efficient outcome in public procurement. Whereas the outcome has been
measured through different aspects of the tender such as price, quality or renegotiation,
the productivity of the selected supplier has been ignored.
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We evaluate whether an award procedure which increases the discretionary power of the
buyer results in the selection of more or less productive firms. The question we address
is hence that of the effect of increasing discretion on the selection of suppliers. If the
selection of more productive firms is more likely to lead to lowered costs and/or better
quality outcomes, then selecting more productive suppliers should result in a better value
for money of the contract, which is the primary objective of public procurement. Second,
if public procurement is to be used as a tool to enhance productivity and growth, it is
worth determining whether increasing discretion through some types of procedures allows
to select more efficient firms, keeping in mind that the use of public procurement to foster
productivity may be questionable if it is not cost-effective.
Our main results indicate that the adoption of an adapted procedure makes the selection
of an efficient supplier less likely. This results in an inefficient allocation of public funds
towards less efficient firms. The magnitude of the effect is large. Our results are robust
to several robustness checks which are presented in the chapter. The first contribution
of the chapter is to study a dimension of procurement that has been neglected so far,
which is the effect of increasing discretion on the ability to select an efficient supplier.
The second contribution comes from the policy implication of the result, namely that
a selection procedure which increases discretionary power is potentially in contradiction
with the main objective of public procurement which is to get the best outcome at the
lowest price, and with one potential broader objective of public procurement, which would
be to promote productivity. The third contribution of the chapter is to identify the role
of some observed characteristics of the buyer, the contract and the economic environment
in selecting a procedure, in line with the work in Bajari et al. [2009].
The economic literature on how to organize public procurement is abundant. It is mainly
interested in identifying the level of discretion in selection procedures that yields the
best value for money. Auction theory shows that open auctions achieve the lowest ex
ante price (see for example Bulow and Klemperer [1996], Cameron [2000] and Decarolis
[2014]) and impede corruption and favoritism by fostering transparency (Burguet and
Che [2004]). Both suggest that open auctions achieve the best value for money in public
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procurement. This view was challenged by the theory of contracts where other aspects are
also considered. It shows that open auctions might not be the best option when contracts
are particularly complex and hence subject to unexpected events (Goldberg [1977]), when
quality dimensions are not easily contractible (Manelli and Vincent [1995]) or to sustain
reputational mechanisms and long-term relationships (Kim [1998], Spagnolo [2012]). In
these cases, introducing some level of discretion in the award procedures could yield a
better outcome. One of the contributions of this chapter is to complement this literature
by looking at the ability of procedures that increase the discretionary power of the buyer
to select the most productive firms.
The analysis is performed using a unique dataset of public procurement contracts in France
between 2006 and 2015. It takes advantage of the French regulatory framework for public
procurement, which has allowed the use of flexible competitive bidding procedures and
hence opened room for discretionary power in 2004. In most countries and organizations,
the rules on which public procurement lays on aim at fostering transparency and efficiency.
In this perspective, the use of competitive and transparent award procedures are promoted
by international institutions (e.g. the World Bank, the OECD) and in many countries,
public procurement rules set thresholds for contract value above which the public buyer
must use open competitive procedures. In Europe, the European Commission sets thresh-
olds above which the use of strictly regulated open auctions is mandatory. Below these
thresholds, national laws apply. In France, below the thresholds set by the European Com-
mission, public buyers are allowed to choose between using a strictly regulated procedure
consisting in an open auction, or a more flexible procedure implying more discretionary
power, named the adapted procedure. The latter procedure gives some freedom to the
buyer on how to advertise and design the tender and how to select the winner, including
the possibility of negotiation.
We combine two main sets of data. The first one is a collection of calls for tenders for public
contracts procured in France between 2006 and 2015. It includes every call for tenders in
France (i.e. around 80K observations per year) and contains information on the identity
of the winning firm only for a sub-sample of contracts (i.e. around 14K observations per
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year). The second dataset, Amadeus, is a panel of financial information of European
firms. We use it to compute labor and total factor productivity of firms. We limit our
estimation sample to contracts below the thresholds set by the European Commission
so that in our sample, public buyers can choose between the two types of procedure
studied. Note that these contracts represent a high share of total public procurement: in
construction works, they account for 40% of the total value in European procurement (see
Palguta and Pertold [2017]). The threshold for public works is much higher than other
sectors (around e5 million and 0.2 million respectively). The limitation of the sample to
contracts below the thresholds has the implication of limiting the analysis to contracts of
simple to moderate complexity for supplies, studies and services, hence reducing the risk
of contract incompleteness leading to costly renegotiations, and to contracts of simple to
high complexity for public works.
Our econometric strategy must take into account the potential endogeneity of the choice
of procedure. Indeed, we expect that some unobserved contract-specific and buyer-specific
characteristics may affect both procedure and supplier selection, resulting in a potential
correlation between the procedure chosen and the error term as a consequence of omitted
variables (e.g. the degree of capture of the buyer, the specific knowledge of the buyer,
etc.). To solve this concern for endogeneity, we instrument the choice of procedure and
use a two-stage least square model. Our identification strategy relies on an instrument that
draws on Guasch et al. [2007]. Our instrument is the prevalence of adapted procedures in
the three months preceding the month of the tender among close by buyers (i.e. buyers
located in a close geographic area). It is highly correlated with the choice of the award
procedure because of the inertia in adopting the new flexible procedure over time and the
spill-over effect of buyers located in a close geographic area. Many empirical papers indeed
demonstrate the significant influence of neighbors in organizational choices. Christoffersen
and Paldam [2003] considers multiple cases of public services in Danish municipalities and
finds a strong diffusion effect from neighboring municipalities when choosing their mode of
public service provision. This finding has been confirmed by Bel and Miralles [2003] and
Miralles [2009], which also demonstrate the existence of such spill-over effect among close
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by municipalities. The instrument does not impact the choice of a relatively more or less
efficient company directly as it is unrelated to buyer and contract-specific characteristics.
The mechanism through which the adapted procedure could lead to the selection of less
efficient firms are discussed in the last section of the chapter. We have identified three
channels which could explain our main result. First, it could be that firms self-select in
some specific procedures. Second, it could be that buyers invite only some specific types
of firms to bid in adapted procedures. Third, it could be that pools of bidders contain
the most productive firms in both types of procedures but that the screening of firms
leads to different outcomes. To discriminate between these channels, we would ideally
need the identities of all the bidders in the tenders to compare the pool of bidders in
the two procedures. However, this information is not available in our dataset. We hence
look at the number of bidders and the characteristics of the winners. We demonstrate
that the number of bidders is on average similar in both types of procedures, and that
our main result is not driven by the adapted procedure selecting smaller, less profitable,
more recent or more local firms. This suggests that buyers do not only invite some specific
types of firms (in terms of age, size, profitability and localization at least) to participate in
adapted procedures, which suggests that we can discard the second channel. Self-selection
into procedures by firms would drive our result if the most productive firms did not bid in
adapted procedures. However, there does not seem to be any reason why a productive firm
that participates in open auctions would not do so in the case of adapted procedures since
participating in open auctions is more costly than participating in adapted procedures.
This suggests that our result is driven by the pure effect of discretion in the screening of
firms, even if one would need to deepen the analysis by looking at the bidders in different
types of procedures to draw a definite conclusion.
Two reasons could explain why public buyers select less efficient firms in adapted proce-
dures. The first possible reason is that the public buyer chooses a procedure with increased
discretion to be able to select a firm that it wishes to favor (for example if the public buyer
is corrupted) so that the public buyer does not even try to select an efficient firm. The
second possible reason comes from the purpose of the adapted procedure, which is to be
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adaptable to the circumstances of the purchase in order to save on ex ante transaction
costs, including publication costs or screening costs. In this case, a public buyer would
select a less efficient firm using the adapted procedure because he would spend less in
the selection process. Put differently, the loss in productivity can be seen as the cost of
reduced ex ante transaction costs. If the public buyer is corrupted or seeks to favor a
particular firm, then the adapted procedure is purely inefficient. If the public buyer uses
an adapted procedure to save on ex ante transaction costs, one would have to balance the
ex ante transaction costs with the ex post outcomes of procedures to conclude on whether
increasing discretion in public tenders is, on average, beneficial. The implication of our re-
sult in terms of policy is that a procedure that would enable to avoid the trade-off between
a loss in efficiency through the selection of less efficient firms and high ex ante transaction
costs could improve the overall efficiency of public procurement. Such procedure would
preserve a high degree of competition between firms and at the same time involve low ex
ante costs and barriers to entry.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follow. In section 3.2, we review the related
literature. In section 3.3, we present the institutional framework. In section 3.4, we
describe the data. In section 3.5, we present the empirical strategy. In section 3.6, we
present the main results, before assessing their robustness. We open a discussion in section
3.7. Finally, we draw a conclusion in section 3.8.
3.2 Literature
This chapter contributes to extend the strand of the literature related to the question of
whether discretion should be increased in public procurement. Overall, this literature uses
contract outcomes (price rebates, delays, renegotiations...) as a measure of efficiency of
different kinds of selection procedures involving different levels of discretion.
On one side, the conventional view is that open auctions are an efficient mechanism for se-
lecting firms because they make the selection of the lowest cost bidder more likely, thereby
reducing the winning price. Using a standard auction model, Bulow and Klemperer [1996]
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shows that a simple auction almost always yields a better outcome than a negotiation
with fewer firms. However, as Goldberg [1977] argues, when complex transactions are
likely to be subject to unexpected events, awarding a contract through negotiation may
be more desirable than through auctions. Manelli and Vincent [1995] illustrates the ben-
efit of negotiation over open auctions under certain circumstances. In particular, when
non-contractible quality dimensions of the procured good are important. Therefore, the
choice of award mechanism is likely to be subject to a trade-off between transparency and
lower ex ante price on the one hand and ex post performance on the other hand.
An extensive empirical literature has been dedicated to assessing the performance of auc-
tions and alternative procedures in public procurement. This literature emphasizes the
merit of the introduction of some discretion in selection procedures. It shows some evi-
dence that increasing discretion improves ex post contract performance. Cameron [2000]
tests for the potential existence of a compromise between price and ex post performance
using a dataset of long-term power contracts electric utilities have awarded in the United
States. It finds that increasing discretion through allowing a more subjective evaluation of
bids as well as post bid negotiations (compared to rigid competitive bidding procedures)
yields a price reduction of 18% but also an increase in the probability of contract breach by
more than 50%. Coviello et al. [2017] analyzes the effect of increased discretion - measured
in terms of whether the buyer can decide who to invite to bid or not - over ex ante and
ex post procurement outcomes using a dataset of public tenders in construction in Italy.
Using a regression discontinuity design, it finds, using its main sample, that increased
discretion has no effect on ex ante auction outcomes (number of bidders, rebates, size of
the winners, distance of the winner from the public buyer) and on most of their ex post
performance measures (duration of the works, monetary renegotiations). In a closer neigh-
borhood of the discontinuity threshold, it finds that the positive effects of discretion may
dominate the negative ones. Discretion is likely to reduce the total duration of works, to
lead to the selection of larger firms and to a reduction in the number of firms submitting
bids, thereby saving costs associated to bid screening. However, a higher level of discretion
is found to have no significant effect over other outcomes such as the winning rebate, cost
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overrun and the probability that the project is awarded to a local firm.
Another important dimension of discretion is that it may facilitate the establishment and
use of relational contracts (long-term relationships) and reputational mechanisms, which
can contribute to complement incomplete contracts. As discussed by Spagnolo [2012],
“there are several reasons why complementing explicit contracts with reputational mecha-
nisms based on ex post evaluations of contractor performance may improve the governance
of procurement transactions. These are linked to the inability of explicit contracts to de-
scribe or of the court system to verify important aspects of the procurement transactions
at reasonable cost, but also to the high costs of enforcing explicit contracts through lit-
igation”. This aspect is confirmed by Coviello et al. [2017] which finds that increased
discretion makes an incumbent more likely to be awarded the contract when renewed. Its
results suggest that incumbents are more likely to be renewed if they had better perfor-
mance in the past than the average (in terms of delay), and that their selection yields
better than average performance when renewed.
Finally, another potential dimension of increased discretion through the possibility to
restrict the number of bidders is also shown to be beneficial to the buyer in non-complex
contracts by reducing the costs related to the selection of the supplier. Chever et al. [2017]
demonstrates that the restriction of competition for small value contracts aims at sharing
out contracts among pre-qualified firms of good repute and does not result in higher
prices. Overall, its results suggest that restricted auctions, while saving on transaction
costs, preserve a high level of competition between the ‘happy few’ firms selected to bid.
However, discretion could be detrimentally used by a public authority to favor a particular
firm and reap off some personal benefits. Open auction is indeed seen as an instrument
that keeps buyers accountable by limiting their discretion in the allocation of public funds.
Palguta and Pertold [2017] observes that, in Spain, increased discretion through the pos-
sibility to preselect potential bidders makes firms with anonymous untraceable owners
more likely to win the contract. On the opposite, Bandiera et al. [2009] exploits a policy
experiment in the Italian public procurement system and concludes that public buyers
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endorsed with more discretionary power are more efficient and are not more corrupt than
more regulated ones, thereby generating less waste overall. It shows that administrative
inefficiency (e.g. buyer’s lack of skills or excessive regulatory burden) appears to be a
more important source of waste than corruption.
To sum up, the literature shows that open auctions which leave no room for discretion
lead to lower prices than procedures involving some forms of discretion. However, in-
creased discretion enables to lower ex ante screening costs when contracts are simple and
is likely to reduce ex post renegotiation costs when contracts are complex and likely to
be incomplete. Concerning corruption, evidence is mixed as to whether discretion fosters
corruptive behaviors.
Unlike most studies focusing on outcomes of discretion in public procurement, our effi-
ciency measure is not one or multiple dimensions of the contract outcome. Instead, we use
the productivity of the selected firm. We believe that the productivity measure reflects
the ability of the firm to meet the terms of the contract at the best price and/or the best
quality. It can be thought of as an indirect measure of price and quality. The closest work
to ours, Baltrunaite et al. [2018], also focuses on the supplier selection side and produc-
tivity. Even though our papers share some similarities, there are two main differences.
First, our definition of discretion is broader since it is not limited to negotiation. Indeed,
in France, the buyer may be granted some discretionary power in terms of, for example,
restriction of competition, deadline to receive the offers, and publicity support. Second,
the identification strategy differs, since we do not compare the outcomes of a tender be-
fore and after a reform, but instead use a two-step procedure where we first assess the
determinants of the adoption of an award procedure where discretionary power is allowed,
and second we determine to which extent the use of such a procedure makes the selection
of an efficient supplier more likely.
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The French law on public procurement is primarily based on the European Union pro-
curement directive1. To mitigate the risk of corruption in public procurement, the Euro-
pean Commission (EC) sets value thresholds (see Table 3.1 for information on thresholds)
above which public authorities must use formal procedures, which consist of open auctions
without negotiation. The use of negotiated procedures is not allowed, except in certain
specific cases set by the EC. For every contract below these thresholds, national laws
apply while still respecting the pillar principles set by the EU, namely equal treatment,
non-discrimination and transparency.
Table 3.1: Public procurement thresholds for sub-central contracting authorities
(2006-2015)
Supplies and services (e) Public works (e)
2006-2007 210 000 5 270 000
2008-2009 206 000 5 150 000
2010-2011 193 000 4 485 000
2012-2013 200 000 5 000 000
2014-2015 207 000 5 186 000
In France, public buyers may in this case use what is called an adapted procedure (procé-
dure adaptée). Its main objective is to give a high degree of discretion and flexibility to the
buyer in order to find out the most efficient way to procure goods and services of low to
moderate value. In this procedure, "ways and means are freely chosen by the public buyer
and should adapt to the nature and characteristics of the needs, the number or location of
firms that are likely to participate to the tender, and to the circumstances of the procure-
ment"2. The buyer is in particular free to define the advertising and competitive processes
that are the most proportionate to the purpose, amount and circumstances of the purchase
1As our procurement data cover the period from 2006 to 2015, our institutional framework is
based on the EU Directive 2004/18 of March 31, 2004, as well as on the 2006 French Code for public
procurement. We are not concerned with the new European Directives on Public Procurement
voted on in 2014 (2014/24/UE and 2014/25/UE) and adopted into French law in 2016.
2Article 28 of the French Code for public procurement. Translation from French by the Authors.
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(see Table 3.2 for a detailed presentation of the characteristics of this procedure, as well
as a comparison with the open auctions procedure).
The main benefits of this procedure are the possibility to directly negotiate, the possibility
to adjust the deadlines to the constraints (nonexistence of a minimal number of days to
submit an offer), the possibility of not specifying ex ante the weights associated to selection
criteria, the possibility to choose the most appropriate publicity support, a freedom of
choice regarding the contracting formalism, and the possibility to directly contact the
firms to submit an offer. In addition, public buyers have the possibility to select the
contractor based on its experience. It is noteworthy that, in case of negotiation, the buyer
has the possibility to restrict competition to a limited number of candidate firms. It is
even encouraged to do so since negotiating with too many candidates is a waste of time
and thereby, a cost. It is estimated that it is difficult for a small public buyer to directly
negotiate with more than two or three candidates3. The restriction of competition to a
pool of bidders should be notified in the call for tenders.
This flexibility should lower the administrative burden of organizing a tender, thereby
resulting in lower ex ante procurement costs compared to the rigid open auction proce-
dures. The other ambition of this procedure is to facilitate the access of firms that are
less able to participate to tenders above the formal thresholds, in particular new entrants
and SMEs. Indeed, formalized procedures require a three-year balance sheet of bidding
firms, a document that new entrants are unable to provide. On the opposite, the adapted
procedure accepts a simple official bank statement. Additionally, new entrants and SMEs
are often not familiar with formal procedures, resulting in disproportionally high costs
for them. Finally, it is recommended that the public buyer does not ask for an excessive
number of documents, in particular to SMEs.
It is noteworthy that, below the formal thresholds, the authority is not compelled to use
an adapted procedure. It has the possibility of using a formal one. In practice, below the
3Direction des Affaires Juridiques (French Legal department), Les marchés à procédure adap-
tée, available at: https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/directions_services/daj/marches_publics/
conseil_acheteurs/fiches-techniques/mise-en-oeuvre-procedure/marches-procedures-adaptees.pdf
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3.3. The institutional context
European Union thresholds, French municipalities use both the adapted procedure and
the open auction one. As the former is considered less costly for simple contracts, we
should observe only this type of award procedure below formal thresholds (if we strictly
refer to an economic point of view).
However, it appears that public buyer often opt for a formal procedure instead of an
adapted one by fear of any legal risk4. The adapted procedure was first introduced in
2004, and it has been increasingly used since (see Figure 3.1). Whereas they accounted for
less than 40% of award procedures for contracts below the EU thresholds in 2006, adapted
procedures represented almost 80% of them in 2015 at the municipal level.
Figure 3.1: Share of adapted procedures for contract below the EU thresholds in
French municipalities (2006-2015)
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Note: Share of adapted procedures over the total number of award notices at the municipal level
for contracts below the EU formal thresholds.
First, the adapted procedure entails much greater legal uncertainty than open auctions.
The procedural flexibility associated with this procedure is limited by the pillars set by the
EC, namely transparency, freedom of access and equal treatment of candidates. Given the
flexibility allowed by the procedure, it is very difficult for public buyers to be sure to be
4EDT, Vade-mecum Mapa, available at: http://www.achatpublic.info/sites/default/files/
document/documents/guide_MAPA_ETD_1.pdf?from=base-documentaire&page=228, 2010.
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compliant with these obligations. For example, the adapted procedure allows a negotiation
phase. At the drafting stage of the consultation document, the question for public buyers
is whether the modalities under which the negotiation is going to take place are defined
precisely enough to comply with the principles of public procurement. Public buyers
may wonder whether it is possible to specify only that negotiation is going to be allowed
or whether they should precisely define the modalities of the negotiation. During the
negotiation, other questions arise such as how to ensure the traceability of the exchanges
between the companies and the buyer. Once the selection of the operator has been made,
the period before the signature of the contract is also a source of great uncertainty for
buyers because the case law is unclear whether a time limit between the notification to
unsuccessful candidates and the signature of the market should be respected. Because of
the legal uncertainty associated with the adapted procedures, some buyers prefer to resort
to open auctions to avoid the risk of legal claims and associated costs (Spiller [2008]; Chong
et al. [2014]). The challenging of contracts before a court is costly and time consuming,
and may cause the elected official to leave its public position and to be prosecuted (Spiller
[2008]). Second, public buyers could feel reluctant to use the adapted procedure to avoid
suspicions of corruption. The adapted procedure indeed introduces discretion at several
stages of the procedure, from the advertising stage to the choice and notification of the
operator. Spiller [2008] shows that when a third party competes with the public buyer
in another political market, the former may behave opportunistically by challenging the
probity of the latter. In this case, the buyer may favor selection procedures and contracts
leaving no room for discretion.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Datasets
This study combines data from several datasets. Measures of productivity of firms were
computed using the Amadeus database, which contains financial information on European
firms. They were then matched with a database of both calls for tenders and award notices
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of public procurement contracts from 2006 and 20155.
Amadeus
We compute labor productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) using the Amadeus
database. Amadeus is a firm-level database compiled by Bureau van Dijk which contains
financial information on European firms. It includes all the balance sheets and P&L items,
such as value-added, turnover, total assets, intangibles assets, etc. over a period of ten
years for each firm. We compute TFP focusing on companies of a certain minimum size,
that is discarding companies of operating revenue below EUR 1 million, total assets below
EUR 2 million, or number of employees below 15. The reason is that we do not have
access to data on these small companies.
The original dataset includes 2,612,450 observations and contains identifiers to track firms
over time between 2006 and 2015. Key variables such as employment and materials are
often missing in the database because private firms are not required to report them. The
sample size is hence reduced by keeping only firm-year observations which contain the
relevant variables to estimate production functions. It is further reduced by performing
the following operations. We deleted firm-year observations with negative or zero value-
added and materials and negative values of capital defined as tangible assets, number
of employees and wages. We removed firm-year observations with extreme variations
in ratios between production function variables (capital stock per employee and value-
added per employee in the 1st or 99th percentiles). We removed firms with growth rate
of value-added, material, labor and wages greater than 500%, 200%, 200% and 200%
respectively. We also replaced firm-year observations in the 1st or 99th percentiles of their
distributions with missing values. At the end, we removed the top and bottom 1% of
the productivity distribution and re-estimated the productions functions without these
extreme observations.
In the end, we are left with a ten-year unbalanced panel of 1,252,194 companies on which
we estimate TFP. We observe a maximum of 142,219 firms in 2014 and a minimum of
5We thank InfoPro Digital for producing and gracefully offering us these data.
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106,962 firms in 2006. Descriptive statistics on the sample are presented in Appendix A1.
Since the Amadeus database does not contain information on the quantities of output and
inputs, TFP was computed estimating revenue-based production functions. Following the
standard practice in the literature, all variables entering the production function were
deflated using industry specific indices. We used indices provided in the EU KLEMS
database. All these indices are specific to France and available at the two-digits NACE
rev.2 level. Value-added was deflated using the gross value-added price index. Wages were
deflated using an index of the compensation of employees. Capital, defined as tangible
assets, was deflated using the gross fixed capital formation index and materials, which
correspond to intermediate consumption, were deflated using the intermediate inputs price
index.
Public Procurement
The original dataset includes every call for tenders by municipalities, associations of mu-
nicipalities, counties and regions in France between 2006 and 2015 (i.e., approximately
80K observations per year). We were able to collect award notices (name of the selected
company) only for a sub-sample of contracts (i.e., for approximately 14K observations per
year).
For each tender, the dataset provides information on the identity of the winner and its final
bid, the procedure and criteria used to select the winner (award mechanism), the number
of bidders, the object of the tender, the sector of the tender (supplies, work, etc.) and the
identity of the buyer. It contains public tenders relative to all goods and services that are
bought by municipalities, associations of municipalities, counties and regions. The range
of goods and services the public buyer deal with is very broad, as is the range of contract
values.
The identity of the firm that won the tender is used, along with the information on its
location, to match this data together with the Amadeus database in order to get the
measures of productivity of the winning contractor, as well as other relevant financial
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information.
3.4.2 Variables
Variable of interest
The database contains two main types of award mechanisms, open auctions and adapted
procedures. Hence we create a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a public
buyer decided to award the contract through an adapted procedure and zero if it chose an
open auction. This variable, adapted procedure, is the variable of interest throughout the
analysis.
Outcomes
We measure the outcome of the awarding procedure using both labor and total factor
productivity. Labor productivity is computed by dividing value-added by the number of
workers. Value-added corresponds to sales from which materials are deducted so that
our measure of efficiency is not influenced by the purchase of intermediate inputs. If
sales were used instead, labor productivity would indeed rise simply because of a firm
buying more material per worker. Total factor productivity is computed by estimating
production functions relating output to inputs of firms at the industry level, using the
approach of Levinsohn and Petrin [2003] (and the approach of Wooldridge [2009] as a
robustness check). More information on the estimation of production functions is given in
Appendix A2.
The outcome variables do not consist in absolute measures of productivity of firms. We are
rather interested in comparing the productivity of the selected firms with the productivity
of firms within the same industry at a given time. We hence define relative measures of
productivity, where the productivity of a firm is compared to the distribution of produc-
tivities of firms that belong to the same industry (defined at the broad NACE Rev.2 level
presented in Table 18) in a given year.
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The measure of the relative efficiency that we use is the proportional distance of a firm
from the technological frontier, measured by the productivity of the firm with the highest
TFP within an industry by year. This measure was proposed by Aghion et al. [2015] to
compute a technological spread within each industry. Formally, we compute:
mit = (TFPF t − TFPit)/TFPF t (3.1)
where F denotes the firm with the highest TFP in the industry in year t and i denotes
nonfrontier firms. 0 ≤ mit ≤ 1 and mF t = 0. Note that depending on the distribution of
TFPs within an industry and at a given year, the average of mit across all firms in the
industry can be either low, which indicates that in this industry firms are technologically
close to the frontier or high, which indicates a large technological gap with the frontier.
Control variables
The regressions include some control variables to account for the characteristics of the
industry, the buyer, and the contract.
First, since our relative measure of efficiency mit is industry and year specific, we control
for the industry of the winning firm by including dummies corresponding to the broad
NACE Rev.2 levels presented in Table 18 in Appendix A2 and for year fixed effects.
Second, we account for some observable characteristics of the buyer. We consider its
type (whether it is a region, a county (French département), a municipality or a group of
municipalities) through the variable buyer type , its size, represented by the population
(Population), and its experience toward public procurement in general, as measured by the
total number of tenders organized by the buyer in the past year (Experience). To control
for the time-invariant characteristics of the buyers, one strategy would be to include buyers
fixed effects in the regressions. However, doing so would eliminate the variation in our
data. It also implies including a very large number of fixed effects in the regressions
(more than 1000), which can be problematic in nonlinear models (incidental parameter
problem). Additionally, we believe that characteristics of buyers which are likely to affect
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procedure and firm selection are likely to be time- and contract-specific (a buyer favors
the incumbent for a given contract or has no expertise in a given industry). We hence do
not include buyers fixed effects in the analysis.
Third, we control for contract-specific characteristics such as the sector of activity of the
contract (Sector) which is divided between public works, services, supplies, and expertise
in our dataset, the expected number of participants to the tender (Expected number of
bidders), defined for each buyer as the average number of bidders participating to a tender
during the past year in a particular category of project (CPV6 level). We also account for
the number of divisions of the contract7 (Number of divisions), which is determined by the
buyer when the tender is designed, even if public procurement rules encourage maximal
division of the contract. Finally, we also control for the total value of the contract (Total
value) and the value of the relevant division (Division value). Note however that these
values do not correspond to ex ante estimations of the values of the contracts by the
buyers but to winning bids. They are therefore likely to be affected by the selection
procedure, hence being bad controls. Contrary to many countries where the buyer’s initial
cost estimates are provided in the calls for tender (e.g. in Italy), this information is
not publicly available in France. Since we do not have other measures of the values of
the contract, we include them in some regressions to see their effect on the coefficient of
interest.
3.4.3 Descriptive statistics on the estimation sample
The final sample is restricted to tenders with contract values that are under the EU formal
thresholds. Indeed, to award these contracts, public buyers have the possibility to choose
between an adapted procedure, that give them some level of discretionary power, and
an open auction, that is strictly regulated and supposedly leaves no room for discretion.
Thresholds depend on the object of the tender (public works or not). They are presented
6The common procurement vocabulary (CPV) establishes a single classification system for
public procurement aimed at standardizing the references used by contracting authorities and
entities to describe procurement contracts.
7We use the terminology of Bajari et al. [2009]. In Europe, division of contracts are also
designated by the term allotment.
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in Table 3.1 by sector and period of time. The final estimation sample contains 7,396
observations, with each observation corresponding to a given contract awarded to a specific
firm for which we have at least a value of TFP.
Table 3.3 shows that the range of industries of firms included in the sample is very broad,
with 59% of observations in the construction industry, 11% in manufacturing, 11% in
wholesale and retail trade; repair of automobile and motorcycles, and 9% in activities of
administrative and support services. The adapted procedure is used in 51% of tenders in
the construction industry, 39% in manufacturing, 40% in trade, repair of automobile or
motorcycles and 37% in activities of administrative and support services. Mean total value
of tenders are particularly high in construction (e786, 465), when compared, for example,
to the manufacturing industry (e504, 729). This fact is not surprising given that firms
belonging to the construction industry are more likely to win tenders classified as public
works, for which the thresholds authorizing the use of adapted procedures are higher than
in other sectors. The average technological gap (measured as the mean of the distances to
the productivity frontier) ranges from 0.81 in the activities of administrative and support
services industry to 0.39 in the agriculture, forestry and fishing industry. In the former,
the technological gap between companies within the industry is high, while it is much
lower in the latter.
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Table 3.3: Sector distribution - Main estimation sample
Sector Number of
obs.
Share of
sample
Share of
adapted
procedure
Mean total
value of
tender
Mean rela-
tive TFP
Accommodation and catering 24 0.00 0.42 86,707 0.46
Activities of administrative and
support services
648 0.09 0.37 589,787 0.81
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 32 0.00 0.22 279,479 0.39
Arts, entertainment and recre-
ation
54 0.01 0.61 251,207 0.72
Construction 4377 0.59 0.51 786,465 0.75
Education 12 0.00 0.92 99,438 0.71
Financial and insurance activities 34 0.00 0.29 115,953 0.56
Information and communication 86 0.01 0.38 135,249 0.69
Manufacturing industry 790 0.11 0.39 504,729 0.71
Other service activities 22 0.00 0.55 93,996 0.62
Specialized, scientific and techni-
cal activities
288 0.04 0.50 173,391 0.78
Trade, repair of automobiles and
motorcycles
835 0.11 0.40 200,843 0.61
Transport and storage 95 0.01 0.32 115,754 0.74
Water production and distribu-
tion, sanitation, waste manage-
ment and pollution
99 0.01 0.34 194,981 0.47
Table 3.4 presents summary statistics on the main variables of the analysis. 46% of
tenders award the contract using an adapted procedure, as opposed to an open auction.
The average distance to the frontier amounts to around 0.73 (mit TFP). The average value
of divisions is e146, 622 and the average total value of tenders is e610, 416.
Table 3.4: Sector distribution - Main estimation sample
Variable Number of
obs.
Mean Std.dev. Min Max
Adapted procedure 7,396 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Number of divisions 7,396 5.39 4.73 1.00 19.00
Experience 7,396 132.09 124.36 1.00 858.00
Division value (euros) 7,396 146,621.81 296,773.25 1,000.00 4,960,000.00
mit TFP 7,396 0.73 0.10 0.09 0.87
Expected number of bidders 4,284 4.84 4.29 1.00 71.00
Population 7,396 111,509.41 157,622.19 54.00 861,676.00
Prevalence 7,396 0.61 0.23 0.00 1.00
Total Value (euros) 7,396 610,416.31 889,048.31 25,162.69 5,229,553.00
Table 3.5 compares the average values of the main variables of the analysis for tenders
awarded through adapted procedures and tenders awarded through open auctions. The
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expected number of bidders, the population, and the experience of the buyer constitutes
variables that are fairly similar across groups. What differs the most are the total value
of tenders and the value of divisions, which are both much higher when open auctions are
resorted to. The average relative productivity of the selected firm (mit TFP) is similar
across the two groups. The test of the null hypothesis of no difference in productivity
between the two types of procedures is reported in Table 3.6. Results support the hypoth-
esis that open auctions select more efficient firms than adapted procedures. This analysis
does not control for projects observable characteristics which differ across the subsample of
projects awarded through open auctions and those awarded through adapted procedures.
It also does not take into account buyers characteristics that influence both procedure and
supplier selection.
Table 3.5: Comparison of tenders with adapted procedure and open auction
Adapted procedures Open auctions
Mean Mean
Division value (euros) 116,264.41 172,876.45
Expected number of bidders 4.51 5.15
Experience 120.78 141.87
Number of divisions 5.27 5.49
Population 121,179.05 103,146.63
Prevalence 0.69 0.53
Total Value (euros) 473,750.28 728,612.13
mit TFP 0.74 0.72
Table 3.6: Test of differences in relative TFP means
Mean(Open_auction) Mean(Adapted_procedure) Diff. Std.Error
mit (TFP) 0.72 0.74 −0.02*** 0.0023
3.5 Empirical strategy
We empirically test whether the use of an adapted procedure makes the selection of a
more efficient firm more likely than the use of an open auction mechanism. The ideal
experiment would be to assign selection procedures randomly to contracts and compare
the productivity of the firms selected with each type of procedure. The model we want to
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estimate is the following:
Yibt = α + βadapted_procedureibt + δ�Xibt + �ibt (3.2)
where Yibt is the relative productivity of the selected firm in tender i organized by buyer b
in year t, adapted_procedureibt is a dummy variable equal to one if the award procedure is
an adapted procedure and zero if it is an open auction, Xibt are a set of controls including
year and industry fixed effects, �ibt is an error term and α, β and δ are parameters to
estimate, with β the effect of using an adapted procedure.
Estimation of equation 3.2 allows controlling for a number of observable characteristics of
buyers and contracts which are likely to impact both the award procedure and supplier
selection such as the sector of the tender (public works, supplies) or the experience of the
buyer with tenders.
However, estimating our specification through OLS would yield biased estimates of the
coefficients in the regression as some unobserved factors, in particular unobserved char-
acteristics of the buyer and of the contract, might influence both the choice of the award
mechanism and of the supplier, resulting in omitted variables. More specifically, these un-
observed factors will likely be buyer-specific, like the presence of corruption or favoritism,
knowledge of the industry or the capability of the buyer to select an efficient supplier.
To address this issue, our strategy is to instrument the award mechanism. A good instru-
ment must fulfill two conditions. First, it must be related to the endogenous explanatory
variable. Second, it should not be correlated with the unobserved factors mentioned above
(corruption, favoritism, effort, skills, etc.).
3.5.1 Identification
Our explanatory variable of interest Adapted procedure is likely to be correlated with
factors that we are not able to observe and that are buried in the error term of equation
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3.2, potentially leading to an omitted variable bias in the OLS regression.
In particular, we might not be able to consider specificities of the buyer that may influence
the decision to use an adapted procedure and the selection of a firm, such as its experience
and skills. For example, if the public buyer is bribed by an inefficient firm, something
that we do not observe, it will be more likely to use an adapted procedure as it gives a
higher degree of discretion, thereby facilitating corruptive behavior. As a consequence,
the OLS estimate is likely to suffer from an upward bias. On the contrary, a downward
bias might be caused by the public buyer having no knowledge about a particular industry
and consequently choosing to use an open auction and at the same time selecting a low-
productive firm. Therefore, the direction of the potential bias we might face is ambiguous.
The instrument should be correlated with the choice of the award procedure but should
not influence whether the selected firm is relatively more productive than firms belonging
to the same industry, other than through the procedure. We construct an instrument that
draws on Guasch et al. [2007]8. Our instrument is the share of adapted procedures used
by different buyers in the three months before the tender (Prevalence)9. The construction
of the variable excludes the share of adapted procedures of the public buyer we consider.
It also only accounts for public buyers located in the same county as the one we consider.
For each tender, we hence compute the share of adapted procedures in tenders in the same
county, in the last three months before the launch of the tender, while excluding the share
of adapted procedures of the buyer considered10.
Since our regressions all include year fixed effects, identification comes from the variations
of the instrument Prevalence between counties in given years. Figure 3.2 shows that there
8Guasch et al. [2007] instruments specific contract clause in procurement using “the average
prevalence, at the time of contracting, of the same clause in the same sector and in different
countries (Instrument 1) and in different sectors and different countries (Instrument 2)”. The
rational for Instrument 2, that is for looking at different sectors, is because some operators might
be present in the same sector in different countries, thereby introducing some correlation through
operator-specific effects. Since we are not worried by firm-specific effects in our specification, we
do not make a distinction by sector.
9Results are robust to the use of shorter or longer lags.
10The exclusion of the share of adapted procedures of the buyer and the use of lagged values of
shares of adapted procedures in tenders is an attempt to mitigate the reflection problem raised in
Manski [1993].
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is heterogeneity between counties in the shares of adapted procedures in each year.
Figure 3.2: Distributions of the instrument by year (2006-2015)
If these variations between counties are not exogenous to variations in productivities, iden-
tification is undermined. To confirm that we should not expect any systematic correlation
between our measure of productivity and the instrument, Figure 3.3 plots, by year, the
relative productivities (mit) of selected firms against the instrument. It illustrates that
the share of adapted procedures is not systematically associated with productivity. Recall
that the endogeneity concern comes from the correlation between procedure choice and
unobserved variables that are likely made of buyer-specific and contract-specific effects.
The validity of the instrument is further confirmed by the fact that the choice of a pro-
cedure is correlated across different buyers in the same county through some aspects that
are independent of buyer- or contract-specific effects. One example would be the existence
of a spill-over effect over buyers in close by geographical areas due to common reasons for
the adoption of the adapted procedure, such as the publication of a guidebook on how
to use the adapted procedure11. According to Kelman [2005], public buyers are prone to
11An example is the guidebook of adapted procedure, published by the county Somme in 2011.
This guidebook is likely to make buyers located in this county understand better the adapted
procedure and hence use it more, independently of their characteristics or of contract-specific
characteristics.
155
resist change so that new procedures such as the adapted procedure may take time to be
adopted.
Figure 3.3: Productivity and share of adapted procedures
3.5.2 Two-step estimation
The causal model of interest is given in equation 3.2, where adapted_procedureibt is a
dummy variable for the award procedure used in tender i organized by buyer b in year t.
The variable of interest is a dummy endogenous variable. The 2SLS first stage is equation
3.3, a linear regression of adapted_procedureibt on a constant, covariates and a vector of
instruments, Zibt.
adapted_procedureibt = π0 + π�1Xibt + π
�
2Zibt + ξibt (3.3)
Because adapted_procedureibt is a dummy variable, the conditional expectation function
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associated with the first stage is nonlinear and should be estimated using a nonlinear
model such as a logit model. Therefore, the procedure to estimate the model must be
implemented in two steps to avoid the risk of biasing the estimation with an incorrect
nonlinear first stage (see Angrist and Pischke [2009] and Wooldridge [2009]). The proce-
dure consists first in estimating equation 3.3 by using a logit, then in using the predicted
value adapted_procedureibt
�
as an instrument for adapted_procedureibt in equation 3.2 in
a conventional 2SLS-IV procedure.
Identification comes from the fact that the vector of instruments Zibt is correlated with
the endogenous dummy variable but has no effect on the outcome other than through the
choice of the award procedure. The regressions also control for additional explanatory
variables, which potentially impact procedure and firm selection. These explanatory vari-
ables are included both in the logit regression which estimates equation 3.3 and in the
conventional 2SLS procedure that estimates equation 3.2 (both in the first-stage and in
the equation of interest).
We can now rewrite equation 3.3 as follow:
adapted_procedureibt = π0 + π1Prevalencebt (3.4)
+π2ln(population)bt +
6�
s=2
π3sbuyer_typesbt
+π4ln(experience)bt + π5ln(number_of_divisions)ibt
+
4�
p=2
π6pSectorpibt + π7ln(expected_participationibt)
+
19�
p=2
π8pIndustrypib +
2015�
j=2007
π9jdj + ξibt
and equation 3.2 as:
Yibt = α + βadapted_procedureibt + δ�Xibt + �ibt (3.5)
where Xibt includes all the variables of equation 3.4 but the instrument Prevalence. We es-
timate equation 3.4 with a logit model and obtain predicted values of adapted_procedureibt
(adapted_procedureibt
�
). We then use this variable as an instrument for adapted_procedureibt
157
in a conventional 2SLS-IV procedure.
Standard errors are likely to be correlated over firms in equation 3.5, hence standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. The clustered standard errors shown in the Tables
of the chapter are the standard errors reported by Stata in the IV-2SLS estimations. As
explained in Wooldridge [2009]12, the usual 2SLS standard errors and test statistics are
indeed asymptotically valid in our two-step procedure13.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Determinants of the choice of a procedure
Table 3.7 provides results from estimating the likelihood of adopting an adapted procedure
using a logit regression. Each column represents the first-stage estimates of different
specifications over the sample used in the second step estimation.
12Page 623.
13We also computed standard errors using a bootstrap procedure. The standard errors obtained,
which are not reported in the chapter, were slightly lower than those reported in the chapter.
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Table 3.7: First-stage regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Prevalence 0.936*** 0.942*** 0.955*** 1.125*** 0.980***
(0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.182) (0.239)
ln(Population) 0.015 0.015 0.012 −0.011 0.055
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.043)
Type: county −0.258*** −0.282*** −0.289*** −0.307*** −0.302***
(0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.080) (0.100)
Type: region 0.570*** 0.596*** 0.599*** 0.660*** 0.803***
(0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.124) (0.148)
Type: agglomeration community −0.204** −0.259*** −0.268*** −0.210** −0.225*
(0.089) (0.090) (0.091) (0.094) (0.128)
Type: municipalities community −0.101 −0.120 −0.087 0.028 0.663***
(0.126) (0.128) (0.128) (0.134) (0.244)
Type: urban community −0.362*** −0.439*** −0.457*** −0.255* −0.134
(0.137) (0.139) (0.139) (0.143) (0.167)
ln(Experience) −0.177*** −0.202*** −0.202*** −0.185*** −0.169**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.068)
ln(Number of divisions) −0.257*** −0.288*** −0.009 0.050
(0.029) (0.030) (0.050) (0.067)
Sector: expertise −0.477** −1.105*** −1.123***
(0.218) (0.223) (0.317)
Sector: supplies −0.510*** −1.169*** −1.256***
(0.121) (0.131) (0.207)
Sector: services −0.758*** −1.375*** −1.528***
(0.119) (0.128) (0.198)
ln(Division_value) −0.037 −0.005
(0.034) (0.045)
ln(Total_value) −0.541*** −0.652***
(0.043) (0.058)
ln(Expected number of bidders) −0.162**
(0.064)
Constant −3.122*** −2.913*** −2.712*** 4.047*** 4.034***
(0.534) (0.535) (0.540) (0.666) (1.441)
Log-likelihood -4264 -4224 -4200 -4002 -2316
pseudo-R2 0.165 0.173 0.178 0.216 0.218
Obs 7396 7396 7396 7396 4278
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Logit estimates. The dependent variable is whether the awarding procedure
is an adapted procedure or an open auction. All columns include year dummies and industry dummies. The
omitted category of reference for the type of buyer is the city and the one for the sector are public works.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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The first line of Table 3.7 (Prevalence) shows that the correlation between the instrument
and the procedure is strong and significant at the 1% level in all specifications. The
prevalence of adapted procedures among buyers located in the same county as the buyer
in the last three months before the tender significantly increases the likelihood to opt for
an adapted procedure. In column (1), which corresponds to the regression in which we
control only for observed characteristics of buyers and time and industry fixed effects,
the coefficient of the instrument (Prevalence) is 0.936, with a standard error of 0.177.
Computing marginal effects for a buyer which is a city, in year 2014, and at mean values
of Population and Experience for cities in 2014 (respectively 80,532 inhabitants and 82
tenders) and with a firm in the construction industry, an increase in prevalence of adapted
procedures among other buyers by 10 points increases the likelihood to choose an adapted
procedure by 2.2 percentage points. When we control also for contracts characteristics,
adding the number of divisions in column (3) and the sector of the contract in column
(4), results are almost unchanged. Adding the values of the contract and of the division
(column (5)), which, as explained in section 3.4.2, can be affected by the procedure because
they represent an outcome of the procedure, and controlling for the expected number of
bidders (column (6)), which reduces the sample size, does not change the results either.
We observe that factors related to the characteristics of buyers have an important role in
the choice of the procedure. Buyers that are more experienced with tenders in general
(Experience) are more likely to use open auctions than adapted procedures. This result
directly corroborates Chong et al. [2014], which explains that experienced buyers use
auctions more frequently because they are more able to specify the characteristics of
the contract to be procured. It is also in line with Bajari et al. [2009], which explains
that specialists of the construction industry argue that competitive bidding is more often
used by buyers who are more experienced because the open auctions procedure is more
complex. Table 3.7 also shows that regions are more likely to use adapted procedures
than cities, contrary to counties and groups of cities (Agglomeration community and Urban
community).
Regarding the two variables that approximate for the complexity of the contract, namely
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the number of divisions and the value of the contract, we first see in Column (3) that
more divided contracts are less likely to be awarded through adapted procedures than less
divided contracts. In column (5), we observe that the final total value of the contract also
negatively influences the likelihood of using an adapted procedure. Values of contracts are
included in one specification to check whether the estimates are impacted by a proxy for
contract complexity. However, we should re-emphasize that values are bad controls here
because they constitute outcomes of the procedure (final bid of the winner). The number of
divisions of a contract and the value of a contract are usual proxies to control for contract
complexity (Bajari et al. [2009]). These results are in contradiction with the predictions
of the theoretical literature and with the result of Bajari et al. [2009], according to which
more complex contracts are awarded through procedures involving discretion in the private
sector. A plausible explanation is that adapted procedures are promoted because they are
less costly to organize than open auctions. Therefore, when buyers consider the ex ante
costs associated with organizing and completing a tender, and compare it to the total cost
of the project, ex ante costs represent a high share of small value contracts, leading buyers
to opt for the adapted procedure. Also, this result may be driven by the need to avoid
suspicions of corruption or favoritism for contracts of higher total values (Spiller [2008],
Moszoro and Spiller [2012]). Our results indeed confirm the result of Chong et al. [2014]
that more expensive projects are awarded via auctions, which is explained by the need
to avoid suspicions of corruption or favoritism in public procurement, especially in more
expensive projects.
Column (4) takes into account the sector of the tender (Expertise, Supplies and Services),
using the public works sector as the group of reference. The use of an adapted procedure
is significantly less likely for sectors others than public works. As contracts in this sector
usually require specifying more dimensions and contingencies than in others, the use of an
adapted procedure may therefore be helpful, particularly if there is a phase of negotiation.
Regarding the competitive environment, column (5) indicates that the higher the number
of potential bidders, the lower the likelihood of using an adapted procedure (Expected
number of bidders). This can be explained by the fact that less potential bidders make
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the use of discretion more attractive (Bajari et al. [2009]).
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3.6.2 Impact of the award mechanism on supplier selection (TFP
of selected suppliers)
Main results
Table 3.8: Second-stage regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS
Adapted procedure 0.007*** 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.028* 0.066***
(0.003) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.020)
ln(Population) −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Type: county −0.002 −0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Type: region 0.004 −0.001 −0.003 −0.004 0.001 −0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Type: agglomeration community 0.002 0.003 0.007* 0.007* 0.006 0.010*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Type: municipalities community −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012)
Type: urban community −0.012** −0.009 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
ln(Experience) −0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Number of divisions) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Sector: expertise 0.007 −0.002 0.014
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Sector: supplies −0.010 −0.019* 0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.017)
Sector: services 0.000 −0.010 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
ln(Division_value) −0.003*** −0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
ln(Total_value) −0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
ln(Expected number of bidders) 0.001
(0.002)
Constant 0.377***
(0.036)
Obs 7396 7396 7396 7396 7396 4278
Weak identification test 103.20 104.40 120.43 183.57 99.41
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the relative productivity of the firm which was
selected mit . All columns include year dummies and industry dummies. The omitted category of reference
for the type of buyer is the city and the one for the sector are public works. Column (1) is estimated by OLS
and columns (2) to (6) represent the IV-2SLS estimates. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10%
maximal IV size is 16.38. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
163
In Table 3.8, we examine the effect of using an adapted procedure on productivity. We
start by estimating equation 3.5 by OLS, regressing the relative productivity of the selected
firms on the procedures and controls for some observed characteristics of the buyers, as
well as year and industry dummies. Column (1) shows that the adapted procedure is
positively associated with the distance to the industry frontier, suggesting that adapted
procedures select on average less efficient firms. The effect is small, the coefficient being
0.007 (standard error 0.003).
To infer something on the causality between procedure and supplier selection, we focus
on our IV-2SLS estimates. We exploit the variation in the lagged prevalence of adapted
procedures among other buyers to predict the procedure selected by the buyer. Overall,
our results indicate that the adoption of an adapted procedure significantly increases
the distance to the frontier, meaning that this awarding mechanism selects less efficient
operators, whatever the specification. The power of the instrument is confirmed by the
weak identification test, where the Kleibergen-Paap statistic is well beyond the threshold
suggested by Stock et al. [2002] and Stock and Yogo [2005]. The 2SLS coefficients are
positive and significant at the 10% level.
In column (2), which corresponds to the regression in which we control only for observed
characteristics of buyers and time and industry fixed effects, the coefficient is equal to
0.052, with a standard error of 0.020. When we control also for contracts characteristics,
adding the number of division in column (3) and the sector of the contract in column (4),
results remain almost unchanged (coefficients respectively of 0.059 (standard error 0.020)
and 0.061 (standard error 0.020)). Adding the values of the contract and of the division,
which, as explained in section 3.4.2, are bad controls because they can be affected by the
procedure, lowers the coefficient and its significance (column (5)). Finally, controlling for
the expected number of bidders, which reduces the sample size, does not change the result
(coefficient 0.066 and standard error 0.020).
Our main finding is in line with Baltrunaite et al. [2018], which finds that increasing
public buyer’s discretion leads to the selection of firms with lower productivity. It is also
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consistent with the idea that open auctions is the most efficient mechanism to reveal the
actual costs of participating firms (Manelli and Vincent [1995]; Burguet and Che [2004]),
with productive firms bidding lower amounts and therefore winning tenders organized
through open auctions. If we consider that more productive firms are able to complete the
contracts at the lowest total cost for the buyer (including ex post adaptation costs) and
providing the expected quality, then, on average, open auctions seem desirable. In a wider
perspective for the economy, open auctions also direct public money towards productive
firms, which helps promoting productivity, at the level of the economy.
To understand the magnitude of the result, we look at the distribution of the mit within the
Amadeus sample in the industry that represents most of the observations of our estimation
sample, namely the construction industry. We focus on the year 2014 that has the largest
number of observations in the Amadeus sample. The distribution of the mit is graphed
in Figure 3.4. It has a mean of 0.79 and a standard deviation of 0.056. The coefficient of
interest estimated (0.052 in column (2) of Table 3.8) hence corresponds to a change in the
mit of almost one standard deviation. The implication is that the adapted procedure moves
the relative productivity of the selected firm quite a lot down the distribution compared
to open auction. Put differently, if we consider that the firm selected using an auction
procedure is at the mean of the distribution of productivities, using an adapted procedure
comparatively selects a firm that is in the first decile of the distribution of productivities.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of mit in the Amadeus sample (construction industry in
2014)
Note: The green line represents the mean of the distribution. The blue lines represent one
standard deviation from the mean. The red line represents the effect that we estimate.
Our regressions also show that as contracts get more divided (Number of divisions), less
efficient firms are selected. The interpretation of this result could be that buyers are
less performing into selecting suppliers when they must screen bids for more divisions.
We also observe that time-invariant characteristics of the buyers such as its type or size
do not impact the selection of a more productive firm, which is consistent with the idea
that buyers perform differently depending on the tender at hand and not on their general
characteristics.
Heterogeneity by sector
In Tables 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11, we look at whether the effects of the adapted procedure are
heterogeneous across different sectors.
Table 3.9 distinguishes the effect between tenders related to public works (76% of the
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estimation sample) and other types of tenders.
Table 3.9: Second-stage regressions - Heterogeneous effect for public works and other
types of tenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS
Adapted procedure 0.002 −0.061 0.001 −0.047* −0.043
(0.007) (0.042) (0.034) (0.027) (0.042)
Adapted procedure x Public Works 0.006 0.097*** 0.050** 0.074*** 0.103***
(0.008) (0.031) (0.025) (0.022) (0.035)
Public Works 0.014** −0.022* −0.012 −0.012 −0.043***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015)
ln(Population) −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Type: county −0.002 −0.003 0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Type: region 0.004 0.001 −0.002 0.002 −0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Type: agglomeration community 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Type: municipalities community −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
Type: urban community −0.013** −0.014** −0.007 −0.007 −0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
ln(Experience) −0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Number of divisions) 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Division_value) −0.004*** −0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
ln(Total_value) −0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.003)
ln(Expected number of bidders) 0.001
(0.002)
Constant 0.369*** 0.397*** 0.376*** 0.450*** 0.489***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.039) (0.042)
Obs 7396 7396 7396 7396 4278
F-stat 48 47 52 48 33
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the relative productivity of the firm which was
selected mit . All columns include year dummies and industry dummies. The omitted category of reference for
the type of buyer is the city. Column (1) is estimated by OLS and columns (2) to (5) represent the IV-2SLS
estimates. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Columns (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Table 3.9 show that the effect of the adapted procedure
differs between tenders related to public works and other types of tenders. The coefficient
of Adapted procedure reflects the effect of using an adapted procedure in tenders not
related to public works. The coefficient Adapted procedure × Public Works represents the
additional effect in tenders concerning public works. We cannot reject the hypothesis that
the coefficient of Adapted procedure is different from zero. On the contrary, the effect
of the adapted procedure in tenders concerning public works is similar to the average
effect (positive and statistically significant, coefficient 0.097 with standard error of 0.031
in column (2) and coefficient 0.050 with standard error of 0.025 in column (3)), which is
not surprising since public works constitute 76% of the observations in the sample. Hence
our main results seem to be mainly driven by public works14.
14Interacting Adapted Procedure with the NACE Rev.2 classification of winning firms reveals also
that the effect that we estimate comes mainly from companies active in the construction industry
rather than in other sectors.
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Table 3.10: Second-stage regressions - Heterogeneous effect by sector and value of
tenders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS
Adapted procedure 0.002 −0.072* −0.043 −0.050* −0.037
0.007 (0.041) (0.036) (0.028) (0.041)
Adapted procedure x Small public Works 0.002 0.094*** 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.098***
(below threholds) (0.008) (0.031) (0.028) (0.024) (0.035)
Adapted procedure x Large public Works 0.008 0.104*** 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.099***
(above threholds) (0.008) (0.031) (0.028) (0.023) (0.035)
Small public Works 0.016** −0.020* −0.014 −0.013 −0.040**
(below threholds) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016)
Public Works 0.013* −0.022* −0.022** −0.010 −0.045***
(above threholds) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016)
ln(Population) −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Type: county −0.002 −0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Type: region 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.002 −0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Type: agglomeration community 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Type: municipalities community −0.003 −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
Type: urban community −0.012** −0.015** −0.009 −0.007 −0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
ln(Experience) −0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Number of divisions) 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Division_value) −0.004*** −0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
ln(Total_value) −0.004 0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
ln(Expected number of bidders) 0.001
(0.002)
Obs 7396 7396 7396 7396 4278
F-stat 45 44 48 46 32
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the relative productivity of the firm which was
selected mit . All columns include year dummies and industry dummies. The omitted category of reference
for the type of buyer is the city and the one for the sector is other sectors than public works. Column (1) is
estimated by OLS and columns (2) to (5) represent the IV-2SLS estimates. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level.
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In Table 3.10, we investigate whether the effect that we find for public works is driven
by the values of contracts in public works exceeding the values of contracts in other
sectors since the thresholds set by the European Commission above which formalized
open auction procedures are compulsory are much higher in public works than in other
sectors (see Table 3.1). We estimate the effect of using an adapted procedure distinguishing
tenders concerning public works which are below the thresholds for other types of tenders
(approximately below e200,000), above the thresholds for other types of tenders and
tenders concerning other sectors than public works. The analysis is flawed by the fact
that our measures of the values of the contracts are the final bids of winners and are hence
potentially affected by the procedure chosen. It nevertheless gives an indication of whether
the result is driven by high value contracts or not. All the IV-2SLS estimates of Table
3.10 show that the effect of Adapted Procedure is similar for tenders in public works which
are above the thresholds set by the European Commission and below the thresholds set
by the European Commission (coefficients of respectively 0.104 and 0.094 in column (2)
and standard errors of 0.031 and 0.031 respectively). These results suggest that our main
result is not driven only by high value contracts in public works but also by small value
contracts in public works. The difference of effects between tenders in public works and
other tenders hence does not come from differences in values but rather from differences
between types of tenders.
In Table 3.11, we further investigate the heterogeneity of the effects among tenders which
are not public works. We look at whether the effects of the adapted procedure are het-
erogeneous across different types of tenders, where types correspond to sectors, namely
public works (76% of the estimation sample), expertise and studies (3%), supplies (11%)
and services (10%). Public works correspond to construction, renovation and mainte-
nance of public buildings. Expertise and studies correspond mainly to support for project
management in construction and diverse studies. Supplies include any equipment, food
or product. Services include printing of documents, public transport, cleaning services,
insurance services, gardening services, etc.
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Table 3.11: Second-stage regressions - Heterogeneous effect by sector of the contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS
Adapted procedure 0.008*** 0.030 0.049** 0.023 0.058***
(0.003) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019)
Adapted procedure x Expertise −0.003 −0.073*** −0.046*** −0.053*** −0.035
(0.007) (0.024) (0.016) (0.020) (0.036)
Adapted procedure x Services −0.021 −0.141*** −0.072*** −0.108*** −0.142***
(0.013) (0.038) (0.027) (0.028) (0.043)
Adapted procedure x Supplies 0.007 −0.077 −0.033 −0.056 −0.105
(0.013) (0.050) (0.045) (0.038) (0.070)
ln(Population) −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Type: county −0.002 −0.004 −0.000 −0.002 −0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Type: region 0.004 0.001 −0.002 0.002 −0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Type: agglomeration community 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.010*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Type: municipalities community −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013)
Type: urban community −0.013** −0.016** −0.008 −0.008 −0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
ln(Experience) −0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln(Number of divisions) 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Sector: expertise −0.004 0.022* 0.022** 0.014 0.018
(0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.024)
Sector: supplies −0.023** 0.008 0.000 −0.001 0.041*
(0.010) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.025)
Sector: services −0.006 0.037*** 0.023** 0.025** 0.049***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017)
ln(Division_value) −0.004*** −0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
ln(Total_value) −0.003 0.000
(0.002) (0.003)
ln(Expected number of bidders) 0.001
(0.002)
Constant 0.384*** 0.377*** 0.366*** 0.445*** 0.449***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.042) (0.046)
Obs 7396 7396 7396 7396 4278
F-stat 45 40 46 42 29
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the relative productivity of the firm which was
selected mit . All columns include year dummies and industry dummies. The omitted category of reference for
the type of buyer is the city and the one for the sector are public works. Column (1) is estimated by OLS and
columns (2) to (5) represent the IV-2SLS estimates. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Columns (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Table 3.11 show that the effect of the adapted procedure is
heterogeneous across sectors. The baseline coefficient (Adapted procedure) represents the
effect in public works. It is positive and statistically significant in columns (3) and (5) and
positive and non significant in columns (2) and (4). Column (2) shows that the additional
effect of the adapted procedure is negative and significant in expertise (coefficient of -
0.073) and in services (coefficient of -0.141), meaning that, in these sectors, the adapted
procedure selects relatively more productive firms than open auctions. The effect for
supplies is not statistically significantly different from the one estimated for public works,
but the points estimates are all negative, which suggests that the effect of the adapted
procedure compared to an open auction is the same or smaller in supplies than in public
works.
If we consider that more productive firms are able to complete the contracts at the lowest
total cost for the buyer (including ex post adaptation costs) and providing the expected
quality, the result for expertise and services is consistent with the idea that when goods and
services are customized to the need of the buyer, which is the case in the sectors of studies
and services, introducing discretion can lead to better overall outcomes. Additionally,
since supplies are usually associated with low-complexity, the fact that open auction is a
better selection mechanism is also consistent with the literature.
Public works are considered rather complex contracts which are subject to unexpected
events and renegotiations. Yet, the effect is positive, meaning that the adapted procedure
is a worst selection mechanism than open auction in terms of productivity of the selected
supplier. We have shown further that this result is not driven only by small value contracts
but also by high value contracts. Hence in contracts concerning public works, introducing
discretion leads to the selection of less efficient firms, both in high and low value contracts.
3.6.3 Robustness checks
We test the robustness of our main results using different specifications. We modify the
variable of interest by using labor productivity and measures of TFPs computed using the
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approach proposed by Wooldridge [2009] instead of the approach of Levinsohn and Petrin
[2003] (see Tables 3.12 and 3.13).
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Table 3.12: Robustness - Labor productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS
Adapted procedure −0.000 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.069*** 0.024* 0.024
(0.002) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.014) (0.019)
ln(Population) −0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Type: county 0.005* 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.007** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Type: region 0.002 −0.001 −0.002 −0.003 0.000 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Type: agglomeration community 0.003 0.006 0.007* 0.007* 0.005 0.009*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Type: municipalities community 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 −0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Type: urban community 0.005 0.008 0.010* 0.010* 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
ln(Experience) −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
ln(Number of divisions) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Sector: expertise 0.014 0.009 0.015
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Sector: supplies 0.000 −0.003 0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Sector: services −0.000 −0.005 0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
ln(Division_value) 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
ln(Total_value) 0.000 0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
ln(Expected number of bidders) 0.003
(0.002)
Constant 0.862*** 0.847*** 0.842*** 0.841*** 0.845***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.032)
Obs 3635 3601 3601 3601 3601 2085
F-stat 8.10 5.37 6.12 5.71 7.23 3.09
Weak identification test 60.65 58.35 61.41 84.83 31.94
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the relative productivity of the firm which was
selected mit . All columns include year dummies and industry dummies. The omitted category of reference
for the type of buyer is the city and the one for the sector are public works. Column (1) is estimated by OLS
and columns (2) to (6) represent the IV-2SLS estimates. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10%
maximal IV size is 16.38. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table 3.13: Robustness - TFP estimated with Wooldridge’s approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS
Adapted procedure 0.007*** 0.046** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.025* 0.061***
(0.002) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019)
ln(Population) −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Type: county −0.002 −0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Type: region 0.004 −0.001 −0.003 −0.003 0.001 −0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Type: agglomeration community 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.009*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Type: municipalities community −0.004 −0.003 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002 −0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012)
Type: urban community −0.011* −0.008 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
ln(Experience) −0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(Number of divisions) 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sector: expertise 0.006 −0.001 0.013
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
Sector: supplies −0.011 −0.019* 0.010
(0.009) (0.010) (0.017)
Sector: services −0.000 −0.009 0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
ln(Division_value) −0.003*** −0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
ln(Total_value) −0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.003)
ln(Expected number of bidders) 0.001
(0.002)
Constant 0.406*** 0.407*** 0.393*** 0.397*** 0.460*** 0.469***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.040) (0.044)
Obs 7441 7396 7396 7396 7396 4278
F-stat 49.52 51.28 53.64 49.76 48.37 31.79
Weak identification test 103.20 104.40 120.43 183.57 99.41
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the relative productivity of the firm which was
selected mit . All columns include year dummies and industry dummies. The omitted category of reference
for the type of buyer is the city and the one for the sector are public works. Column (1) is estimated by OLS
and columns (2) to (6) represent the IV-2SLS estimates. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10%
maximal IV size is 16.38. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
In Table 3.12, firm’s productivity is measured using labor productivity rather than TFP.
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Results show that the effect of our main variable of interest Adapted procedure is of similar
magnitude and significance level as the estimates from Table 3.8. In Table 3.13, TFP
was calculated with the method which was developed by Wooldridge [2009]. Our results
demonstrate a very strong robustness since our explanatory variable shows very strong
similarities in terms of both sign, magnitude and significance.
3.7 Discussion
We have identified three channels which could explain our main result. First, it could be
that firms self-select in some specific procedures. Second, it could be that buyers invite
only some specific types of firms to bid in adapted procedures. Third, it could be that
pools of bidders contain the most productive firms in both types of procedures but that
the screening of firms leads to different outcomes.
Given the cost associated with keeping up with new tenders and the fact that the adapted
procedure allows buyers to choose where to advertise, adapted procedures could attract
fewer bidders. On the other side, one of the purposes of the adapted procedure is to attract
SMEs and young firms as ex ante costs associated with submitting bids are lower in adapted
procedures than in formalized procedures. Hence adapted procedures could attract more
bidders and bidders with different characteristics than open auctions. Additionally, the
adapted procedure allows for the ex ante selection of a pool of invited firms to participate to
the tender, which would also result in the restriction of competition in adapted procedures.
To discriminate between these channels, we would ideally need the identities of all the
bidders in the tenders to compare the pool of bidders in the two procedures. However
this information is not available in our dataset. We hence look at the information that is
available in our dataset, which is the number of bidders in tenders and the characteristics
of the winners. We first assess the effect of the procedure over the number of participants
in the tender. In a second step, we compare the characteristics of the winning firms.
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3.7.1 Adapted procedure and number of bidders
In Table 3.14, we examine the effect of using an adapted procedure on the number of
bidders. We start by estimating the equation using a Poisson regression, regressing the
number of bidders on the procedures and controls for some observed characteristics of
the buyers and the tender, as well as year-dummies. This specification is standard when
the dependent variable is a count one (and the dependent variable is not over dispersed).
Column (1) shows that the adapted procedure is not associated with the number of bidders.
The effect is indeed small and not statistically significant (coefficient -0.038, standard error
0.028).
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Table 3.14: Regression over the number of participants
(1) (2)
Poisson IV-Poisson
Adapted procedure −0.038 0.287
(0.028) (0.365)
ln(Population) 0.015 0.013
(0.021) (0.018)
Type: county 0.055 0.073
(0.048) (0.045)
Type: region −0.051 −0.094
(0.066) (0.094)
Type: agglomeration community 0.014 0.028
(0.046) (0.053)
Type: municipalities community −0.105* −0.098
(0.061) (0.063)
Type: urban community 0.035 0.070
(0.079) (0.100)
ln(Experience) −0.049* −0.037
(0.026) (0.030)
Sector: expertise 0.269*** 0.291***
(0.053) (0.060)
Sector: supplies −0.137*** −0.096
(0.038) (0.062)
Sector: services −0.131*** −0.070
(0.040) (0.086)
ln(Number of divisions) 0.058*** 0.075***
(0.019) (0.029)
Constant 1.946*** 1.854***
(0.171) (0.185)
Obs 7396 7396
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the number of bidders. All columns include
year dummies. The omitted category of reference for the type of buyer is the city and the one for the sector
are public works. Column (1) is estimated by Poisson and column (2) represent the IV-Poisson estimates.
Standard errors are clustered at the buyer level.
In order to infer something on the causality between procedure and number of bidders,
we focus on our Poisson-2SLS estimate. First, the competitive environment is likely to
influence the choice of an awarding mechanism, yielding concerns for the presence of
reverse causality. In particular, using open auctions generates more benefits when the
degree of competition is high. Also, it is highly possible that our specification suffers from
an omitted variable bias. Some unobserved factors explaining the adoption of an adapted
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procedure could also be correlated with the number of bidders, in particular contract-
specific characteristics. Therefore, we use a two-step procedure where we first regress the
choice of the procedure over a set of explanatory variables. In a second step, we run an IV
Poisson using the same instrument as in the main analysis. Column (2) shows that there
is no significant effect of using an adapted procedure over the total number of participants
to the tender.
We therefore conclude that our main result, namely that adapted procedures select less
efficient firms, is not driven by a change in the size of the pool of bidders.
3.7.2 Adapted procedure and characteristics of winners
The dataset does not allow us to examine the characteristics of bidders between types of
selection procedure because we do not have any information on all bidders. We are only
able to look at the effect of procedures on supplier selection using observable characteristics
of suppliers. The idea is to examine whether the differences in productivity observed in
open auctions and adapted procedures come from observable characteristics of firms.
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Table 3.15: Effect of the selection procedure on firm’s characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(turnover) ln(profit) Age (in years) ln(distance)
Adapted procedure −0.437 −0.289 −2.906 −0.306
(0.280) (0.372) (3.341) (0.366)
ln(Population) 0.000 0.010 −0.006 −0.051**
(0.030) (0.029) (0.315) (0.023)
Type: county −0.002 −0.003 −1.510** 0.226***
(0.059) (0.077) (0.671) (0.066)
Type: region −0.106 −0.115 −0.462 0.622***
(0.085) (0.113) (1.049) (0.103)
Type: agglomeration community −0.038 −0.054 0.322 0.061
(0.052) (0.076) (0.747) (0.075)
Type: municipalities community 0.051 0.102 0.057 0.132
(0.078) (0.100) (1.047) (0.087)
Type: urban community 0.281** 0.160 −0.467 0.009
(0.121) (0.127) (1.726) (0.134)
ln(Experience) −0.015 0.027 0.183 0.071**
(0.033) (0.037) (0.361) (0.032)
ln(Number of divisions) −0.292*** −0.257*** −0.353 −0.029
(0.032) (0.038) (0.349) (0.034)
Sector: expertise −0.251** −0.139 −4.241*** 0.006
(0.112) (0.163) (1.290) (0.191)
Sector: supplies 0.241** 0.076 1.704 0.662***
(0.104) (0.138) (1.354) (0.119)
Sector: services 0.040 −0.056 −0.678 0.423***
(0.103) (0.137) (1.184) (0.109)
Constant 15.094*** 11.183*** 31.613*** 3.977***
(0.293) (0.441) (4.043) (0.328)
Obs 7396 6696 7396 6461
F-stat 8.13 7.30 6.45 19.08
Weak identification test 94.63 102.60 94.63 84.03
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is ln(turnover) in column (1), ln(profit) in
column(2), age in years in column (3) and ln(distance) in column (4). All columns include year dummies and
industry dummies. The omitted category of reference for the type of buyer is the city and the one for the sector
are public works. All columns represent the IV-2SLS estimates. The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:
10% maximal IV size is 16.38. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
As for the examination of productivity, we are concerned that our specification suffers from
an endogeneity problem. Therefore, the coefficients reported in this section are estimated
using a two-step procedure with the prevalence of adapted procedures among other buyers
as the instrument. Results from the IV regressions are displayed in Table 3.15. It shows
that using an adapted procedure does not lead to the selection of a firm with a smaller
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turnover (column (1)), less profits (column (2)), younger (column (3)) or closer to the
buyer in distance (column (4)), since none of the coefficients are significant at the 10%
minimum statistical level.
Since one of the main objectives of the implementation of adapted procedures is to foster
the entry of SMEs and new firms in the public procurement market, we expect these types
of firms to be more likely to win in this procedure. This is not the case in our dataset. A
plausible explanation is that our dataset almost exclusively contains SMEs, since the 95th
percentile of the distribution of turnovers in the sample is e37 million, SMEs being usually
characterized as companies with turnovers below e50 million. Moreover, the minimum age
of the firms observed in the sample is 3.5 years so that it does not contain new entrants,
namely firms that are selected in a tender during their first year of activity.
The results displayed in Table 3.15 indicate that the difference in productivity observed
among winning firms does not come from buyers targeting some firms with specific ob-
servable characteristics (small companies, new entrants or local companies) with the use
of adapted procedures. Combined with the fact that the number of bidders is similar in
both types of procedures, this suggests that buyers do not restrict the pool of bidders to
some firms with specific observable characteristics in adapted procedures (in terms of age,
size, profitability or localization at least).
Therefore, the effect that we observe may either come from pure discretion in the screening
process or firms self-selecting into the type of procedure they participate in. Self-selection
into procedures by firms would drive our result if the most productive firms did not bid in
adapted procedures. However, there does not seem to be any reason why a productive firm
that participates in open auctions would not do so in the case of adapted procedures since
participating in open auctions is more costly than participating in adapted procedures.
This suggests that our result is driven by the pure effect of discretion in the screening of
firms, even if one would need to deepen the analysis by looking at the bidders in different
types of procedures to draw a definite conclusion.
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3.8 Conclusion
This chapter compares the productivity of suppliers selected in competitive tenders orga-
nized by public buyers using two different types of procedures. We evaluate whether an
award procedure that increases discretion results in the selection of more or less productive
firms. The question we address is hence that of the effect of discretion over the selection
of suppliers.
Our main result, which is robust to several specifications and tests presented in the chap-
ter, indicates that the adoption of an adapted procedure significantly increases the distance
to the efficiency frontier, meaning that this awarding mechanism selects less efficient oper-
ators, resulting in an inefficient allocation of public funds towards less efficient firms. We
provide some evidence in the last section of the chapter that it is driven by the pure effect
of discretion in the screening of firms, even if one would need to deepen the analysis by
looking at the bidders in different types of procedures to draw a definite conclusion.
We have identified two reasons to explain why public buyers select less efficient firms in
adapted procedures. The first possible reason is that the public buyer chooses a procedure
with increased discretion in order to be able to select a firm that he wishes to favor (for
example if the public buyer is corrupted) so that the public buyer does not even try to
select an efficient firm. The second possible reason comes from the purpose of the adapted
procedure, which is to be adaptable to the circumstances of the purchase in order to save
on ex ante transaction costs, including publication costs or screening costs. In this case,
a public buyer would select a less efficient firm using the adapted procedure because he
would spend less in the selection process. Put differently, the loss in productivity could
be seen as the cost of reduced ex ante transaction costs.
If the selection of more productive firms is more likely to lead to lowered costs and/or better
quality outcomes, discretion is potentially in contradiction with the primary objective of
public procurement, which is to get the best outcome at the lowest price. However, one
would have to balance the ex ante transaction costs, which we do not observe, with the
182
3.8. Conclusion
ex post outcomes of the procedures to conclude on whether increasing discretion in public
tenders is, on average, beneficial. The implication of our result in terms of policy is that
a procedure that would enable to avoid the trade-off between a loss in efficiency through
the selection of less efficient firms and high ex ante transaction costs could improve the
overall efficiency of public procurement. Such procedure would preserve a high degree of
competition between firms and at the same time involve low ex ante costs and barriers
to entry. The other implication of the result is that discretion is also in contradiction
with one potential secondary objective of public procurement, which would be to promote
productivity. We also show that the experience of the buyer, the complexity of the contract
and the competitiveness of the environment are all positively associated with the use of
open auctions.
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A1. Descriptive Statistics on the Amadeus sample
Appendices
A1 Descriptive Statistics on the Amadeus sample
In the main analysis presented in the chapter, we use measures of TFP computed using
an unbalanced sample of 1,252,194 firms covering the period 2005-2016. Table 16 presents
the sectoral distribution of firms in this sample. Table 17 provides summary statistics on
key variables used in the estimations of the production functions.
All variables entering the production functions were deflated using industry specific in-
dices. We used indices provided in the EU KLEMS database. All these indices are specific
to France and available at the two-digit NACE Rev 2 level. Value-added was deflated using
the gross value-added price index, wages were deflated using an index of the compensation
of employees, capital, defined as tangible assets, was deflated using the gross fixed capi-
tal formation index and materials, which correspond to intermediate consumption, were
deflated using the intermediate inputs price index.
Table 16: Sector distribution of firms in Amadeus - Main estimation sample
Sector Number of firms Mean Mean Mean Mean
in 2014 deflated value-added deflated wages deflated capital deflated materials
(ke) (ke) (ke) (ke)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1,424 786 576 954 1,836
Mining industry 277 712 640 1,304 2,170
Manufacturing industry 22,835 2,487 1,863 1,103 5,863
Water production and distribution; sanitation, waste management and pollution 1,087 1,966 1,421 1,589 4,996
construction 20,327 1,112 969 210 2,640
Trade; repair of automobiles and motorcycles 53,809 996 703 325 5,465
Transport and storage 7,192 1,917 1,533 746 3,615
Accommodation and catering 7,570 862 613 648 1,023
Information and communication 3,462 2,869 1,995 438 3,488
Financial and insurance activities 2,707 5,589 3,836 2,942 13,479
Real estate activities 1,053 599 555 391 939
Specialized, scientific and technical activities 8,673 2,368 1,714 523 3,463
Activities of administrative and support services 5,413 2,298 1,740 449 2,571
Education 784 1,415 1,162 406 1,341
Human health and social action 3,670 2,318 1,733 722 1,815
Arts, entertainment and recreation 1,034 1,873 1,262 1,119 1,745
Other service activities 902 1,319 996 427 1,364
Table 17: Statistics on the Amadeus dataset - Main estimation sample
Variable Number of observations Mean SD Min Max
Capital (kEuros) 1,252,194 573 2,005 1 36,534
Number of employees 549,819 40 76 1 2,823
Wages (kEuros) 1,252,194 1,241 2,472 8 29,294
Materials (kEuros) 1,252,194 4,515 10,591 88 145,349
Value-added (kEuros) 1,252,194 1,652 3,286 72 48,363
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A2 Measures of total factor productivity
Total factor productivity (TFP) is computed estimating production functions relating
output to inputs of firms. In the standard theory, the inputs considered are capital (which
includes for example buildings) and factors of productions such as number of workers and
materials. Output is either a measure of value-added or a measure of revenues of the firm.
In this chapter, we estimate value-added production functions so that our measure of TFP
reflects the contribution of each firm to the economy, holding factors inputs constant.
We estimate the Cobb-Douglas production function presented in equation 6 for each indus-
try, industries being defined according to the broad structure of the NACE Rev.2 industry
classification presented in Table 18.
Table 18: Broad structure of NACE Rev. 2
Section Title
1 Agriculture, forestry and fishing
2 Mining and quarrying
3 Manufacturing
4 Electricity, gas, stream and air conditioning supply
5 Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities
6 Construction
7 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
8 Transportation and storage
9 Accommodation and food service activities
10 Information and communication
11 Financial and insurance activities
12 Real estate activities
13 Professional, scientific and technical activities
14 Administrative and support service activities
15 Public Administration and defence; compulsory social security
16 Education
17 Human health and social work activities
18 Arts, entertainment and recreation
19 Other service activities
20 Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and
services-producing activities of households for own use
Yit = AitL
βl
it K
βk
it (6)
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where Yit is the value-added of firm i at time t, Lit is labor, Kit is capital and Ait is
the Hicksian neutral efficiency level of firm i in period t. βl and βk are the parameters
to estimate. The value-added and capital measures are measured in values. Labor is
measured by wages.
Taking logs we obtain equation 7:
yit = α + βllit + βkkit + wit + ηit (7)
where yit ≡ ln(Yit), lit ≡ ln(Lit), kit ≡ ln(Kit) and ln(Ait) = α + wit + ηit. α measures
the mean efficiency level across firms, wit is firm i’s productivity in year t and ηit is the
idiosyncratic error of firm i in year t. The key difference between wit and ηit is that
wit affects firms’ input demand so it refers to factors predictable by the firm (such as
managerial ability) whereas ηit does not. ηit includes unexpected deviations from the
mean due to measurement errors, unexpected delays or other unexpected situations.
There is a large and active empirical literature that estimates production functions. This
literature shows that the use of OLS is inappropriate. The main problem with OLS
is that of simultaneity. OLS treats labor, capital and material as exogenous variables,
meaning that they are determined independently of productivity. However if firms observe
some productivity shocks which are not observed by the econometrician and that this
affects decisions concerning input levels (hiring), estimated coefficients are biased. The
literature shows that firm-level fixed effects do not solve the problem because time-varying
productivity shocks can affect a firm’s input decisions. Several procedures have been
proposed in the literature to overcome this problem (see for instance Olley and Pakes
[1996], Blundell and Bond [2000] or Levinsohn and Petrin [2003]). To solve the simultaneity
problem, we resort to the procedure suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin [2003], which
estimates the production function in two steps and uses intermediate inputs (materials
and energy) as a proxy for unobserved productivity. This procedure extends the procedure
of Olley and Pakes [1996] which relies on investment to proxy for unobserved productivity
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shocks. To test the robustness of our results, we also use the more recent approach
proposed by Wooldridge [2009] which combines the two steps used in the Olley and Pakes
[1996] or Levinsohn and Petrin [2003] methods into one single step using GMM thereby
allowing to overcome some potential identification issues related to the approaches of Olley
and Pakes [1996] and Levinsohn and Petrin [2003].
Another difficulty in the estimation of production functions comes from entry and exit of
firms, which potentially creates a selection bias. The bias comes from the fact that firms
decide the allocation of inputs in a given period conditional on their survival and that
firm with a higher capital stock will be able to survive with a lower productivity level,
creating a bias in the capital coefficient. Olley and Pakes [1996] proposed a method to
take into account this bias. However in the Amadeus dataset, firms are automatically
removed if they do not report information during the last five years. We are not able to
distinguish exit from the sample from exit from the economy. We are hence not able to
account explicitly for exit in the analysis. However very small changes in the production
function coefficients are generally found after implementing the correction for the selection
bias (see de Loecker [2011] and Van Beveren [2012]).
The estimation of production functions also faces a difficulty referred to as the omitted
price problem. Most datasets, including Amadeus, report neither value-added nor capital
in value or firm-level prices, hence deflated value-added and capital are used as measures
of output and input. The use of deflated value-added means that unobserved differences
in prices that deviate from the industry average price are buried in the residual term. In
practice, there is a high correlation between these two measures as shown by Foster et al.
[2008] which has data on plant level input and output prices. It is hence unclear whether
using measures in volume would make too much of a practical difference to our results.
We consider alternative ways to estimate TFP : we use the approaches by Levinsohn and
Petrin [2003] and Wooldridge [2009]. We estimate TFP by industry (defined at the broad
NACE Rev.2 level). Results of the coefficients on labor and capital obtained for each
industry using the 10-year unbalanced panel, to which we apply the Levinsohn Petrin
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approach, are reported respectively in Figures 5 and 6. Depending on the industry, co-
efficients on labor obtained range between 0.70 and 0.85 while coefficients on capital fall
between 0.01 and 0.08.
Figure 5: Coefficients on ln(labour)
189
Figure 6: Coefficients on ln(capital)
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Essays on Decision Theory and Economic Efficiency
Abstract. This doctoral thesis focuses on two distinct themes: decision-making in situ-
ations of risk and economic efficiency. These two questions are treated in an empirical
framework using unique databases. The first chapter tests the theoretical models of deci-
sion under risk on bets on horseraces to identify the theory that allows the best description
of individuals’ choices. This chapter shows that behavioral theories of decision under risk
(cumulative prospect theory and rank-dependent utility) are better suited to explain the
behavior of bettors observed in the data than the expected utility theory. The second
chapter estimates the effect of a merger between two large companies in the urban trans-
port sector in France on their costs. The results show that the merger did not result
in efficiency gains for the merging parties. This result can be understood in light of the
context in which the merger was conducted, in particular the reasons for the choice of
the target, the perception of customers and employees of the merger, the differences in
culture between the companies and the operational preparation of the merger. The third
chapter examines the impact of greater discretion in tendering procedures on the selec-
tion of operators, particularly their productivity. The main result is that the procedure
that potentially increases the discretion of public purchasers leads to the selection of less
efficient companies than a procedure involving little or no discretion. Further analyzes
suggest that the result is due to the effect of greater discretion at the screening stage.
Keywords: Decision-making, Merger ex post evaluation, Cost efficiencies, Award proce-
dure, Productivity, Public procurement.
Essais sur la théorie de la décision et l’efficacité économique
Résumé. Cette thèse de doctorat s’intéresse à deux thèmes distincts : la prise de déci-
sion en situation de risque et l’efficacité économique. Ces deux questions sont traitées
dans un cadre empirique en utilisant des bases de données uniques. Le premier chapitre
teste les modèles théoriques de décision en situation de risque sur des données réelles de
paris hippiques pour identifier la théorie qui permet la meilleure description des choix
des individus. Ce chapitre montre que les théories comportementales de la décision en
situation de risque (théorie des perspectives cumulées et modèle de l’utilité dépendante
du rang) sont mieux adaptées pour expliquer le comportement des parieurs observé dans
les données que la théorie de l’utilité espérée. Le second chapitre estime l’effet d’une con-
centration entre deux grandes entreprises du secteur des transports urbains en France sur
leurs coûts. Les résultats obtenus mettent en évidence que la fusion n’a pas entraîné de
gains d’efficacité pour les parties à la fusion. Ce résultat s’explique notamment par le
contexte dans lequel la fusion a été menée, en particulier les raisons du choix de la cible,
la perception des clients et des employés de la fusion, les différences de culture entre les
entreprises et la préparation opérationnelle de l’opération. Le troisième chapitre examine
l’impact d’une plus grande discrétion dans les procédures d’appels d’offres sur la sélection
des opérateurs, en particulier leur productivité. Le résultat principal est que la procé-
dure qui accroit potentiellement le pouvoir discrétionnaire des acheteurs publics conduit
à la sélection d’entreprises moins efficaces qu’une procédure n’impliquant pas ou peu de
discrétion. Nos analyses complémentaires suggèrent que le résultat s’explique par l’effet
d’une plus grande discrétion à l’étape de sélection des entreprises.
Mots-clés : Prise de décision, Évaluation ex post des fusions, Gains d’efficacité, Procédure
d’attribution, Productivité, Marchés publics.
